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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the economic effects of cultural diversity; it focuses on recent 
experience in British cities, and on links between migrant and minority communities, 
diversity and innovation. Like many western societies Britain is becoming more culturally 
diverse, a largely urban process driven by net immigration and growing minority 
communities. Despite significant public interest we know little about the economic impacts. 
This PhD aims to fill these major gaps. 
 
First, I explore connections between diversity, immigration and urban outcomes. I 
ask: does diversity help or hinder urban economic performance? Initial cross-sectional 
analysis finds positive associations between ‘super-diversity’ and urban wages. Using 
panel data and instruments to establish causality, I find that net immigration helps raise 
native productivity, especially for high-skilled workers, but may help exclude lower-skill 
natives from employment opportunities. De-industrialisation and casualization of entry-
level occupations partly explain the employment results.  
 
Next I investigate links between co-ethnic groups, cultural diversity and innovation. 
I explore effects of co-ethnic and diverse inventor groups on individual members’ patenting 
rates, using patents microdata and a novel name classification system. Controlling for 
individuals’ human capital, I find small positive effects of South Asian and Southern 
European co-ethnic membership. Overall group diversity also helps raise individual 
inventors’ productivity. I find mixed evidence of effects on majority patenting.  
 
I then explore the case of London in detail, using a unique survey of the capital’s 
firms. I ask: does organisational diversity or migrant/ethnic ownership influence firms’ 
product and process innovation? Results show small positive effects of diverse 
managements on ideas generation. Diverse firms are more likely than homogenous firms 
to sell into London’s large, cosmopolitan home markets as well as into international 
markets. Migrant entrepreneurship helps explain the main result.  
 
Together, these papers make important contributions to a small but growing 
literature on diversity, innovation and economic development. 
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Introduction, critical discussion and conclusion  
 
 
1. Introduction   
 
This thesis explores the economic impacts of cultural diversity: it focuses on recent 
experience in British cities, and on links between migrant and minority communities, 
diversity and innovation. Like many Western societies Britain is becoming more culturally 
diverse, a largely urban process driven by net immigration and growing minority 
communities. These are issues of great importance for the public, business and 
policymakers. However, we know little about the real economic impacts of immigration and 
diversity, and little about which policy choices maximise welfare in these areas. The thesis 
aims to fill these important gaps; it comprises four papers, which form the subsequent 
chapters of the document.  
 
This introductory chapter provides an overview and synthesis. I begin with a brief 
discussion of some basic concepts and the UK policy context. Next, I survey academic 
perspectives on cities and cultural diversity, before introducing economic frameworks in 
more detail. I identify three main research questions and outline the metastructure of my 
primary research. I provide brief summaries of each paper’s methods, results and 
contribution, before concluding with some more general thoughts and lessons for 
policymakers.    
 
 
2. Background and motivation  
 
 
There is a vast and sprawling literature on cities and cultural diversity, covering (among 
others) historical, ethnographic, sociological, social capital, urbanist and post-colonial 
perspectives, as well as a large body of economic research. The economic literature has 
been dominated by two major debates. First, labour economists have developed a large 
literature on both the migration decision, and the effects of immigration on sending and 
receiving countries. In the case of receiving countries, analysis has largely focused on 
labour market impacts for natives, and on broader social and economic outcomes for 
migrants (‘immigrant integration’) (Dustmann et al., 2008, Kerr and Kerr, 2011). Second, in 
the development and economic growth fields a number of country-level studies have 
explored the impact of cultural, ethnic and linguistic divisions on long term economic, 
social and political outcomes (Ranis, 2009, Fernandez, 2010).   
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Four strands of current thinking on growth and economic development suggest the 
potential for a broader approach.  First, endogenous growth theories highlight the 
importance of human capital in driving productivity and long term growth, and in sustaining 
spatial disparities (Romer, 1990). Second, research in economic geography highlights 
cities’ productivity-enhancing functions, in particular via knowledge spillovers and 
economic diversity (Jacobs, 1969, Duranton and Puga, 2001). Third, theoretical and 
experimental studies suggest that the diversity of economic agents may accelerate the 
creation of knowledge, or improve the quality of ideas (Page, 2007, Berliant and Fujita, 
2009). Fourth, these studies also suggest co-ethnicity and diversity channels may be 
amplified in urban areas through agglomeration effects, large migrant/minority 
communities and a cosmopolitan city population’s taste for new and diverse goods and 
services.  
 
In recent years a small number of empirical studies have started to combine these 
elements. For example, in spatial economics, Ottaviano and Peri (2005a, 2006) have 
explored the effects of cultural and linguistic diversity on urban economic performance. In 
economic sociology Saxenian (2006) has investigated the role of migrants and diasporic 
communities on regional economic development and high-technology sectors. Meanwhile,  
in economic geography Richard Florida has argued that a cities need to attract a tolerant, 
diversity-loving ‘creative class’ in order to maintain long term economic success (Florida, 
2002).  
 
This thesis contributes to this growing literature on the economic effects of 
immigration and diversity: in particular, it explores impacts on innovation and urban 
economic development.  
 
2.1. Endogenous growth and the economic role of cities  
 
The first building block of my research is the continued relevance of cities, and the 
role of endogenous growth and economic geography frameworks in explaining this. Over 
50% of the world population now live in urban areas, and this share is predicted to keep 
rising. Despite predictions of the ‘death of distance’, large urban centres remain of great 
demographic, social and economic importance. As McCann argues, “the global economy 
appears to be simultaneously characterised by global flattening and local steepening” 
(2008) (p361).  Other see it as ‘spiky’ (Florida, 2005) or an ‘archipelago economy’ of linked 
urban centres (Veltz, 2000). 
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Geographers have developed a variety of frameworks for understanding cities and 
urban systems. Peet (1998) provides a brief history, from the cultural and regional 
geography of the 1920s and 1930s, through to the ‘quantitative revolution’ of the 1950s 
and 60s and the emergence of radical and environmental perspectives in the 1970s. There 
has been a proliferation of approaches in the past few decades: realist perspectives, 
postmodernist frameworks and a re-emergence of quantitative approaches in the ‘New 
Economic Geography’.  
 
Some of these frameworks provide important foundations for the thesis. From an 
urbanist perspective Jane Jacobs proposes we view neighbourhoods and cities as 
‘problems in organised complexity’ (Jacobs, 1961). Unpicking urban systems requires a 
focus on the economic, social and cultural processes shaping areas from the outside, as 
well as close observation of local actors and specificities. Critical realist Doreen Massey 
similarly argues that local economies are the product of national / global processes, but 
that local conditions produce variety and uniqueness (Massey, 1984). Michael Storper’s 
‘transformationalist’ approach develops this line further, arguing that capitalism is 
structured by societal specifics and thus ‘the local helps make the global’ (Storper, 1997). 
 
Storper is also clear that to understand the continued relevance of cities under 
globalisation, geographers need to use the tools of other disciplines. His ‘heterodox 
paradigm’ combines elements of economics, sociology, management science and 
geography to explain regional development as a relational process, with regions as the 
nexus of formal economic interactions and informal ‘untraded interdependencies’ (Storper, 
1997). Within regions, cities are ‘socio-economies’ that play critical roles in the 
organisation of high-value economic activity.  
 
These geographical frameworks repeatedly intersect with those of urban 
economics (hence UE) and the ‘New Economic Geography’ (hence NEG). These latter are 
particularly helpful in explaining the location patterns of economic activity. While classical 
models of economic growth predict the long run convergence of countries and regions, in 
practice spatial disparities between and within countries turn out to be persistent.  
 
Endogenous growth theories help to explain these trends by highlighting the 
importance of human capital and knowledge in advancing the technological frontier. 
Subsequent productivity gains help drive countries’ long term economic growth and 
development (Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1990). National and regional differences in knowledge 
creation and diffusion thus help explain spatial disparities – both across and within 
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countries. In these frameworks, human capital spillovers are the key channel for both the 
diffusion of existing ideas and the development of new ones.  
 
Drawing on these ideas, both UE and NEG have developed a number of insights 
that help explain the behaviour of urban systems and spatial economies, and thus explain 
spatial differences.  In these accounts of long term growth, cities play a number of 
important and well-established roles. Both perspectives partly develop out of Marshall’s 
ideas on agglomeration economies: thick labour markets, input-sharing and knowledge 
spillovers that help raise firms’ productivity in urban environments (Marshall, 1918). Jane 
Jacobs (1969) extends these ideas by highlighting the importance knowledge spillovers 
across sectors. Cities’ long term economic resilience is thus partly a product of economic 
diversity, which facilitates innovation.  
 
UE and NEG approaches share many insights, but also contain important 
differences of emphasis (Combes et al., 2005, Glaeser, 2008). Urban economics 
frameworks begin with the spatial location models of Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and 
Henderson (1974). These models focus on the balance of agglomeration economies and 
diseconomies in a system of cities (Combes et al., 2005). Productivity gains driven by 
agglomeration effects help raise nominal wages and (often) employment rates; conversely, 
urban crowding in growing cities raises costs and eats into real wages. In spatial 
equilibrium, labour, housing and amenities markets clear, real wages equalise and workers 
and firms are indifferent between locations.   
 
New Economic Geography begins with firms’ location decisions under 
globalisation, assuming monopolistic competition and both internal and external scale 
economies (Krugman, 1991). As transport costs decline, internal increasing returns mean 
that firms will want to consolidate activity in single large plants and to specialise 
production. Agglomeration economies, notably upstream-downstream linkages and local 
knowledge spillovers will lead to clustering (Krugman and Venables, 1995). Conversely, 
congestion, pollution and competition may lead firms to exit. Overall, the balance of 
‘centrifugal’ and ‘centripetal’ forces determines the location of economic activity (Fujita et 
al., 1999). The clustering process is characterised by feedback loops, so that existing 
agglomerations often have first mover advantage (Krugman and Obsfeldt, 2003); however, 
technological change and sectoral differences also tend to produce ‘production jumps’ 
from higher to lower cost regions (Venables, 2006). These jumps occur within sectors as 
well as between them: Venables gives the example of a financial services firm with 
offshored call centres, IT services outsourced to local partners, an international network of 
retail branches and a London-based headquarters. These complex production chains 
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require careful co-ordination, and can imply high search, transaction and management 
costs (McCann, 2008, Saxenian and Sabel, 2008). Most recently, the ‘globalisation of 
innovation’ has seen the international re-organisation of increasingly high-value, 
‘knowledge-intensive’ activities (Mudambi, 2008).   
 
Both perspectives help explain important stylised facts for UK cities. Recent 
structural shifts in national economies – in particular, an increased share of employment in 
services and ‘knowledge-intensive’ activity – have helped to accelerate the sorting of 
employers and skilled workers across urban areas (Overman and Rice, 2008). Urban 
environments play increasingly important roles in local knowledge spillovers and ideas 
flow, by supporting face to face interactions and other ‘learning’ economies. At the same 
time, there are important differences in the ‘demand for cities’ between and within sectors, 
and across the lifecycle (Champion and Fisher, 2004, Graham, 2007, Melo et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 Cultural diversity 
 
The second building block of my research is the notion of ‘cultural diversity’, in 
particular as it relates to the city:  as Amin (2002) makes clear, cities are the primary sites 
of cultural diversity. While multicultural societies and cities are usually seen as new 
phenomena, their roots often go back for centuries (Sandu, 2004). Britain and many other 
European societies share a long history of demographic change. Migrations typically 
resulted in new minority communities assimilating, to different degrees, into the cultural 
mainstream (Sassen, 2004). In his history of London, for example, Peter Ackroyd writes 
that “by the tenth century [the city] was populated by Cmyric Brythons and Belgae, by 
remnants of the Gaulish legions, by East Saxons and Mercians, by Danes, Norwegians 
and Swedes, by Franks and Jutes and Angles, all mingled and mingling together to form a 
distinct tribe of ‘Londoners’” (Ackroyd, 2000).  
 
Cultural diversity is not straightforward to define. As the popular discussion around 
the summer 2011 riots in London and other English cities makes clear, disentangling 
culture and ethnicity from class, education and other socio-economic factors is both 
important and difficult to do. Quantitative approaches have much to offer in principle, 
helping to illuminate over-arching trends, patterns and relationships; but they are hard to 
implement. Diversity metrics typically borrow from demographics or industrial economics, 
deploying Fractionalisation and other indices. However, accurate measurement of diversity 
requires a robust measure of cultural or ethnic identity. This is challenging, as identity is a 
multifaceted concept with objective, subjective and dynamic elements (Mateos, 2007, 
Aspinall, 2009). 
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Quantitative measures of identity thus tend to be partial: they focus on identity’s 
visible, objective components, assuming away self-ascription and endogeneity issues 
(Ottaviano et al., 2007). For quantitative researchers, therefore, identifying identity involves 
a least-worst proxy, such as country of birth, language or religion – or official ethnic 
typologies, such as those built by the UK Office of National Statistics (hence ONS) (Office 
of National Statistics, 2003). Aspinall (2009) argues that all such identity proxies offer a 
trade-off between ‘granularity’ and ‘utility’, between high levels of detail and wider 
tractability.   
 
I discuss definition and measurement issues in greater detail in the next chapter.  
Over the course of the thesis I make use of three identity proxies: country of birth, ONS 
ethnic groups, and the ONOMAP cultural-ethnic-linguistic (hence CEL) name classification 
system. These are used to construct measures of immigrant and ethnic groups, and to 
populate measures of cultural diversity at firm, group and area level. Each proxy offers a 
different balance of granularity and utility. More detail on the classifications is given in 
Appendix A, and the ONOMAP system is explained in Appendix B. I use a 
Fractionalisation Index as my main diversity metric, following others in the literature; the 
Index is helpful in that it captures both the number of identity groups in a population or 
area, and their relative sizes. I discuss the Index further in the first paper.  
 
2.3 UK context  
 
 The economic impacts of immigration and diversity have particular salience for the 
UK and for British cities. Britain and many other Western societies are becoming more 
culturally diverse, a process driven by both net immigration and the growth of new and 
established minority communities (Champion, 2006, Putnam, 2007). In 2007 immigration 
accounted for 52% of overall UK population growth, with natural change explaining the 
remaining 48%. Natural change is taking a rising share of overall change, and since 2007 
has overtaken migration as a driver of population growth. Natural change includes a rising 
share of live births to mothers born outside the UK; this is currently running at over one in 
four (Office of National Statistics, 2011).  
 
In turn, this reflects both higher levels of recent migration and higher birth rates in 
some minority groups (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2003). Between 2001 and 2009, 
non-White British groups in England and Wales have grown from 6.6m to 9.1m and now 
comprise one in six of the population (Office of National Statistics, 2011).  Projections for 
the UK suggest that minority ethnic populations are likely to comprise 21% of the 
population by 2050, from 7.7% in 2001 (Wohland et al., 2010).   
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These trends make the UK’s current and recent experience an important area for 
study. Not surprisingly, there are also very high levels of public and policy interest in these 
issues in the UK. Of course, worries about diversity are not new. In the year 883 King 
Alfred banished the Danes from London, restricting them to land east of the river Lea 
(Keith, 2005); Vertovec (2007) chronicles complaints across medieval Britain that 
“foreigners were practising their own customs”.  
 
However, over the past decade and a half diversity and immigration have become 
particularly high-profile agendas. Race and immigration are now commonly chosen ‘most 
important issues’ in public opinion surveys (Blinder, 2011). While attitudes to immigration 
and diversity vary significantly by class and education, overall large majorities of British 
people oppose mass immigration: the Government’s most recent Citizenship Survey, 
taken in 2009-10, found that 78% of respondents favoured reducing immigration, 56% by 
“a lot” (Blinder, 2011). By contrast, UK business voices have been strongly supportive of 
open immigration policy, to help firms fill skills gaps and hire from global talent pools 
(McSmith and Russell, 2007, London First, 2008, BBC, 2010), and the business 
community has taken a similarly supportive stance on workforce diversity. 
 
Reflecting these complexities, national immigration policy has undergone several 
major re-organisations since 2001 (Somerville, 2007). Immigration was a major issue in 
the 2010 UK election. While the previous Labour administration sought to encourage 
skilled migrants via a points-based entry system, the current Coalition government has 
capped net migration, with significant restrictions on entry for those outside the EU. 
Significantly, it has retained the Migration Advisory Committee (hence MAC), which 
provides intelligence on sectors and occupations facing skills shortages.  
 
There is a continued debate on the wider impacts of growing diversity on the 
economy, society and public services (see for example (Goodhart, 2004, Putnam, 2007, 
Caldwell, 2009, Simpson and Finney, 2009, Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010, 
Goodhart, 2010). Since 9/11, 1980s models of multiculturalism have come under 
increased criticism, and both Labour and the coalition government have developed 
policies emphasising integration and community cohesion. Reflecting this, broader public 
and policy debates have tended to focus on issues of religious/racial tension and social 
cohesion, and on British towns and cities – such as Burnley and Oldham – that have seen 
ethnic / racial disturbances in recent years. The wider economic dimensions of diversity 
have tended to be underplayed (Wolf, 2008).  
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These issues have a distinctive urban footprint. Migrants and minority communities 
are unevenly distributed across the UK, with the highest numbers in cities. Since 2004, a 
number of rural areas and small towns have experienced very rapid growth in migrant 
populations (Bassere et al., 2007, Green, 2007a); however, bigger British cities still 
contain the largest migrant volumes and population shares. In 2002-3, over half of all net 
migration was to London, and over half of the rest was to the other conurbations and large 
cities (Champion, 2006). The urban share of both migrant groups and visible minorities 
has been increasing over the past decade and a half.  
 
These are important times to be studying such issues. The economics of 
immigration and diversity is of great concern to national government, with policymakers 
needing to balance public opinion, local community dynamics and business interests. 
Many city leaders also need to manage larger, more diverse populations to maximise 
economic and social benefit. And as we shall see below, there remain important evidence 
gaps on the economic impacts of immigration and cultural diversity in the UK. 
 
 
3. Cultural diversity and cities: perspectives 
 
The literature on diversity and urban places is large and itself diverse. It includes historical 
analysis, such as the history of ‘creative cities’ (Hall, 1998) or the role of migrants in 
developing the 19th century Atlantic Economy (Crafts and Venables, 2001); ethnic group 
studies, covering the prospects and progress of (for example) Jewish, Italian and 
Caribbean communities in the US and UK (Sante, 1998, Sandu, 2004); the post-colonial 
literature, exploring diasporas, the development of cultural identity and the changing 
nature of ‘home’ (Gilroy, 1993, Urry, 2000); urban sociology, exploring related ideas of the 
cosmopolitan, transnational or ‘mongrel’ city (Smith, 2001, Sandercock, 2003, Keith, 
2005); health (Fernandez, 2010); a number of studies looking at political participation, 
social capital and community cohesion (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, Putnam, 2007) as 
well as a related literature on segregation and immigrant integration (Landry and Wood, 
2008, Simpson and Finney, 2009); development studies examining the role of ethnic 
fractionalisation in social development (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998);  and a wide-ranging 
economic literature covering management and organisational performance, labour 
markets and human capital, entrepreneurship, innovation, productivity and the cost of 
living. These are discussed further in the next section.   
 
As noted above, within the economic strand there are two traditional 
preoccupations. First, there is an extensive literature on the migration decision, and on 
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immigration’s impact on sending and receiving countries. In the latter case the focus is on 
migration-related labour supply shocks (for reviews see Dustmann et al (2008) or Kerr and 
Kerr (2011)). Researchers have focused on both the effects of immigrants on natives – at 
local and national scales – and on the social / economic outcomes of immigrants.  Most 
recently within the UK, Anne Green and colleagues have conducted a number of important 
studies exploring the labour market effects of, and outcomes for migrants from Central and 
Eastern European countries that have recently joined the European Union (Green et al., 
2007a, Green et al., 2007b, Green, 2007b, Green, 2008, 2009). Despite the largely urban 
footprint of immigration to the UK, few studies have looked at the urban level (see below).  
 
Second, in the development studies and economic growth fields a number of 
country-level studies have looked at the role of ‘ethno-linguistic fractionalisation’ in 
affecting long-term economic development. Ranis (2009) reviews this literature, 
suggesting that the low population density of some countries in sub-Saharan Africa makes 
it even harder to generate trust relationships across ethno-linguistic groups – conversely, 
smaller, more highly populated Asian countries have been better able to foster the 
necessary social capital. Specifically, fractionalisation reduces trust and increases 
transactions costs (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Some recent studies have also made use 
of genetic distance data (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009) and global values surveys 
(Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011) to proxy cultural commonality and difference, and its 
effect on countries’ economic performance.  A number of researchers, in particular 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005a, 2006, 2007), have extended these analyses to cities in the US 
and EU.  
 
 
4. The economics of cultural diversity: frameworks  
 
This thesis develops a broad-based view on the economic effects of cultural diversity, 
drawing on the economic literature and more widely. Specifically, I explore two 
crosscutting topics: first, links between immigration, urban population mix and the 
economic performance of cities; second, connections between migrant communities, 
diversity and innovative activity at individual, group and firm level. Basic theoretical 
frameworks are set out below: the relevant chapters provide more detail, and cover 
relevant empirics.   
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4.1 Immigration, diversity and urban economies 
 
How might net immigration and growing cultural diversity affect urban economic 
performance?  In recent years a number of influential authors have suggested that there 
are significant economic gains from migration and diversity, especially in cities (Florida, 
2002, Legrain, 2006, Landry and Wood, 2008, Leadbeater, 2008). 
 
In the geography field, much of the thinking in this area has been driven by Richard 
Florida’s ‘Creative Class’ framework (Florida, 2002). Florida argues that in the US, UK and 
other Western countries, economic, demographic and social shifts have seen the 
emergence of a skilled, liberally minded ‘Creative Class’ of workers. Members of the 
Creative Class have a preference for diverse, cosmopolitan urban neighbourhoods. 
Employers – and thus, jobs – follow the Creative Class to specific cities. Urban 
employment rates and investment rise, as do firms’ innovation and productivity (although 
urban inequality may also increase). These ‘Creative Class’ perspectives have become 
pervasive among policymakers, but have been criticised for their lack of empirical 
foundation (Glaeser, 2005, Nathan, 2007). There is certainly a need to subject these ideas 
to further testing. 
  
Economic and economic geography frameworks suggest a wider set of 
perspectives. In a spatial economy, net immigration increases the size of the labour force. 
Immigration also changes population and workforce composition, increasing diversity. This 
may be direct through the arrival of new people and/or departure of existing workers, and 
indirect via impacts on birth rates. The overall effects on urban economic outcomes are 
ambiguous. Under neoclassical assumptions, the main effects are through the labour 
market. In small open economies – like cities – average wages are temporarily bid down, 
but then readjust via capital flows and expansion of labour-intensive sectors. If wages are 
sticky, employment may fall in the short term. Initially, immigrants typically ‘cluster’ in 
entry-level occupations, so that low-skill UK-born workers (so-called ‘natives’) may 
experience short term wage losses and high-skill natives short-term gains (Dustmann et 
al., 2008).  
 
Once externalities are allowed, the picture changes significantly. Immigration – and 
the diversity migrants bring – may lead to production complementarities for firms and 
workers (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, Bellini et al., 2008, 
Südekum et al., 2009, Longhi, 2011). For example, these may operate through more 
diverse workforces and diasporic communities (Saxenian, 2006, Page, 2007, Kerr and 
Lincoln, 2010). These channels will raise average labour productivity, not least by 
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improving levels of innovation (see below). Larger urban populations also induce home 
market effects, raising demand for non-tradables. The combination of these channels may 
influence agglomeration economies, leading to further inward migration. However, greater 
competition for space in growing cities may raise the local cost of living (Saiz, 2003, 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). Over time, shifts in urban industrial structure and labour market 
institutions further influence economic outcomes. More cosmopolitan urban populations 
may also raise demand for new/hybridised goods and services, triggering Jacobian 
knowledge spillovers across sectors (Mazzolari and Neumark, 2009).  
 
Conversely, employers in labour-intensive sectors may respond to long-term 
migrant inflows by permanently adjusting production functions to take advantage of cheap 
labour. Low value-added firms may then become reliant on migrant workers, locking out 
lower-skilled UK born workers from employment opportunities (Stenning et al., 2006).   If 
these firms raise labour intensity and lower capital investment, migration may contribute to 
‘low skills equilibrium’ in some urban areas (Finegold and Soskice, 1988). 
 
My first and second papers review this theory and relevant empirics in more detail. 
They suggest a number of evidence gaps remain, particularly in a UK context. First, there 
are still few studies that explore economic impacts of immigration beyond labour markets. 
Second, we know relatively little about the specific effects of urban diversity, over and 
above migrant populations. Third, the transmission mechanisms linking population shifts to 
urban economic outcomes are under-developed. The papers in this thesis are able to 
address all of these issues, and add to our knowledge of the UK experience.   
 
4.2 Innovation, immigration and diversity 
 
I develop these ideas further by focusing on a specific set of transmission 
mechanisms: the links between migrant and minority communities, diversity and 
innovation. I define innovation as ‘the successful exploitation of new ideas’; a combination 
of invention, adoption and diffusion (Fagerberg, 2005, Department of Innovation 
Universities and Skills, 2008).  
 
Conventional theories of innovation have relatively little to say to about 
immigration, ethnicity or the composition of inventor communities. Schumpeter (1962) 
focuses on the ‘entrepreneurial function’ inside and outside firms, and the role of 
individuals in identifying and commercialising new ideas, in the face of social inertia or 
resistance. National ‘innovation systems’ approaches explore relationships between firms 
and public institutions such as government agencies and universities (Freeman, 1987). 
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Spatial approaches focus on clustering of innovative activity due to agglomeration-related 
externalities, particularly local knowledge spillovers  (Jacobs, 1969, Jaffe et al., 1993, 
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). More recently, a number of authors have explored the 
‘globalisation of innovation’, as businesses in high-cost countries relocate research and 
development activity into lower-cost locations (Mowery, 2001, Archibugi and Iammarino, 
2002, Cantwell, 2005, Yeung, 2009). 
 
However, endogenous growth theories provide the basis for a number of newer 
studies linking demography to innovation, by highlighting the importance of human capital 
stocks and knowledge spillovers to levels of innovation. In practice, access to knowledge 
is likely to be uneven across locations, business sectors and social groups (Agrawal et al., 
2008). Migrants, co-ethnic groups and group diversity may all affect knowledge creation, 
access and flow. Recent work suggests four ways in which this could occur. 
 
First, migrant status may induce positive selection of highly skilled or 
entrepreneurial individuals (Borjas, 1987). For example, both firms and wider research 
communities may benefit from the presence of migrant ‘stars’ (Stephan and Levin, 2001). 
Conversely, exclusion from mainstream economic institutions may force members of 
minority communities to develop new businesses, products and services (Kloosterman and 
Rath, 2001). The empirical challenge here is to distinguish migrant/minority status from 
other human capital endowments and wider structural conditions.  
 
Second, social networks such as diasporic groups can accelerate ideas generation 
and (in particular) transmission (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). Social networks offer their 
members higher social capital and levels of trust, lowering transaction costs and risk. In 
turn, networks seem to positively affect innovative activity (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 
2006, Kaiser et al., 2011). As innovation systems globalise, co-ethnic networks such as 
diasporas may be an important channel for knowledge spillovers and ideas flow – 
improving awareness of new technologies and passing on tacit knowledge (Kapur and 
McHale, 2005, Saxenian and Sabel, 2008, Kerr, 2009). Firms employing diaspora 
members may thus benefit from these improved ideas flows, as well as a wider set of 
potential joint venture partners (Foley and Kerr, 2011). Conversely, other social networks – 
such as family or kinship networks, or professional associations – might turn out to be 
more important in determining knowledge spillovers (Agrawal et al., 2008). Discrimination 
against minority groups from other communities will limit knowledge spillovers.  
 
Third, diversity may improve ideas generation, if a diverse set of economic agents 
has access to a larger set of ideas, perspectives and skills. Both Berliant and Fujita (2009) 
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and Hong and Page (2001, 2004) model systems of group-level knowledge creation, 
showing that heterogeneity can accelerate ideas generation through individual-level 
production complementarities. But, group-level cultural diversity may have a negative 
effect if it leads to lower trust and poor communication between individuals. Spillovers (and 
co-operation) will be limited, leading to fewer, lower-quality solutions (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2004). Fujita and Weber (2003) argue that positive diversity effects will be most 
likely observed in ‘knowledge-intensive’ activities and industries. 
 
Finally, we might observe bigger co-ethnicity and diversity effects on innovative 
activity in cities because of composition effects:  innovative activity, migrant and minority 
communities tend to be clustered in urban areas. Cities may also have positive or negative 
‘amplifying’ effects. For example, if cultural diversity contributes to economic diversity, it 
may help foster knowledge spillovers across sectors at urban level (Jacobs, 1969). 
Conversely, members of minority communities may be physically isolated in particular 
urban neighbourhoods, limiting the opportunity for knowledge spillovers and interaction 
with other groups (Zenou, 2011).  
 
This is another emerging research field in which there are a number of knowledge 
gaps: my third and fourth papers discuss theory and empirics in more detail. There are few 
studies exploring any one of the channels set out above, or comparing their relative 
impacts. A small number of studies explore the urban footprint of population-innovation 
effects, but data is often limited and results partial. Most importantly for my own research, 
there is virtually no empirical coverage of these issues in a British or wider European 
context. The papers in this thesis add to a small but growing global literature on 
immigration, diversity and innovation.  
 
 
5. Questions and approach 
 
My main research questions are:  
 
1) What are the effects, if any, of ethnic / cultural diversity on the economic 
performance of UK cities?  
 
2) What transmission mechanisms link diversity to economic outcomes?  
 
3) What does this imply for policymakers?  
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My basic approach is built on economic geography concepts and frameworks. I am 
also making use of a wider range of research literatures and evidence bases, including: 
spatial/urban economics; labour economics; economic sociology; migration studies, 
diversity literature and cultural studies. The research draws predominantly on quantitative 
methods, particularly econometric analysis.  
 
In order to identify migrant, ethnicity and diversity effects on innovation, I need to 
distinguish these from other individual, firm, industry, area and national trends and 
processes. I therefore pay careful attention to causality when designing research methods 
and identification strategies.  
 
The thesis involves three phases of primary research, presented in papers. Phase 
1 (linkages) tests potential connections between diversity and urban-level economic 
outcomes. Using Labour Force Survey and Land Registry microdata plus material from UK 
Electoral Registers, I construct cross-sections and panels of UK urban areas. Phase 2 
(channels) explores how 'diversity effects' might be conferred. I focus on innovation 
channels, using patents microdata and the novel ONOMAP name classification system to 
explore effects of co-ethnic communities and diversity on inventor productivity.  Phase 3 
(experiences) examines the case of London in detail, exploring effects of cultural diversity 
and migrant entrepreneurs using a survey of firms in the capital. The papers are some of 
the first contributions to a growing European literature on diversity, innovation and urban 
economic performance.  
 
 
6. The economics of ‘super-diversity’ 
 
My first paper explores patterns of cultural diversity in British cities and their links to urban 
economic outcomes, focusing on the years 2001-2006 and the emergence of ‘super-
diversity’ in some urban areas.  
 
6.1 Context and contribution 
 
The UK and many other Western societies have a long, sometimes hidden history 
of cultural diversity and multiculturalism (Sandu, 2004, Sassen, 2004). Over the past few 
decades, these societies have become dramatically more diverse, a process driven both 
by shifts in international migration and by natural change (Putnam, 2007). Vertovec (2006, 
2007) argues that the resulting spread of new communities, languages, religious practices 
and people flows across the UK represents a shift from traditional patterns towards a new 
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‘super-diversity’, particularly in urban areas. As discussed in Section 4, there is now some 
suggestive evidence that cultural diversity may be an economic asset at the urban level 
(Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, Page, 2007). However, there has been little empirical 
research on the economics of super-diversity, especially in the UK.  
 
The paper makes two main contributions to this growing literature. First, it 
assembles new data on patterns of cultural diversity in UK cities. Specifically, I use two 
‘traditional’ metrics based on country of birth and official ethnic groups, plus new 
measurements derived using ONOMAP, a new and fine-grained system of cultural-ethnic-
linguistic (CEL) name classification. This produces a very rich set of descriptive statistics 
covering recent experience in UK cities (see Appendix A for resulting typologies, and 
Appendix B for more on ONOMAP). Second, the paper tests linkages between cultural 
diversity measures, urban wages and employment rates, using cross-sectional analysis.   
 
6.2 Data and estimation strategy  
 
My three diversity measures draw on different sources. Labour Force Survey 
(hence LFS) microdata are used to construct metrics based on country of birth and official 
Office of National Statistics ethnic groups. The UK Electoral Register provides raw input 
for ONOMAP, which is provided as a pooled cross-section for 2001-6 on 67 ‘cultural -
ethnic- linguistic’ groups.  
 
Both datasets are supplied with local authority district-level identifiers. These are 
aggregated to 2001 Travel to Work Areas (hence TTWAs) using postcode weighting; 
following Gibbons et al (2011) I restrict the sample to ‘primary urban’ TTWAs to minimise 
the risk of sampling error (see Appendix C). I estimate a simple model linking diversity to 
average wages and employment rates. I include controls covering demographic, social 
and economic characteristics, drawn from the LFS.  
 
6.3 Results  
 
Diversity is a complex concept, and the descriptive analysis confirms that different 
metrics capture different aspects of demographic change. Country of birth and ethnic 
group-based measures show the growth of new migrant and minority communities in the 
years since 2001. ONOMAP-based analysis highlights the long history of the multicultural 
city in the UK, as well as the complex regional, religious and linguistic patterns of urban 
population mix. All three measures shed light on the emergence of ‘super-diversity’, in 
contrast with the established late 20th century urban demographics.  
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 Regression analysis suggests some positive links between super-diversity and 
both wages and employment at the urban level. However, the size and sign of the 
relationship crucially depends on the diversity measure used.  Specifically, country of birth 
and ethnic group-based measures show strong positive links to urban wages, as do some 
CEL-based measures. Links to urban employment rates are more mixed, with only one 
CEL measure showing a positive relationship (the other shows a negative link).  
 
These results are drawn from a small cross-section. As such, my findings have to 
be taken as suggestive, and coefficients as upper bounds. However, they are in line with a 
growing body of international evidence suggesting some economic benefits of cultural 
diversity, particularly in urban areas.  
 
 
7. The long term impacts of migration in British cities  
 
My second paper examines the long term economic impacts of migration on British cities, 
using a new 16-year panel. Since the early 1990s the UK has experienced ‘the single 
biggest wave of immigration in British history’ (Goodhart, 2010). Net migration has been 
highly urbanised: has it affected the wages, employment rates and prices faced by UK-
born workers?  
 
7.1 Context and contribution 
 
There is a large existing literature on the local economic impacts of migration, 
predominantly focused on labour market effects. As outlined above, most studies find little 
impact on average UK-born (‘native’) labour market outcomes (see Dustmann et al (2008) 
for a recent review). However, few authors examine broader effects of migration on the 
spatial economy, as more diverse communities emerge. This paper helps fill the gaps, 
adapting the pioneering US work of Ottaviano and Peri (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006) for a British context.   
 
Wider urban impacts of migration may be productivity-enhancing, if migrants 
facilitate knowledge spillovers or reduce trade costs (Saxenian, 2006, Berliant and Fujita, 
2009). Net migration may then lead to higher native productivity, wages and employment 
rates: crowding raises the local cost of living.  Alternatively, parts of the local economy 
may become ‘migrant-dependent’ (Stenning et al., 2006). Net migration damages native 
employment if lower-skilled natives cannot move into better jobs. If this sustains a low-
skills equilibrium (Finegold and Soskice, 1988), wages and prices also fall over time. 
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7.2 Data and estimation strategy 
 
The analysis follows the spatial correlations approach (Altonji and Card, 1991) but 
has several novel features. These allow me to improve on existing UK studies (Frattini, 
2008, Lee, 2010, Longhi, 2011) with a longer sample period, better-defined spatial units, 
and richer data. Specifically, I assemble a new 16-year panel of urban economies between 
1994 and 2008, using postcode weighting to aggregate microdata from the UK Labour 
Force Survey, Land Registry and other sources. I use 2001 Travel to Work Areas to 
approximate local labour markets, focusing on 79 ‘primary urban’ areas (see Appendix C). 
To measure the size and diversity of migrant populations, I use both migrant population 
shares and an inverse Herfindahl Index of country of birth groups.  
 
I estimate a parsimonious two-period model with time dummies and area fixed 
effects, linking net migration to changes in UK-born average wages, employment rates 
and house prices. I am able to explore detailed interactions between different skill groups 
of migrants and natives. The model also allows me to infer the effects of migrant-related 
changes in urban labour productivity, since over time, productivity changes are reflected in 
shifting nominal wage rates (Combes et al., 2005). Finally, I run several robustness checks 
– including tests for native outflows and for positive migrant selection (Borjas, 1994). The 
latter test uses a shift-share instrument based on historic migrant settlement patterns.    
 
7.3 Results 
 
The results suggest important impacts of net migration on urban economies, within 
and beyond the labour market. Specifically, the diversity migrants bring helps drive up 
high-skill native productivity and wages, implying both production complementarities and 
relative scarcity effects. Conversely, increasingly migrant-intensive labour markets appear 
to ‘lock out’ some intermediate and low-skilled British-born workers from employment 
opportunities, particularly since 2000. ‘Migrants taking British jobs’ is an oversimplification, 
however: on-going impacts of long-term industrial decline and the increasing casualisation 
of entry-level jobs partly explain the employment findings. For the UK, the dynamic effects 
of immigration also appear to be significantly different from the US, reflecting Britain’s 
distinctive urban system, migrant populations and labour market institutions.   
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8. Ethnic inventors and innovation in the UK 
 
The next phase of my research focuses on transmission channels, in particular links 
between demographic change and innovation. My third paper looks at ‘ethnic inventors’, 
building on growing academic and policy interest in links between immigration and 
innovation (Legrain, 2006, Page, 2007, Leadbeater, 2008, Kerr and Kerr, 2011). Interest in 
ethnic inventor communities is largely based on the experience of high-tech US regions 
like Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 2006). Little is known about how ethnic inventors might 
shape innovative activity in the UK. The paper explores recent British experience, using a 
new panel of patents microdata.   
 
8.1 Context and contribution 
 
As suggested in Section 4, demographic shifts might affect innovation in four broad 
ways. First, migration or minority status may induce positive selection of skilled or 
entrepreneurial individuals, although this needs to be distinguished from other human 
capital endowments (Borjas, 1987, Stephan and Levin, 2001, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 
2008). Second, co-ethnic diasporic groups can accelerate ideas generation and 
transmission, although discrimination may constrain knowledge spillovers (Kloosterman 
and Rath, 2001, Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). Third, cultural diversity may improve ideas 
generation, if the benefits of a larger set of ideas, perspectives outweigh trust or 
communication difficulties (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, Berliant and Fujita, 2009). 
Finally, urban areas may have positive influences via ‘demand push’ from cosmopolitan 
populations, or negative influences if immigrant communities are spatially segregated 
(Gordon et al., 2007).  
 
This paper looks at the role of ethnic inventors in innovation in the UK, using a new 
12-year panel of patents microdata. Using the novel ONOMAP name classification system 
to build on pioneering US work by Agrawal et al (2008) and Kerr (2008a) I am able to 
explore all four ‘population-innovation’ channels (Appendices A and B  give more detail on 
ONOMAP). As far as I am aware, it is the first paper of its kind in the UK or Europe.  
 
8.2 Data and estimation strategy 
 
I construct a panel of inventor activity 1993-2004, using European Patent Office 
microdata cleaned by the KITES team at Bocconi University. I then apply the ONOMAP 
name-scoring system to inventor surname-forename combinations. Together, these 
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enable me to identify individual migrant inventors and co-ethnic groups, and to build 
measures of inventor group diversity.   
 
I estimate a simplified knowledge production function linking counts of inventor 
patenting activity – ‘inventor productivity’ – to individual, group and Travel to Work Area-
level area characteristics. Controls are taken from Labour Force Survey microdata, 
aggregated using postcode weights. Using techniques popularised by Blundell et al 
(1995), I exploit historic patent information to fit inventor-level fixed effects.  I also run a 
series of robustness checks, testing for dynamic feedback effects within the panel, the 
influence of area-level demographic characteristics on inventor composition, the role of 
historic patent stocks, and distributional impacts of ethnic inventors on ‘majority’ groups.  
 
8.3 Results  
 
I fit the model as a negative binomial and in OLS, with similar results. Ethnic 
inventor status has no effect on inventor productivity once human capital is controlled for. 
However, membership of some co-ethnic groups has a positive effect – specifically South 
Asian and Southern European communities. I also find small but robust positive effects of 
inventor group diversity on individual patenting counts. Distributional impacts are less clear 
– I find some individual-level evidence that majority inventors are crowded out, but not at 
area level.  
 
In contrast to theory, I do not find that urban location or density has a significant 
effect on individual patenting counts once other area-level factors are taken into account. 
The results survive a range of robustness tests, although alternative measures of area-
level human capital weaken diversity effects.  
 
Overall, ethnic inventors are a net positive for patenting in the UK, although the 
British experience is significantly different from the US. This is likely to reflect distinctive 
patterns of US and UK migrant settlement – in particular skill-biased migration of 
engineers and scientists to the US – as well as culturally distinctive US attitudes to 
entrepreneurship. This is an emerging field of research, and further studies could explore 
alternative measures of innovative activity, more precise identification of migrant / ethnic 
inventors, sectoral and area differences, distributional impacts and other ethnicity/diversity 
transmission channels. 
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9. Does cultural diversity help firms to innovate?  
 
The third phase of research looks in detail at the experience of London. My fourth paper, 
written with Neil Lee, examines cultural diversity and innovation in 7,600 London 
businesses.  The UK capital is one of the world’s most diverse – in terms of country of 
birth, language and ethnicity (Burdett and Sudjic, 2011).  London’s diversity is seen as a 
social asset. This paper asks: does it help London firms to innovate?  
 
9.1 Context and contribution 
 
In theory, diversity’s effect on innovation is ambiguous. Diverse organisations may 
have higher communication costs and lower trust (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004); 
however, diverse teams may be better at generating new ideas or problem solving (Page, 
2007, Berliant and Fujita, 2009). Through diasporic networks, firms can access additional 
markets, assisting process innovation and the commercialisation of new ideas (Saxenian 
and Sabel, 2008, Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). But diverse firms may also face 
discrimination in the marketplace, especially in taking new products / processes to market.   
 
Empirical evidence suggests that individual migrant entrepreneurs play critical roles 
within and around firms, developing new ideas and linking companies in different countries 
(Kapur and McHale, 2005, Saxenian, 2006, Wadhwa et al., 2007). Diverse cities may 
amplify these processes (Berliant and Fujita, 2009). Minority populations concentrate in 
cities (Champion, 2006); large, diverse urban markets encourage the emergence of new 
products (Mazzolari and Neumark, 2009).  
 
We make several contributions to this growing field. We believe this is the first 
study to use a large sample of real-world firms in an urban context, and allows 
examination of multiple diversity-innovation channels. And as far as we know, our results 
are original for the UK.   
 
9.2 Data and estimation strategy 
 
We use data from the London Annual Business Survey (LABS), constructing a 
repeat cross-section of over 7,600 firms from 2005-2007.  Exploiting LABS’ unique 
structure, we develop multiple measures for both innovation and its commercialisation, and 
a series of diversity variables covering the birth country and ethnicity mix of business 
owners/partners. We also identify migrant-run and ‘UK-run’ firms.  
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We deploy a simplified knowledge production function linking firms’ innovative 
activity to ownership characteristics, estimating the model as a conditional logit with a 
range of controls, sector and year dummies. We extend the model to look at links between 
firms’ owner/partner composition and market orientation, and examine the extent of 
migrant entrepreneurship using a subset of company founders. We also examine 
innovative activity across ‘knowledge-intensive’ and less knowledge-intensive firms in the 
city, which allows us to explore patterns of high-value and ‘ordinary’ innovations.  
 
We adopt various checks to try and identify causality. We use the natural 
experiment of A8 accession in 2004 to minimise city-level demand-pull factors. To control 
for firm-level positive selection, we fit a shift-share instrument based on historic migrant 
settlement patterns within London neighbourhoods.  
 
9.3 Results  
 
Our results suggest small but robust positive effects of diverse top teams and 
migrant-run firms on the development of new products and processes. In contrast to the 
wider literature, we find diversity-innovation effects across London’s industrial structure – 
particularly in less knowledge-intensive sectors. This suggests the ‘diversity bonus’ is 
particularly important for ‘ordinary’ innovations. London’s large and diverse home markets, 
diasporic communities and international connectivity play important roles, as do 
entrepreneurial migrant business owners.  
 
Overall, the results support claims that London’s cultural diversity helps support 
innovative activity, strengthening the capital’s long-term economic position. Our findings 
for the UK capital contrast with findings from the author’s earlier papers, which suggest 
rather weaker effects of diversity on urban level productivity. Intuitively, our results might 
be replicated in other UK conurbations where urban scale effects are similar. Parallel 
research would be fruitful. 
 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
Britain and other Western societies are becoming more culturally diverse, with 
immigration, shifting patterns of settlement and natural change all important drivers. The 
UK’s cultural diversity is largely urbanised, reflecting both historical patterns and the 
economic pull of large cities. My research explores the economics of cultural diversity – in 
particular, links to innovative activity and to urban economic performance. Despite high 
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levels of interest, there is surprisingly little research on these issues, especially in a British 
context, and many of the papers are UK ‘firsts’.  
 
 The first phase of research explores connections between diversity, immigration 
and urban economic performance. While cross-sectional analysis finds positive 
associations, panel data analysis reveals a more complex story. I find that net immigration 
helps raise native productivity, especially for high-skilled workers, but may help exclude 
lower-skill natives from employment opportunities. De-industrialisation and casualisation of 
entry-level occupations partly explain the employment results. Phase two investigates how 
'diversity effects' might be conferred, in particular links to innovation. Analysis of patents 
microdata suggests that in some cases, co-ethnic group membership raises inventor 
productivity, as does the overall diversity of inventor groups. Exploring impacts on majority 
patenting, I find some evidence of individual-level ‘crowd-out’ but no effects of 
displacement at area level. I explore diversity-innovation links further in phase three, a 
case study of London firms. I find positive effects of diverse managements on ideas 
generation. Diverse firms are also more likely than homogenous firms to sell into London’s 
large, cosmopolitan home markets – and into international markets. Migrant 
entrepreneurship helps explain our main result. London’s megacity status is also likely to 
influence the findings, and parallel research is required in other large UK cities.  
 
 The research has been conducted against the backdrop of intense public and 
policy conversations. Over the past decade and a half, race and immigration have 
consistently scored among the issues of greatest concern to the UK public. On 
immigration, policymakers have had to reconcile a largely anti-immigration public and 
strong pro-immigration business voices. On diversity, the 1980s model of multiculturalism 
has faced widespread criticism post-9/11 and policy has shifted, placing greater emphasis 
on ‘integration’ and maintaining community cohesion. Policymakers in both areas would 
benefit from a better understanding of the economic effects of larger, more diverse 
communities and cities.  
 
 Overall, my findings contrast with popular narratives that net immigration and 
diversity are straightforwardly ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the UK. They show positive effects on 
productivity, wages and innovation, although these tend to be small. Significantly, EU and 
non-EU groups both appear to influence levels of innovative activity. Distributional analysis 
is more complex, with high skill workers and firms the winners, and some evidence that 
low-skill native workers can lose out. The UK’s ‘diversity experience’ is distinctive, 
reflecting historical factors and policy choices.  
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The results suggest that the right policy mix can help British cities and citizens 
achieve greater economic benefit from bigger and more diverse communities. An 
‘economics of diversity’ strategy would consist of two main elements. The first element 
would exploit the connections between high-skill immigration, diversity, innovation and 
productivity. Policymakers need an unambiguous policy of encouraging high-skill migrants 
from around the world. This would imply a move away from the current migration cap, and 
allowing universities to compete more easily for international students. At the same time, 
policymakers should take active steps to help build diasporic communities in the UK, for 
example by facilitating return migration and remittance flows, and promoting greater trade 
flows with producers in key ‘home’ countries.   
 
The second element of the strategy would mitigate negative effects, in particular 
the labour market lock-out that seems to be affecting some lower-skilled UK-born workers. 
This would require a re-regulation of entry-level occupations in ‘migrant-intensive’ sectors 
such as food processing, with stronger enforcement of minimum wage and working 
conditions legislation and a restriction of some of the activities of temporary recruitment 
agencies. This strategy also requires that we raise the skills and employability of low-skill 
Britons, through more effective welfare to work and in-work support programmes. In some 
areas, these supply-side interventions could be combined with economic development 
policies to raise the quality of employer business models; by encouraging firms to move 
into higher-value production, these might help lift areas out of low-skills equilibrium. 
Together, these interventions could help the UK make the most of its growing diversity.    
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper explores the patterns of cultural diversity in British cities and their links to urban 
economic outcomes, focusing on the years 2001-2006 and the emergence of so-called 
‘super-diversity’ in some urban areas. It looks at the distribution of diversity1 across urban 
areas in the UK, using new and innovative measures based on cultural-ethnic-linguistic 
(CEL) name classification, as well as conventional measures based on birth country and 
the UK’s official ethnic groups. CEL data also allows me to show results from cross-
sectional analysis of these diversity measures on urban wages and employment.2  
 
The UK and many other Western societies have a long, sometimes hidden history 
of cultural diversity and multiculturalism (Sandu, 2004, Sassen, 2004). Over the past few 
decades, these societies have become dramatically more diverse, a process driven both 
by shifts in international migration and by natural change (Putnam, 2007). Vertovec  (2006, 
2007) argues that the resulting spread of new communities, languages, religious practices 
and people flows across the UK represents a shift from traditional patterns towards a new 
‘super-diversity’.  
 
The effects of bigger, more mixed societies are now of major public and policy 
interest (Florida, 2002, Goodhart, 2004, Wolf, 2008, Aspinall, 2009, Caldwell, 2009, 
Simpson and Finney, 2009, Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010). However, public debate 
has tended to focus on the short-term impacts of migrants on labour markets, public 
services and community cohesion (House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2008, 
Card et al., 2009, Somerville and Sumption, 2009). There has been little research on the 
broader economic impacts of super-diversity.  
 
In order to understand the economic effects of cultural diversity in the UK, it is 
important to look at cities and urban economies. There is a simple reason for this: put 
crudely, cities are ‘where the diversity is’. Despite more dispersed patterns of migration in 
recent years, in spatial terms cultural diversity remains an urban phenomenon (Champion, 
2006).  
 
There is good evidence that economic diversity in cities helps support long-term 
economic growth (Glaeser et al., 1992, Duranton and Puga, 2001). Furthermore, there is 
now some suggestive evidence that cultural diversity may also be an economic asset at 
                                               
1
 For the purposes of this paper I use ‘cultural diversity’, ‘ethnic diversity’ and ‘diversity’ as interchangeable 
terms. Section 3 discusses these concepts in more detail.  
2
 CEL data is only available on a pooled basis at area level. The next chapter focuses on immigration and 
develops a full panel dataset and IV checks.  
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the urban level. For example, diversity may lead to production complementarities if diverse 
workforces make better decisions, or if firms have access to diasporic networks that 
reduce transactions costs (Page, 2007, Berliant and Fujita, 2009, Docquier and Rapoport, 
2011). However, diverse firms may also suffer trust or communication problems, and the 
effect of co-ethnic diasporas may be limited through discrimination or exclusion (Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2004, Zenou, 2011). Given the spatial distribution of diversity, these 
channels are likely to be stronger in urban areas. Urban-level features may also support 
positive effects of diversity: a more diverse urban population may drive the development of 
new goods and services (Leadbeater, 2008), and a diverse urban environment may help 
attract a ‘creative class’ of skilled, liberally-minded employees (Florida, 2002). However, 
minority communities may be physically isolated in urban areas, with limited participation 
in the mainstream economy.  
 
Immigration is one of the main drivers of demographic shifts in cities. While the 
diversity that immigration brings may support some of these positive channels, the 
clustering of migrants in some entry-level occupations may lead firms to become ‘migrant-
dependent’, potentially locking out UK-born workers from job opportunities (Stenning et al., 
2006, Green, 2007b).   
 
There is now some international evidence supporting these ideas, mainly from the 
US (see section 4 of this paper and the overview chapter). However, there is much less 
European or UK evidence of the existence and magnitude of ‘diversity effects’ on urban 
economies. It is important to fill these gaps, given the high levels of public and policy 
interest in the economic impacts of both net immigration – and the larger, more diverse 
societies and cities that result.  
 
The paper makes two main contributions to the field. First, it develops rich new 
descriptive data on recent patterns of cultural diversity in UK cities, using three different 
identity measures. Specifically, I use the ONOMAP system of cultural-ethnic-linguistic 
(CEL) name classification, alongside more conventional metrics based on country of birth 
and Office of National Statistics ethnic groups. I then use Fractionalisation Indices to 
measure urban diversity, generating a largely intuitive picture of urban mix.  
 
Second, the paper tests linkages between these measures and urban wages and 
employment rates, using a simple growth model and cross-sectional analysis.  The results 
suggest the diversity measures are complements, capturing distinct aspects of ‘super-
diversity’ – and that there are a number of channels from demographic change to urban 
economic outcomes, not all of them positive.  Country of birth and ethnic group-based 
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measures show significant positive links to urban wages, as do some CEL-based 
measures. Links to urban employment rates are more mixed, with predominantly non-
significant or negative coefficients.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section two discusses key trends and policy 
context. Section three looks at the concept of ‘cultural diversity’ in more detail, and 
introduces the CEL methodology. Section four reviews theory and evidence on the 
economics of cultural diversity, particularly in relation to urban areas. The rest of the paper 
describes the primary research. Section five outlines the approach, datasets and sample. 
Section six gives the results of the descriptive analysis, and section seven the regression 
results. Section eight concludes.  
 
 
2. The multicultural city in history 
 
Multicultural society and ‘the multicultural city’ are usually seen as new phenomena. In 
fact, their roots often go back for centuries (Sandu, 2004). Britain and many other 
European societies share a long history of people movement and demographic change. 
Migrations typically resulted in new minority communities assimilating, to different degrees, 
into the cultural mainstream: ‘even when [new groups] kept their differences, they were 
members of the community: part of the complex, highly heterogeneous ‘we’ of any 
developed society’ (Sassen, 2004). Vertovec (2007) chronicles complaints across 
Medieval Britain that ‘foreigners were practising their own customs’. By 1867 the Times 
was arguing that ‘there is hardly such a thing as a pure Englishman on this island … our 
national denomination, to be strictly correct, would be a composite of a dozen national 
titles’ (Sandu, 2004). 
 
This ‘complex we’ is usually highly urbanised: cities are the primary sites of cultural 
diversity (Amin, 2002). Again, many urban communities in the UK have surprisingly deep 
roots. In his history of the city, Peter Ackroyd writes that ‘by the tenth century [London] was 
populated by Cmyric Brythons and Belgae, by remnants of the Gaulish legions, by East 
Saxons and Mercians, by Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, by Franks and Jutes and 
Angles, all mingled and mingling together to form a distinct tribe of ‘Londoners’’ (Ackroyd, 
2000).  
 
Even apparently recent phenomena such as ‘Chinatowns’ often turn out to be 
venerable. For example, Chinese communities in London, Liverpool and Manchester were 
well established by the end of the 19th century. Liverpool’s Chinatown grew up in the 
 36
1860s on the back of a regular steamer service to Chinese ports: by the 1930s, there were 
around 20,000 ethnic Chinese living in the city. 
 
 This is not only true of Britain, of course. Since the 1970s, Indo- and Chinese-
American entrepreneurs have played an important role in the growth of Silicon Valley. But 
the Bay Area has had large communities from both countries since the 19th century: 
Indian migrants started arriving from the 1850s onwards, many becoming prominent 
figures in the Santa Clara valley during its first, agricultural phase (Randolph and Erich, 
2009 ).  
 
The main changes over the past few decades are the scale and speed of 
population movement. As the world’s population grows, so does the scale of global 
mobility (Landry and Wood, 2008). The US, historically a  ‘country of immigrants’ (and the 
descendents of slaves) has also experienced large upturns in net migration from South 
American countries, South and South East Asia (Putnam, 2007).  
 
The UK has experienced particularly striking changes. Vertovec (2006, 2007) 
argues that since the early 1990s, there has been a transformative ‘diversification of 
diversity’ leading to the emergence of ‘super-diversity’. Vertovec’s terminology captures a 
number of linked changes. At the most basic level, the UK has moved from a net exporter 
of people to a net importer. At the same time, the range of country of birth groups in Britain 
has substantially expanded  (Kyambi, 2005). For England and Wales between 2001 and 
2009, non ‘White British’ groups have grown from 6.6m to 9.1m and now comprise one in 
six of the population (Office of National Statistics, 2011).  
 
As new communities form, the number of languages spoken and religions practised 
has also grown. In 2003, the first year data was collected, 10.4% of primary schoolchildren 
and 8.8% of secondary schoolchildren had a first language other than English. By 2009, 
these had risen to 15.2% and 11.1% respectively (Department for Children Schools and 
Families, 2009). 
 
International migration is a key driver of growing cultural diversity in the UK, but not 
the only one. By mid-2007, net births had overtaken immigration as a source of population 
growth (Office of National Statistics, 2008b). This includes a rising share of births to 
mothers born outside the UK, reflecting higher than average birth rates in some migrant / 
minority groups. It also reflects the tendency of new migrants to put down roots in host 
countries, even when economic conditions turn down (Department of Communities and 
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Local Government, 2009b). By 2051, the UK’s black and minority ethnic communities may 
have grown to 21% of the population, up from 8% in 2001 (Wohland et al., 2010).  
 
The UK’s cultural diversity is a largely urban phenomenon. England’s migrant and 
minority ethnic populations are largely concentrated in and around London, the 
conurbations and other cities. In 2001 the capital contained 48.2% of England’s non-white 
population  (Champion, 2006). Schoolchildren in London speak at least 300 different 
languages at home (Baker and Eversley, 2000). As new communities settle, they tend to 
de-concentrate across urban space, moving from inner urban areas into suburban 
neighbourhoods (Simpson and Finney, 2009). Vertovec emphasises that changes in 
spatial patterning also inform super-diversity – while urban cores represent the largest 
stocks and inflows of minority communities, many suburban and rural areas have seen 
rapid relative change (Vertovec, 2007). At the same time better, cheaper technology and 
transport facilitate transnational lifestyles and strengthens diasporas.  
 
2.1 Policy context  
 
Worries about diversity and migration are nothing new. Fearing unrest, in the year 
883 King Alfred banished the Danes from London, restricting them to land east of the river 
Lea (Keith, 2005). Elizabeth I issued a proclamation in 1610 ordering the expulsion of 
‘negars and Blackamoores’ from the capital (Sandu, 2004). Sassen points out that all the 
major European countries have centuries-long histories of anti-immigrant sentiment 
(Sassen, 2004). In the America of the late 19th and early 20th century, urban communities 
like New York, Chicago, San Francisco and New Orleans were often riven with inter-ethnic 
conflict as established groups – self-described ‘Americans’ – battled with newer arrivals 
(Sante, 1998).  
 
Cultural and ethnic conflicts are often hard to disentangle from other fears about 
class, poverty and access to resources, as the 2001 disturbances in many northern 
English towns illustrate (Cantle, 2001). Similar discussions have taken place in the wake of 
the summer 2011 riots in London and other English cities. There remain widespread public 
and policy concerns about the social and economic effects of larger, more diverse 
communities in the UK (Goodhart, 2004, Caldwell, 2009, Goodhart, 2010). Around 80% of 
Britons say that the UK has good relations between different types of people (Landry and 
Wood, 2008). Nevertheless, since 2003, ‘race and immigration’ has been one of the top 
three issues in MORI’s monthly omnibus surveys of public opinion (Somerville, 2007), and 
in public opinion surveys, large majorities consistently say they would like immigration 
reduced (Blinder, 2011).   
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The emergence of Muslim communities in many European cities has provoked 
particularly strong reactions. Cultural conservatives such as Caldwell (2009) raise the 
prospect of a future ‘Eurabia’ dominated by Islamic culture and laws; progressives argue 
that as new communities become established, religion and cultural customs typically 
evolve or are left aside (Kuper, 2009). In the UK there are periodic concerns about ‘white 
flight’ from urban areas – in 2005 Trevor Phillips, then head of the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, suggested that Britain was ‘sleepwalking into segregation’, although 
evidence suggests little spatial segregation in British cities (Simpson and Finney, 2009).  
 
Reflecting these debates, British policy frameworks have evolved in the past 40 
years – from a broadly multiculturalist approach towards a greater focus on integration of 
minority groups and maintaining community cohesion (Landry and Wood, 2008, 
Department of Communities and Local Government, 2008, Department of Communities 
and Local Government, 2009a). Under the last government immigration policy became 
increasingly orientated towards meeting economic goals, attracting skilled workers and 
restricting the supply of others (Somerville, 2007). By contrast, the current Coalition has 
implemented much greater restrictions on migrants, with an overall cap on net immigration 
introduced from 2011.  
 
 
3. Understanding cultural diversity: measures and bases  
 
This paper seeks to answer two questions. First, how culturally diverse are British cities? 
Second, what are the links between urban cultural diversity and economic performance? 
To answer these satisfactorily, I need to settle a third, prior question: how best to 
conceptualise quantify, ‘cultural diversity’? This section reviews the literature and issues, 
and introduces the three main diversity metrics used in this and other papers.  
 
Defining cultural diversity is extremely challenging. Fundamentally, we are trying to 
classify human distinctiveness, something that tends to resist being pinned down (Landry 
and Wood, 2008). There are two basic steps in attempting to define cultural diversity. The 
first is to establish a working definition of ‘cultural identity’; the second is to use this to 
classify the diversity of identities.  
 
3.1 Understanding cultural identity  
 
Culture and ethnicity are ‘context-driven social and psychological concepts’, and so 
are fundamentally difficult to identify and estimate (Aspinall, 2009). For researchers 
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interested in identity, this presents three problems. First, cultural identity is multi-
dimensional and multi-level: components of identity are commonly assumed to comprise 
kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality and appearance (Bulmer, 1996). As 
Casey and Dustmann  (2009) point out, ‘because ‘identity’ is not a uniquely defined 
concept, its correct measurement in empirical analysis is unclear’.  
 
Second, identity has important elements of self-definition – it is our ‘sense of self’. 
There is general agreement that ‘membership of a … [cultural] group is something that is 
subjectively meaningful to the person concerned’ (Office of National Statistics, 2003). 
However, many people (such as the children of immigrants) may not feel they belong 
uniquely to a single group. Casey and Dustmann (2009) find strong evidence of parental 
influence on identity in a study of German migrants; they also find that while fathers tend 
to ‘transmit’ German identity to children, mothers transmit ‘home’ identity, particularly to 
daughters. This suggests limits to the self-definition of identity, and that identities may 
evolve beyond childhood.  
 
Third, both individuals’ sense of identity and categories of ethnic and cultural 
classification tend to change over time. The UK has shifted from crude groupings such as 
‘coloureds’ in the 1960s towards increasingly sophisticated categories today (Keith, 2005). 
The literature distinguishes ‘primordial’ views of ethnicity, which view identity as an 
exogenous given, and ‘constructivist’ theories -which stress the role of economic 
development and nation-building processes in shaping and re-shaping identity (see Green 
(2011) for an overview).  
 
Over time, identities may be shaped by exogenous geographical conditions and 
man-made factors such as colonisation (Michalopoulos, 2008), or coalition-building to 
secure public goods (Ahlerup and Olsson, 2007). Using cross-country data, Green (2011) 
finds that in developing countries urbanisation is a significant influence on identity 
formation, while in countries with mature urban systems such as the UK, international 
migration plays a more important role. Studies of migrant communities suggest certain 
aspects of identity become more or less salient as groups assimilate. Manning and Roy 
(2007)find that age, years of residence and years of education have a positive association 
with the strength of British identity. Evolving aspects of identity within communities help 
shape that community’s view of itself. Discussing the evolution of cultural identity within 
French Muslim communities, sociologist Olivier Roy uses the concept of ‘formatage’ – a 
dynamic process in which aspects of ‘traditional’ cultural or religious behaviour, typically 
those of first generation migrants, are reshaped by subsequent generations to reflect new 
socio-cultural milieux (Roy, in Kuper (2009)).  
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3.2 Classifications of cultural identity  
 
These properties of identity suggest that all attempts to classify and measure it will 
be imperfect.  At the extreme, if we believe that individual identity is essentially self-
ascribed, or entirely fluid, it becomes very difficult to ascribe behaviour to identity – 
especially aspects of identity that are malleable, such as nationality or religion (Casey and 
Dustmann, 2009). Most researchers therefore look for relatively stable, objective proxies 
for cultural identity (Mateos et al., 2009).  
 
Researchers are getting to grips with many of the conceptual challenges (Aspinall 
2009). However, existing datasets tend to be relatively crude, particularly those relying on 
a single ‘tick-box’ approach (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010).  
 
There are two major practical criteria for identity proxies (Aspinall, 2009). The first 
is the need for high ‘granularity’, to distinguish different groups at a high level of detail. The 
second is the ‘validity / utility tradeoff’: we need to balance granularity with the need to link 
smaller groups into larger ones. These are not simply theoretical concerns: multi-
dimensional, multi-level classifications seem to help explain economic and social 
outcomes. A recent major study found that at cross-country level, high-level ethno-
linguistic cleavages are good predictors of civil conflict and redistributive tendencies; finer-
grained, sub-national distinctions matter more for economic growth and the provision of 
public goods (Desmet et al., 2009).  
 
I deploy three metrics for quantifying cultural diversity, which are discussed in 
outline here. Further details are given in Appendices A (classifications) and B (the 
ONOMAP / CEL system).  
 
My first two  proxies for cultural identity are country of birth and ethnicity. Both have 
pros and cons – both inherent, and for use in the UK context. Country of birth is objective, 
and data is available at high levels of detail (information is provided for over 100 countries 
in the UK Labour Force Survey). As a measure of immigration, country of birth is obviously 
more than adequate. However, birth country is only one aspect of cultural identity. While it 
offers high granularity, country of birth provides limited validity as a diversity proxy: 
notably, in the 2001 Census only half the ethnic minority population was born outside the 
UK (Mateos et al., 2007). 
 
The UK Office of National Statistics (ONS) also provides typologies of ‘official’ 
ethnic groups, which are used in the Census and a number of other public datasets. In the 
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2001 and 2011 Census the ONS has worked with a typology of 15 ‘major’ ethnic groups 
such as ‘White British’, ‘Indian’, ‘Pakistani’ and ‘Black Caribbean’. These groups have the 
advantage of aggregating a number of dimensions of cultural identity, and have been 
designed for ease of use. However, they have been criticised for both poor granularity – 
hiding substantial variation between groups – and limited validity,  bearing little relation to 
actual cultural norms or socio-economic outcomes (Mateos et al., 2009). By focusing on 
‘visible minorities’, the ONS classifications also provide limited information on the recent 
growth of ‘white other’ communities in the UK, in particular arrivals from central and 
Eastern Europe  (Green, 2007b).  
 
Cultural-ethnic-linguistic (CEL) name classification is an alternative approach, 
designed to capture multiple aspects of identity including religion, geography, language 
and kinship using name information (see Mateos (2007) for a review of recent research). I 
use the ONOMAP system, which classifies individuals according to most likely cultural-
ethnic characteristics identified from forenames, surnames and forename-surname 
combinations. ONOMAP is developed from very large names database extracted from UK 
Electoral Registers and other sources, covering 500,000 forenames and a million 
surnames across 28 countries (see Appendix B for more details). 
 
ONOMAP has the advantage of providing objective information at several levels of 
detail and across several dimensions of identity. For example, it can usefully disaggregate 
complex groups, such as the British ‘Muslim community’, into distinct geographical, ethnic 
and linguistic sets. It is also able to deal with Anglicisation of names, and names with 
multiple origins, giving it additional granularity and validity. However, it has three 
limitations. First, by observing only objective elements of identity it provides information on 
most likely identity. Second, it does not easily distinguish ‘British’ names from those in 
other English-language countries. Third, it does not distinguish migrants from those in 
existing minority communities.  
 
3.3. From cultural identity to cultural diversity  
 
 Having identified three – relatively – stable identity proxies, I am now able to 
generate measures of diversity. In a review of the literature, Ottaviano et al (2007) identify 
various salient dimensions of diversity: richness / number of groups; evenness / 
distribution of groups, and distance between groups. In practice, most metrics can only 
capture one or two of these dimensions.  
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For instance, isolation indices and dissimilarity indices – which measure, 
respectively, the extent to which members of a given group are only exposed to members 
of that same group, and the exposure of one group to members of another – are good 
measures of distance and evenness. By construction, however, they are unhelpful if we 
want to examine a number of different groups (rather than two).   
 
Researchers interested specifically in diversity have often used the 
Fractionalisation Index, which I also adopt here. Fractionalisation Indices are derived from 
the Herfindahl Index of industrial concentration, and are widely used in the literature 
(Easterley and Levine, 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a). 
For area a in year t, the value of the Index is given by:  
 
FRACat = 1 – ∑g [SHAREgat]2                 (1) 
 
Where SHARE is group g’s share of the total area population, and g indexes (1 ... n) 
groups.  The Index measures the probability that two individuals in an area come from 
different birth country/ethnic/CEL groups: it takes the value 0 when everyone is in the 
same country of birth group and 1 when each individual is in a different group. 
 
The Index is suitable for measuring diversity in that it reflects both the number of 
different groups in an area and their relative sizes. In this way, it captures both richness 
and evenness of groups. However, this latter property can also lead to some unexpected 
results. The evenness property implies that Fractionalisation Index scores increasing in 
both number of groups and evenness of group sizes. This means that, for example, a city 
with a lot of small identity groups and a city with a few large, evenly sized groups get 
similar scores on the Index. I obtain precisely this result in Section 6, where the CEL-
based Index generates similar scores for London and for large Scottish cities.  
 
 
4. The economics of cultural diversity: reviewing the evidence  
 
The introductory chapter sets out some basic theoretical frameworks on immigration, 
diversity, innovation and urban economic performance. This section considers specific 
issues in more detail, and summarises relevant empirical results.  
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4.1 Cultural diversity and cities: approaches 
 
The literature on diversity and urban places is large and itself diverse, covering historical 
analysis (Hall, 1998, Crafts and Venables, 2001), ethnic group studies (Sante, 1998, 
Sandu, 2004), the post-colonial literature (Gilroy, 1993, Urry, 2000), urban sociology 
(Smith, 2001, Sandercock, 2003, Keith, 2005); health (Fernandez, 2010), political 
participation, social capital and community cohesion (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, 
Putnam, 2007).  
 
 The economic literature is wide-ranging, covering topics including diversity and 
organisational performance (Ozgen et al., 2010, Parrotta et al., 2011), entrepreneurship 
(Honig et al., 2010), labour markets (Borjas, 1994, Card, 2005); innovation (Saxenian, 
2006, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2010, Kerr and Lincoln, 2010), productivity (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2006), the cost of living (Saiz, 2003) and long term economic development 
(Easterley and Levine, 1997, Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009, Gorodnichenko and Roland, 
2011). Within the economic strand there are two major preoccupations. First, there is an 
extensive literature on migration decisions and migration-related labour supply shocks 
(see Kerr and Kerr (2011)and Dustmann et al (2008) for recent reviews). Second, in the 
development studies field a number of country-level studies have looked at the role of 
‘ethno-linguistic fractionalisation’ in affecting long term economic development, particularly 
in some African countries (Ranis, 2009).  
 
In order to understand the economics of cultural diversity at urban level, it is 
important to look beyond both of these debates. To do this I develop a simple theoretical 
framework, using perspectives from growth theory and new economic geography. I then 
populate the framework with evidence from the UK and elsewhere.  
 
4.2 Cities and economic development  
 
Classical models of economic growth predict the long run convergence of countries 
and regions. By contrast, endogenous growth theories highlight the importance of human 
capital and knowledge in advancing the technological frontier. Subsequent productivity 
gains drive long term growth rates (Romer, 1990). National and regional differences in 
knowledge creation and diffusion thus help explain spatial disparities.  
 
In these accounts of long term growth, cities play a number of important and well-
established roles. Agglomeration economies help raise firms’ and workers’ productivity. 
Duranton and Puga (2003) summarise these as ‘matching’, ‘sharing’ and ‘learning’ effects. 
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In particular, cities facilitate knowledge spillovers and ideas flow, by supporting face to 
face interactions and other ‘learning’ economies. Jacobs (1969) suggests cities offer 
dynamic productivity gains to firms by enabling innovation. Recent structural shifts in 
national economies – in particular, an increased share of employment in services and 
‘knowledge-intensive’ activity – have helped sort employers and skilled workers across 
urban areas (Overman and Rice, 2008). Productivity gains driven by agglomeration help 
raise nominal wages and (often) employment rates; conversely, urban crowding in growing 
cities raises costs and eats into real wages (Combes et al., 2005).  
 
4.3 Cultural diversity and urban economies: frameworks   
 
These theories also suggest various roles for cultural diversity in urban economic 
development. Net immigration to a city changes both the size and composition of the 
population and the workforce. Under neoclassical assumptions, the main effects are 
through the labour market. In small open economies – like cities – average wages are 
temporarily bid down, but then readjust via capital flows and expansion of labour-intensive 
sectors. Initially, immigrants typically ‘cluster’ in entry-level occupations, so that low-skill 
UK-born workers (so-called ‘natives’) may experience short term wage losses and high-
skill natives short term gains (Dustmann et al., 2008). 
 
Allowing for diversity-related externalities sets up a number of other impact 
channels: most notably, production complementarities for firms and workers (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2005a, Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, Bellini et al., 2008, Südekum et al., 2009, 
Longhi, 2011). First, diversity may influence knowledge creation at the group (team, firm) 
level, via the benefits of a wider set of perspectives for problem-solving and ideas 
generation (Page, 2007, Berliant and Fujita, 2009).3 On the other hand, more diverse 
groups or communities may suffer from communication problems or a lack of trust (Alesina 
and La Ferrara, 2004). Second, the composition of economic agents may influence 
knowledge flows: diverse groups may have better access to new ideas and markets via 
access to co-ethnic diasporas - which reduce information and communication costs 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). Third, migrants themselves act as mobile carriers of 
knowledge. Migration decisions reflect both expected returns and the taste for risk-taking. 
Ethnic entrepreneurs may also act as ‘reputational intermediaries’, forging partnerships 
and helping markets access (Kapur and McHale, 2005, Saxenian and Sabel, 2008). But 
                                               
3
 Page’s Diversity Prediction Theorem suggests  that given a group of predictive models, the greater the 
diversity of modellers, the smaller the chances of error. This also implies that in some circumstances, the 
diversity of the problem-solving group is more important than individual talent. Cultural diversity (analogous 
to Page’s ‘identity diversity’)  is related to cognitive diversity, since different backgrounds and experiences 
are likely to generate different views and ideas. Various empirical studies confirm this.  
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migrants and minority groups may face discrimination from majority groups, restricting the 
role of diasporas and ethnic entrepreneurs. 
 
These diversity-growth channels may be more important for some types of 
economic activity than others. Intuitively, we would expect greater benefits in ‘knowledge-
intensive’ environments – such as R&D, creative industries, academia and strategic 
management / consulting (Fujita and Weber, 2003). At urban level these channels will 
directly influence average labour productivity. Urban areas may also have indirect 
amplifying effects. These may be positive, via the composition effects of larger, more 
diverse populations and the presence of agglomeration economies. Conversely, members 
of minority communities may be physically isolated in particular neighbourhoods, limiting 
opportunities for knowledge spillovers and interaction with other groups (Zenou, 2011). 
 
If the overall effect of these channels is net positive it may influence agglomeration 
economies, leading to further in-migration. However, greater competition for space in 
growing cities may raise the local cost of living (Saiz, 2003, Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). 
Over time, shifts in urban industrial structure and labour market institutions further 
influence economic outcomes. More cosmopolitan urban populations may also raise 
demand for new / hybridised goods and services, triggering Jacobian knowledge spillovers 
across sectors (Mazzolari and Neumark, 2009). Conversely, employers in labour-intensive 
sectors may respond to long term migrant inflows by permanently adjusting production 
functions to take advantage of cheap labour. If low value-added firms may then become 
reliant on migrant workers, locking out lower-skilled UK born workers from employment 
opportunities (Stenning et al., 2006).   
 
4.4 Cultural diversity and urban economies: evidence base  
 
In theory, the effects of cultural diversity on urban economic performance are 
ambiguous. What empirical evidence exists is similarly mixed. US city-level evidence 
suggests that long term, increases in cultural diversity are linked to both productivity and 
price gains in American cities, so that real welfare effects are close to neutral (Saiz, 2003, 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, Sparber, 2007). Bellini and colleagues (2008) find similar effects 
in a sample of European regions. UK panel studies of urban areas suggest similar 
productivity-driven wage gains, alongside employment losses for lower-skilled workers 
(see next paper).  
 
There are also a number of studies on wider diversity effects in cities. There is 
some evidence the co-location of migrant inventors is linked to higher levels of urban 
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innovation (Peri, 2007, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008, Ozgen et al., 2010). Several 
studies also find that migrant networks also facilitate international links and reduce trade 
costs (Peri and Requena, 2009). Saxenian (2006) provides detailed evidence on the roles 
of migrant and ethnic diasporas in the Silicon Valley area. Similarly, Kerr’s analysis of 
international patent citations suggests that ethnic research communities in the US, who 
tend to be heavily urbanised, play a critical role in generating and exporting new ideas 
(Kerr, 2009, Kerr and Lincoln, 2010). At the other end of the economy, immigration is 
positively associated with an increased range of restaurants in California (Mazzolari and 
Neumark, 2009). However, overall levels of ‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ seem to vary greatly 
by group, country and community class structures (Nakhaie et al., 2009).  
 
Alesina and La Ferrara (2004) review a number of studies on diversity and urban 
social outcomes, finding some links between ethnic fragmentation, lower trust in others 
and lower provision of public goods. More recently, Putnam (2007) finds some evidence 
that US neighbourhood-level bonding social capital falls when diversity increases, but 
suggests that the long term economic and social benefits of diverse communities outweigh 
short-term losses. Card (2007) argues along similar lines, suggesting that the diversity 
immigrants bring to US cities is net positive in welfare terms.   
 
4.5 Diversity and a Creative Class? 
 
An alternative view is suggested by Richard Florida (Florida, 2002). In this model, 
urban economies are increasingly dominated by a ‘Creative Class’ of skilled workers with 
strong preferences for cultural diversity. Open and tolerant cities attract the Creative Class, 
improving their human capital mix and attracting new investment. This implies that diverse 
cities might have stronger economic performance primarily because of the Creative Class, 
with cultural diversity contributing nothing directly. In practice, the Creative Class performs 
poorly in both US (Glaeser, 2005) and UK contexts (Nathan, 2007). Significantly, there is 
little UK evidence that a single ‘Creative Class’ exists – skilled workers have a range of 
location preferences covering city centres, suburbs and rural locations. 
 
 
5. Data and sample  
 
There is little British evidence on the issues just discussed. I build a sample of UK urban 
areas to explore. The structure of the main data sources result in a pooled cross-section of 
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5.1 Data sources 
 
I draw on two main data sources, the UK Electoral Registry and the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS). Electoral data provides the main input for ONOMAP and was kindly 
provided by Pablo Mateos at CASA, UCL. Electoral Register information is provided as a 
continuous cross-section; at the time of writing the most recent data was for the years 
2001-6. This determines the basic shape of the urban areas sample.   
 
Raw data for ONOMAP is drawn from names in Electoral Registers, with additional 
data provided by Experian’s ‘Consumer Dynamics’ database.4 The version of ONOMAP I 
am using has been designed for analysis at the urban level, and provides information for 
65 CEL ‘subgroups’, aggregating smaller CEL communities into larger units.  
 
The Labour Force Survey provides detailed information on country of birth and 
ONS ethnic groups, and so is used to construct the other diversity measures. While not as 
large as the Census, the LFS has the advantages of quarterly surveys and access to 
individual-level information for the whole sample5.  I am interested in links between 
diversity, wages and employment: I therefore restrict observations to the LFS working age 
population (16-64 for men, 16-59 for women). I drop observations from Northern Ireland, 
which is not covered by CEL data. The LFS also provides information for demographic, 
economic and social controls for the regression analysis (see section seven).   
 
The relatively small size of the LFS raises the risk of measurement error when 
used below regional level (Dustmann et al., 2005). I am interested in the sub-regional level 
– specifically the local spatial economy – so need to minimise sources of error. ONOMAP 
data is provided at local authority level, and LFS microdata is provided with local authority-
level identifiers. I aggregate the microdata to local authority level, and use a postcode 
share weighting system to aggregate both sets of data to Travel to Work Area Level (2001 
TTWAs, the most recent iteration).6 TTWAs have the additional benefits of being designed 
                                               
4
 Since 2001 UK residents have been able to opt out of the publicly available version of the Register. The 
raw data highlights deregisters, but does not identify which are genuine opt-outs and which are simply 
moves from one constituency to another. As a result, a number of records in the raw data may be 
duplicates. The ONOMAP team have performed extensive de-duplication, minimising this risk.  
5
 From the ONS Virtual Microdata Lab (VML). The quarterly LFS samples around 60,000 households. 
Each quarter consists of five overlapping ‘waves’, with an 80% overlap within that quarter. As per ONS 
recommendations, to ensure a sample of unique individuals I keep only observations from waves 1 and 5 
in each quarter. I then pool the remaining data to produce calendar years. This approach gives me 
c.120,000 individual-level observations per year.  
6
 I aggregate individual-level LFS data to local authority-level averages and combine with Electoral 
Register data. I then aggregate everything to TTWA level averages using postcode shares, as follows. 
Local Authority District (LAD) boundaries are not congruent with TTWA boundaries, so straightforward 
aggregation is not possible. Using the November 2008 National Postcode Sector Database (NSPD), I 
calculate the number of postcodes in each 2001 TTWA and in each of its constituent LADs. I then 
calculate each LAD’s ‘postcode share’ of the relevant TTWAs’ total postcodes. For each TTWA, shares 
sum to one.  Shares are then used to construct TTWA-level averages from the relevant LAD-level 
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to represent largely self-contained local labour markets, and are regarded as good proxies 
for a spatial economy (Robson et al., 2006). I further restrict the analysis to ‘primary urban’ 
TTWAs where the sample sizes are biggest, drawing on analysis by Gibbons et al (2011) 
(see Appendix C).  
 
5.2 Diversity variables  
 
My main measure of cultural diversity is the ONOMAP CEL classification, which covers 67 
urban-level subgroups. From this, I construct Fractionalisation Indices of cultural diversity, 
as defined in Section 3. 
 
For the ONOMAP data I make two Fractionalisation Indices. The first Index looks at 
the distribution of all 67 sub-groups, and covers the whole UK urban population. The 
second Index is based on the groups not classified as English, Celtic, Welsh or Scottish 
geographical origin, who comprise around 20% of the total urban population. This second 
Index puts greater weight on recent migrant and minority communities, and acts as a 
rough ‘Super-diversity Index’. The intention here is not to make a judgement on the 
inherent ‘Britishness’ of names, but rather to use geography and geographical ‘roots’ as a 
proxy for recent patterns of population change.  
 
I construct further Indices of diversity using birth country and ethnic group 
information.  The birth country Index covers 101 countries, and the ethnic groups Index the 
15 main ONS ethnic groups (see Appendix A). I also develop two alternative ‘Super-
diversity’ Indices covering migrant and minority ethnic populations respectively. 
 
 
6. Descriptive analysis 
 
My data provides for very rich descriptive statistics, which are set out in Tables 1-8.  Table 
1 presents summary statistics. Tables 2– 4 break down the various diversity measures by 
area, focusing on the urban areas of greatest cultural diversity; Tables 5-8 look at the 
largest groups.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
averages. Each TTWA cell contains an average of 517 individual-level LFS observations: sample sizes will 
be higher for the final cross-section, which uses urban areas only.  
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6.1 Stylised facts  
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the 79 urban TTWAs – covering 
demographic characteristics, economic performance measures and information on 
population density, industrial and economic structure. The first panel covers economic 
performance variables: average hourly wages (measured in £ and pence) and 
employment rates (given as a percentage of the working age population). The mean wage 
for 2001-6 is just under £10 an hour and is lowest is Burnley (£8.09) and highest in 
London (£13.88). Employment rates average 75 percent, from 62.3% in Hartlepool to just 
over 82% in Swindon.  
 
The second panel refers to diversity measures and throws up two striking points. 
First, as measured by CEL sub-groups, average levels of urban cultural diversity are 
considerably higher than using ‘traditional’ measures such as country of birth. Specifically, 
the mean of the CEL Fractionalisation Index is 0.416 with minimum 0.197, compared to 
other means of 0.28 (ONS ethnicity) and 0.143 (country of birth). The most diverse city on 
the CEL Index is Glasgow, and the least diverse Crawley (more on this below). Birth 
country and ethnicity-based Indexes are distributed as one would expect. In both cases 
London is the most diverse, Hartlepool the least diverse.  
 
Second, the descriptives start to shed light on urban super-diversity – with majority 
name subgroups removed, the average value of the CEL Index is 0.826, with London 
scoring the maximum of 0.946 and Lanarkshire the minimum of 0.368. Indexes of migrant 
groups and minority ethnic groups also put London at the top, and (respectively) 
Hartlepool and Darlington at the bottom. 
 
6.2 Urban cultural diversity by group  
 
Tables 2 and 3 give information on the major CEL name subgroups. As expected, 
‘English’, ‘Celtic’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Welsh’ country-origin subgroups make up over 88% of 
names in UK urban areas (Table 2). Beyond this, ONOMAP data provides richer 
disaggregation than country of birth and much finer-grained information ONS ethnicity-
based rankings. For example, ONOMAP is able to distinguish between Ashkenazi and 
Sephardic Jewish communities, and also illustrate the complexity of constructions like the 
‘British Muslim community’, which turns out to incorporate disparate groups from Pakistan 
(around six per cent of minority subgroups), Kashmir (0.74%), Somalia (0.5%), the 
Balkans (0.37%), Iran (0.14%) and a range of smaller ‘other Muslim’ groups including 
Sudan, Malaysia and some Central Asian Republics.   
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Tables 4 and 5 provide some illustrative dynamics, using country of birth and 
ethnicity measures from 2001 – 2006.  Table 4 shows that Germany, India, Pakistan and 
Ireland consistently form the largest migrant communities among the urban working-age 
population. The 2001 figures are likely to include many in the ‘new migrant communities’ 
that developed in urban Britain over the 1990s – notably those from Zimbabwe, Poland, 
South Africa and Hong Kong (Kyambi, 2005). Many of these continued to grow during the 
2000s, particularly South Asian and North American groups. Table 4 also illustrates the 
rapid growth of some migrant communities from the Central / Eastern countries which 
acceded to the EU in 2004. Most notably, Polish migrants made up 1.27% of the migrant 
population in 2001, but this had risen to almost 5% by 2006.  
 
Table 5 provides similar information by ONS ethnic group. The figures show that 
while ‘White British’ is by far the single largest official ethnic group, its overall share of 
ethnic groups fell over four percentage points during the sample period. The largest gains 
were for ‘Other White’ and ‘Other’ groups, whose population shares gained 1.98 and 0.61 
percentage points between 2001 and 2006. Unfortunately the construction of ONS 
groupings prevents further examination of these ‘other’ groups, although given the 
previous analysis the majority are likely to be from countries in Central / Eastern Europe 
and across North America. 
 
6.3 Urban cultural diversity by area 
 
Tables 6-8 ranks urban areas’ cultural diversity by Fractionalisation Index scores. 
Table 6 gives results for the CEL Index: the left hand columns give results for the full 
Index, the right hand columns scores for the super-diversity Index. Perhaps surprisingly, 
the full Index suggests that Scottish cities are more culturally diverse than London, with 
the biggest Welsh cities only fractionally behind the capital.  
 
By construction, Fractionalisation Index scores increase with the number of groups 
and with groups of equal size. Scottish and Welsh cities will tend to have relatively few 
groups of fairly even size, with large, historic populations of ‘Celtic’ and ‘English’ CEL 
origin alongside majority ‘Scottish’ and ‘Welsh’ groups. By contrast, London has a very 
large number of distinct cultural communities, but with widely varying sizes (Kyambi, 
2005). This is borne out in the right hand column, which shows ranking by areas once 
‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’ and ‘Celtic’ groups are removed. Without these name group 
populations, CEL-based rankings look closer to intuition, as well as more established 
diversity measures.  
 
 51
Tables 7 and 8 give scores for country of birth and ethnicity Indexes, both drawn 
from LFS data. Unlike ONOMAP data, the LFS is available year by year so I am able to 
examine change within the period. Table 7 examines ‘migrant diversity’. With the exception 
of Guildford and Aldershot, the 15 most diverse urban areas have also all increased their 
migrant population share during the sample period.7 The biggest climbers are Cambridge, 
Reading and Bracknell, Leeds, and Wycombe and Slough, with Luton and Watford some 
way behind.  
 
Table 8 shows area diversity using ONS ethnic groups. The set of most diverse 
urban areas is broadly similar to measures using country of birth, although Wycombe does 
not feature in the top 15. The list of climbers is also broadly similar, although the largest 
increases in ethnic group diversity have been in Bolton, where the Fractionalisation Index 
rose by 0.142. Whether measured by birth country or ethnicity – although not by CEL 
groups – London is by some way the most diverse city in the UK.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that how diversity is measured makes a major 
difference. All three diversity measures capture different aspects of urban demography, 
and the measures for which we have dynamic information show substantial change across 
both migrant and ethnic groups. Second, on an area level diversity metrics using CEL 
information can be substantively different from those using country of birth or ethnicity as 
the identity proxy.  However, once CEL information is restricted to ‘non-UK origin’ names, 
the Index scores converge.   
 
 
7. Regression analysis  
 
Using the dataset, I test for linkages between cultural diversity and economic performance 
in UK cities. The descriptive analysis above suggests significant variation between urban 
areas, so an area-level analysis seems useful. It also suggests important differences 
between diversity metrics: I therefore use all three measurement bases. Given the small 
number of observations I set up a parsimonious model linking urban economic outcomes 
to diversity and a range of demographic, economic and spatial controls. I briefly discuss 
the estimation strategy then highlight the main findings.  
 
 
 
                                               
7
 Aldershot contains a major army base. As the Army is predominantly White British, this may 
affect trends during the 2001-6 period.   
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7.1 Estimation strategy  
 
My estimation strategy follows the spatial correlations approach widely used in the 
migration and diversity literature, e.g. Altonji and Card (1991), Card (2001), Dustmann et al 
(2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2006). This exploits local variations in levels of cultural 
diversity and economic outcomes of interest. For TTWA i, the model is given by:  
 
 Yi = bDIVi + DEMic + ECONid + eSPATi  + e                      (2) 
 
I fit a log-linear specification, which allows me to interpret coefficients of b as 
marginal effects. In this case, Y is either the log of average hourly wages or the log of 
average employment rates, in each case for the working-age population. Because CEL 
data does not allow me to distinguish wages or employment rates by CEL subgroups, I 
focus in this paper on outcomes for the whole urban population. (The next paper looks at 
immigration and isolates outcomes for natives and various native skill groups.) The 
variable of interest is DIV, which is either the Fractionalisation Index of CEL subgroups, 
the ‘super-diversity Index’, or an Index of country of birth groups or of ONS ethnic groups.  
(For comparison I also fit indices of migrant groups and minority ethnic groups alongside 
the Super-diversity Index.) 
 
I fit a series of controls for variables likely to affect the main relationship, or for 
precision. DEM represents two demographic controls (share of workers 24 and under, 
share of female workers). Relationships between diversity, wages and employment may 
partly reflect age factors. Migrants (particularly recent migrants) are younger than the 
average Briton, but younger workers are also likely to earn less and less likely to be in 
work (Lucifora et al., 2005, Goujard et al., 2011). I also fit the share of female workers for 
precision: women’s wages are likely to be lower than men’s (although in many areas their 
employment rates will be higher) (Swaffield, 2011).     
 
ECON is a set of economic structure controls (share of workers with degrees, 
share of workers in manufacturing sectors, share of jobless who are long term 
unemployed). These are fitted for precision. Human capital is positively linked to urban 
productivity, and thus levels of urban wages (Glaeser et al., 1992). By contrast, the 
presence of manufacturing industry may be negatively linked to wages, and worklessness 
is negatively associated with both wages and employment rates (Berthoud, 2003).  
 
SPAT is given by logged population density, measured as total population over 
surface area. This is a simple device for capturing agglomeration economies, which again 
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may lead both to higher wages and employment rates, and simultaneously to larger, more 
diverse urban populations. I therefore need to control for this potentially intervening factor.  
 
I estimate by Ordinary Least Squares on the pooled cross-section of 79 
observations (76 for CEL models), using robust standard errors. The descriptive analysis 
shows that London is the main outlier in terms of both cultural diversity and economic 
performance, so I run models with and without the capital. Data constraints force a number 
of compromises. As my dataset is cross-sectional, I am relying purely on spatial variation 
and am unable to fit year or area dummies.8  More seriously, robust causality checks are 
unavailable: the sample structure means that I am unable to construct any of the usual 
instruments for my main variables of interest. 9 This is problematic given the potential for 
positive selection of workers into high-performing cities, (Altonji and Card, 1991, Borjas, 
1994), which is reduced but not eliminated by my controls. 
 
7.2 Results  
 
Regression results are set out in full in Tables 9 – 14. Each table sets out 
estimates for wage or employment models, by each set of diversity measures (CEL, 
country of birth, ethnic groups).  For each table the left hand panel gives wage results, the 
right hand panel employment results. In each case specification (1) gives the sample 
univariate correlation between DIV and the dependent variable of interest; specification (2) 
adds controls, and specification (3) fits the model without including London.  
 
Tables 9 and 10 give the main results for diversity measured by CEL subgroups. 
Table 9 shows diversity as measured across all CEL groups. We see that the coefficient of 
diversity is insignificant on wages (with coefficients close to zero). Conversely, there is a 
small negative link to employment rates: the coefficient of DIV is -0.140, significant at 1%, 
This implies that a 10 percentage point difference in the Index – for example, raising 
diversity in Cardiff to that in Dundee – is linked to a 1.40% lower average urban 
employment rates.  By contrast, the Super-diversity Index – excluding the ‘English’, 
‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Celtic’ origin subgroups – turns up strong positive associations with 
both wages and employment rates. Table 10 shows that the coefficients of DIV are 0.275 
(wages) and 0.095 (employment), significant at 1% and 5% respectively. The wage result 
implies that shifting Southampton’s diversity to that of London, a roughly five-point 
difference in the Super-diversity Index, is linked to 1.375% higher average hourly wages.  
 
                                               
8
 However, the model passes diagnostic tests for fit, collinearity and spatial autocorrelation. 
9
 For example, time lags, ‘migrant gateway’ or shift-share instruments. For further discussion on causality 
and instruments see Ottaviano and Peri (2006) or Card (2007). 
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Tables 11 and 12 repeat the analysis for Fractionalisation Indices of country of birth 
and ethnic group. Strikingly, both show positive associations of diversity with average 
wages, but no significant links with employment rates. For example, the coefficient of 
migrant DIV on wages is 0.643, significant at 1% (Table 11), while for ethnic DIV the 
corresponding result is 0.518, also significant at 1% (Table 12). However, respective 
coefficients of DIV on employment rates are 0.026 and 0.020. Tables 13 and 14 show 
results for alternative ‘super-diversity indexes’, based on migrant and minority populations 
respectively. Unlike the CEL-based Super-diversity Index, coefficients of DIV on wages 
and employment rates are always insignificant for the full sample.  
 
Taken together, the results suggest measures of diversity and ‘super-diversity’ 
capture qualitatively different phenomena, and that different diversity metrics are 
complementary. The CEL Super-diversity Index is positively linked to urban wages and 
employment, results not replicated using other identity bases. By contrast, Indices of all 
birth country and ethnic groups show positive links to wages, but the Index of all CEL 
groups shows no significant association. The CEL Index also shows a negative connection 
to urban employment rates, while corresponding Indices show no significant link.  
 
7.3 Robustness checks 
 
I then run three simple robustness checks. First, London is a clear outlier in terms 
of wages and diversity, and given the small number of observations may skew the results.  
Removing London from the sample changes the numbers slightly in a few cases (Tables 
9-14, column 3). For CEL and ethnicity models, results are broadly the same. For country 
of birth models, coefficients of DIV are generally larger when London is left out. There 
seems to be a ‘migrant effect’ on employment rates in London: excluding the capital raises 
the coefficient of DIV from 0.026 to 0.138 and is now significant at 5% (Table 11). 
Similarly, without London, the coefficient of the ethnic groups Index on wages increases 
from 0.123 to 0.164, and is now significant at 5% (Table 14).  
 
Second, there are a number of other areas in the UK with historically low diversity 
and low economic performance, or which are historically high-performing areas. ‘Diversity 
effects’ in these cases may reflect some omitted variable or variables.  I therefore fit 
dummies for outliers, leverage points and influential observations from the sample. 
Outliers are defined as maxima on wages, employment rates and diversity; leverage points 
are observations in the top five leverage points across at least one wage or employment 
model; similarly, influential observations are those with the high values of Cook’s D across 
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more than one wage or employment model. Results are given in Tables 15 and 16, 
columns 1-3, and show very little difference to the main results.  
 
Finally, I test for the influence of long term economic change by fitting dummies for 
20 ‘de-industrialising’ cities, taken from Turok and Edge (1999).10 All of these locations lost 
substantial employment during the 1980s and early 1990s, and many will have continued 
to do so into the 2000s, leading to a persistent ‘jobs gap’. Many of these locations also 
saw substantial inflows of migrant workers during the 1960s and 1970s to work in now-
defunct factories. The combination of these factors could explain some of the negative or 
insignificant employment results. Results are given in column 4 of Tables 15 and 16. 
Again, both wage and employment models are essentially unaffected.  
 
Taken together, these tests suggest the main results are robust to the effects of 
outlying urban areas and to omitted variable bias.  
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The UK has become more culturally diverse over the last decade and a half. A wider range 
of diaspora groups, languages and religions, as well as a greater fluidity of identities, has 
contributed to a new sense of super-diversity. British cities are where most of this change 
is taking place: super-diversity is a largely urban phenomenon.  Public and policy interest 
in these issues is high, but there is surprisingly little research on the economic and social 
impacts of super-diversity. In part, this is because measuring and quantifying ‘cultural 
diversity’ beyond broad trends is extremely challenging. This paper makes two 
contributions to filling these gaps. First, it develops a new dataset of UK cities for the years 
2001-6, using a range of diversity measures providing very rich descriptive statistics. 
Second, it tests links between cultural diversity, wages and employment, using the full 
range of diversity measures.    
 
The analysis throws up two main messages. First, the basis on which identity and 
diversity are measured makes an important difference to the resulting picture. Given the 
multifaceted nature of cultural identity this is not a surprise. As identity proxies, CEL, 
country of birth and ethnic groups appear to be complements, capturing distinct aspects of 
diversity and ‘super-diversity’ – whether this is the composition of cultural-ethnic groups 
                                               
10
 These are Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire TTWAs), West Yorkshire (Leeds and 
Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, South Yorkshire (Sheffield and 
Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan. 
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across the UK, or differences between different urban areas. Fractionalisation Indices 
generally perform well as measures of diversity, although care needs to be taken when 
using bases such as CEL, which distinguish between different parts of the indigenous / 
established UK population.  
 
Overall, the descriptive results support other evidence that cultural diversity is both 
highly urbanised, and likely to remain so. UK urban areas increased their ‘diversity share’ 
between 2001-6, and more recent evidence suggests this will continue (Wohland et al., 
2010). Descriptives for Scottish and Welsh cities, in particular, help illustrate the long 
history of the multicultural city in the UK. 
 
Second, the regression results suggest there are a number of potential channels 
from demographic composition to urban economic outcomes. As suggested by the 
theoretical framework, not all of these are positive. Specifically, country of birth and ethnic 
group-based measures show significant positive links to urban wages, as do some CEL-
based measures. Links to urban employment rates are more mixed, with predominantly 
non-significant or negative coefficients. These results are drawn from a single, relatively 
small cross-section. I am unable to infer causality, and legitimate concerns could be raised 
about sample size. As such, my findings have to be taken as suggestive. However, they 
are in line with a growing body of international evidence suggesting some economic 
benefits of cultural diversity – and probably some costs – particularly in urban areas.  
 
There are a number of fruitful areas for further research. For example, collecting 
UK panel data would allow more robust analysis and the potential for causality checks.  
The next paper delivers some work along these lines, focusing on net immigration and 
country of birth-based diversity measures. The results also suggest a number of potential 
microfoundations to urban diversity-wages and diversity-employment connections. These 
would need to be explored using individual and firm-level data: the third and fourth papers 
make contributions in these areas by looking at connections between migrant and minority 
groups, diversity and innovation.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics. 
 
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Ave hourly wage 79 9.991 1.319 8.089 13.879 
Ave employment rate 79 0.75 0.044 0.623 0.821 
      
      
Fractionalisation Index CEL subgroups 76 0.416 0.131 0.197 0.744 
Frac Index, CEL ‘super-diversity’  76 0.826 0.1 0.368 0.946 
Fractionalisation Index, birth country   79 0.143 0.078 0.033 0.56 
Frac Index, migrant groups  79 0.898 0.077 0.448 0.974 
Fractionalisation Index, ethnicity  79 0.28 0.085 0.177 0.657 
Frac Index, minority ethnic groups 79 0.749 0.108 0.404 0.877 
      
      
% aged 24 or less 79 0.165 0.014 0.132 0.198 
% female  79 0.497 0.008 0.48 0.522 
% with NVQ4 (degrees/HE qualification) 79 0.242 0.053 0.146 0.373 
% with NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / 5+GCSEs) 79 0.474 0.031 0.349 0.531 
% with NVQ1 (other / no qualifications) 79 0.284 0.048 0.197 0.402 
% in senior/pro/associate pro occs  79 0.394 0.057 0.261 0.532 
% in admin/secretarial/skilled trades   79 0.245 0.016 0.208 0.292 
% personal services/sales/routine occs  79 0.361 0.052 0.252 0.496 
% employed in service sector  79 0.5 0.05 0.368 0.639 
% employed in manufacturing  79 0.146 0.044 0.054 0.259 
% employed in other sectors  79 0.354 0.029 0.281 0.482 
% long term unemployed who are jobless 79 0.198 0.06 0.081 0.347 
      
Population density (‘000s) 79 1.245 0.808 0.294 5.660 
Working age population (‘000s) 79 119.668 72.034 48.132 422.820 
      
 
Source: ONS / LFS, ONOMAP 
     
Notes: CEL data is missing for three TTWAs: Colchester, Preston, Tunbridge Wells. 
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Table 2. 50 largest CEL name subgroups, urban Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs). 2001-6. 
 
CEL subgroup  % of all groups CEL subgroup % of all groups 
ENGLISH 66.77 SOMALIAN 0.15 
CELTIC 11.33 JEWISH 0.13 
SCOTTISH 5.31 OTHER AFRICAN 0.13 
IRISH 3.27 HISPANIC 0.12 
WELSH 2.67 OTHER EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 0.11 
PAKISTANI 1.67 HINDI NOT INDIAN 0.06 
OTHER MUSLIM 1.17 INTERNATIONAL 0.05 
INDIAN HINDI 1.08 JEWISH AND ARMENIAN 0.05 
SIKH 0.82 VIETNAMESE 0.05 
ITALIAN 0.46 CZECH / SLOVAK 0.05 
BANGLADESHI 0.46 OTHER BALKAN 0.04 
POLISH 0.42 SWEDISH 0.04 
NIGERIAN 0.39 DANISH 0.04 
OTHER EUROPEAN 0.36 RUSSIAN 0.04 
CHINESE 0.34 DUTCH 0.04 
GREEK 0.29 BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN 0.03 
PORTUGESE 0.26 OTHER NORDIC 0.03 
SPANISH 0.23 IRANIAN 0.03 
FRENCH  0.23 SIERRA LEONIAN 0.03 
GERMAN 0.22 HUNGARIAN 0.02 
PAKISTAN KASHMIR 0.21 FINNISH 0.02 
SRI LANKAN  0.20 JAPANESE 0.02 
OTHER SOUTH ASIAN  0.19 AFRIKAANS 0.02 
GHANAIAN 0.17 ALBANIAN 0.02 
TURKISH 0.17 OTHER BALTIC 0.02 
 
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes: 2001-6 pooled. CEL subgroups aggregate smaller CEL categories. See Appendix A for more details.  
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Table 3. 50 largest CEL name subgroups (excluding ‘English’, ‘Scottish’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Celtic’ subgroups), urban TTWAs, 2001-6. 
  
CEL subgroup % of all groups CEL subgroup % of all groups 
PAKISTANI 12.02 HINDI NOT INDIAN 0.42 
OTHER MUSLIM 8.42 INTERNATIONAL 0.38 
INDIAN HINDI 7.77 JEWISH AND ARMENIAN 0.36 
SIKH 5.86 VIETNAMESE 0.34 
ITALIAN 3.33 CZECH / SLOVAK 0.33 
BANGLADESHI 3.31 BALKAN 0.31 
POLISH 3.02 SWEDISH 0.30 
NIGERIAN 2.82 DANISH 0.27 
OTHER EUROPEAN 2.62 RUSSIAN 0.27 
CHINESE 2.43 DUTCH 0.26 
GREEK 2.08 BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN 0.22 
PORTUGESE 1.86 OTHER NORDIC 0.22 
SPANISH 1.65 IRANIAN 0.21 
FRENCH  1.62 SIERRA LEONIAN 0.18 
GERMAN 1.61 HUNGARIAN 0.15 
PAKISTAN KASHMIR 1.53 FINNISH 0.15 
SRI LANKAN  1.42 JAPANESE 0.14 
OTHER SOUTH ASIAN  1.38 AFRIKAANS 0.13 
GHANAIAN 1.23 ALBANIAN 0.13 
TURKISH 1.20 OTHER BALTIC 0.13 
SOMALIAN 1.06 SERBIAN 0.11 
JEWISH 0.97 NORWEGIAN 0.11 
OTHER AFRICAN 0.96 MUSLIM NORTH AFRICAN  0.08 
HISPANIC 0.86 UKRANIAN 0.07 
OTHER EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC 0.76 LEBANESE 0.06 
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Table 4. 15 largest migrant groups, urban TTWAs, 2001-6 and within-period change. 
 
Country of birth % total migrants 2001-6 2001 2006 % change  
    
 
Germany 9.15 10.81 7.13 -3.68 
India 9.15 9.17 9.71 0.54 
Pakistan 7.73 7.05 7.03 -0.02 
Ireland 7.64 8.64 6 -2.64 
South Africa 4.61 4.3 4.26 -0.04 
Bangladesh 3.03 3.06 3.42 0.36 
USA 2.87 3.22 4.26 1.04 
Australia 2.46 2.17 1.79 -0.38 
Hong Kong 2.21 2.54 1.79 -0.75 
Zimbabwe 2.13 1.3 2.63 1.33 
Canada 2.1 2.69 3.42 0.73 
Poland 2.04 1.27 4.84 3.57 
Kenya 2 2.67 1.79 -0.88 
Singapore 1.71 1.95 1.53 -0.42 
Italy 1.67 1.93 1.32 -0.61 
    
 
Migrants as % total working age population 7.6 6.8 8.9 2.1 
 
Source: ONS / LFS 
Notes: sample is working-age population.  
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Table 5. Largest ethnic groups, urban TTWAs, 2001-6 and within-period change. 
 
Group % of all groups 2001-6 2001 2006 % change 
     
White 79.68 92.82 88.73 -4.09 
Other White 10.35 2.21 4.19 1.98 
Indian  1.39 1.38 1.66 0.28 
Pakistani 1.35 1.2 1.58 0.38 
Other  0.6 0.33 0.94 0.61 
Black Caribbean  0.49 0.57 0.57 0 
White and Black Caribbean 0.44 0.21 0.22 0.01 
Black  African  0.41 0.32 0.6 0.28 
Bangladeshi 0.36 0.22 0.29 0.07 
Other Asian  0.34 0.23 0.47 0.24 
Chinese 0.33 0.29 0.36 0.07 
Other Mixed 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.12 
White and Asian  0.13 0.13 0.15 0.02 
Other Black  0.09 0.04 0.04 0 
White and Black African 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.02 
     
 
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: Sample is working-age population Figures are based on ETHCEN15 variable.  
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Table 6. Urban areas with the 20 largest values of the CEL Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6. 
 
2001-6  2001-6 
TTWA name Frac Index, all CEL subgroups  TTWA name Frac Index, CEL ‘Super-diversity’ 
Glasgow 0.744  London 0.946 
Lanarkshire 0.724  Southampton 0.941 
Dundee 0.701  Oxford 0.936 
Edinburgh 0.698  Reading & Bracknell 0.924 
Aberdeen 0.689  Nottingham 0.921 
London 0.688  Guildford & Aldershot 0.920 
Swansea Bay 0.638  Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.920 
Cardiff 0.600  Peterborough 0.919 
Blackburn 0.591  Wycombe & Slough 0.915 
Birmingham 0.564  Cambridge 0.914 
Wycombe & Slough 0.552  Walsall & Cannock 0.914 
Bradford 0.551  Southend & Brentwood 0.913 
Luton & Watford 0.543  Bournemouth 0.910 
Wolverhampton 0.527  Brighton 0.908 
Newport & Cwmbran 0.524  Poole 0.903 
Liverpool 0.523  Hastings 0.901 
Leicester 0.522  Ipswich 0.899 
Manchester 0.515  Luton & Watford 0.897 
Coventry 0.511  Bedford 0.895 
Rochdale & Oldham 0.503  Northampton & Wellingborough 0.893 
  
   
All urban TTWAs 0.416  All urban TTWAs 0.826 
 
 
   
Source: ONOMAP 
Notes: Super-diversity Index excludes ‘English’, ‘Welsh’, ‘Scottish’ and ‘Celtic’ CEL subgroups. See Appendices A and B for more detail on ONOMAP. 
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Table 7. Urban TTWAs with the 15 highest values of the country of birth Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6 and within-period change.  
 
TTWA name 
Frac Index 
2001-6 2001 2006 % change  
     
London 0.56 0.530 0.588 0.058 
Wycombe & Slough 0.308 0.257 0.345 0.088 
Bradford 0.295 0.279 0.289 0.010 
Birmingham 0.272 0.276 0.309 0.033 
Leicester 0.266 0.255 0.282 0.027 
Luton & Watford 0.265 0.244 0.323 0.079 
Reading & Bracknell 0.253 0.226 0.326 0.100 
Bedford 0.241 0.226 0.276 0.050 
Cambridge 0.236 0.215 0.322 0.107 
Guildford & Aldershot 0.215 0.211 0.238 0.027 
Brighton 0.213 0.250 0.215 -0.035 
Oxford 0.207 0.186 0.252 0.066 
Wolverhampton 0.198 0.180 0.228 0.048 
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 0.196 0.179 0.188 0.009 
Leeds 0.195 0.156 0.249 0.093 
     
All urban TTWAs 0.143 0.13 0.167 0.037 
     
 
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: sample is working-age population  
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 Table 8. Urban areas with the 15 largest values of the ethnic groups Fractionalisation Index, 2001-6 and within-period change. 
 
TTWA name 
Frac Index 
2001-6 2001 2006 % change  
  
  
 
London 0.657 0.579 0.648 0.069 
Birmingham 0.496 0.394 0.482 0.088 
Bradford 0.49 0.379 0.404 0.025 
Leicester 0.425 0.299 0.361 0.062 
Bedford 0.404 0.261 0.359 0.098 
Luton & Watford 0.402 0.291 0.393 0.102 
Huddersfield 0.389 0.274 0.314 0.04 
Bolton 0.361 0.211 0.353 0.142 
Leeds 0.358 0.205 0.310 0.105 
Glasgow 0.349  0.350 0.35 
Coventry 0.347 0.181 0.299 0.118 
Dudley & Sandwell 0.345 0.199 0.319 0.12 
Manchester 0.34 0.188 0.267 0.079 
Blackburn 0.333 0.202 0.126 -0.076 
Burnley, Nelson & Colne 0.321 0.186 0.113 -0.073 
Cambridge 0.321 0.186 0.312 0.126 
     
All urban TTWAs 0.28 0.133 0.203 0.07 
     
 
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: sample is working-age population. Variable is drawn from LFS variable ETHCEN15. 
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Table 9. Results for wages, employment and cultural diversity (all CEL subgroups). UK urban areas 2001-6. 
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Frac Index 0.107 -0.042 -0.076 -0.132*** -0.140*** -0.134*** 
 (0.123) (0.072) (0.069) (0.048) (0.033) (0.033) 
       
% 24 or less  -1.725** -1.450**  -0.590* -0.641* 
  (0.695) (0.684)  (0.348) (0.343) 
       
% Female  -0.775 -0.777  -1.294** -1.294** 
  (0.963) (0.894)  (0.598) (0.603) 
       
% degrees  1.522*** 1.515***  0.699*** 0.701*** 
  (0.292) (0.297)  (0.105) (0.105) 
       
% manufacturing   -0.373 -0.265  0.151 0.131 
  (0.291) (0.288)  (0.102) (0.101) 
       
ln(population density) 
 0.011 -0.001  -0.011* -0.008 
 
 (0.016) (0.013)  (0.006) (0.006) 
       
% unemployed who   -0.093 -0.147  -0.280*** -0.270*** 
are long term jobless  (0.125) (0.112)  (0.070) (0.071) 
       
Constant 2.247*** 2.613*** 2.657*** -0.235*** 0.447 0.439 
 (0.052) (0.530) (0.498) (0.021) (0.282) (0.284) 
       
Observations 76 76 75 76 76 75 
F-statistics 0.755 22.296 21.761 7.634 41.721 39.872 
R2 0.107 0.703 0.707 0.080 0.784 0.785 
Source: ONS / ONOMAP.  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 10. Results for wages, employment and cultural diversity (CEL ‘Super-diversity Index’). UK urban areas 2001-6. 
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
 
   
   
Frac Index 0.577*** 0.275*** 0.241*** 0.301*** 0.095** 0.108** 
 (0.172) (0.092) (0.084) (0.083) (0.046) (0.047) 
 
      
% 24 or less 
 -1.849*** -1.733***  -1.115*** -1.162*** 
 
 (0.650) (0.637)  (0.367) (0.362) 
 
      
% Female 
 0.099 -0.139  -1.490** -1.393** 
 
 (1.077) (0.972)  (0.639) (0.631) 
 
      
% degrees 
 1.403*** 1.366***  0.479*** 0.494*** 
 
 (0.266) (0.267)  (0.092) (0.092) 
 
      
% manufacturing  
 -0.354 -0.282  0.101 0.072 
 
 (0.267) (0.264)  (0.109) (0.107) 
 
      
ln(population density) 
 0.001 -0.008  -0.015** -0.012 
 
 (0.014) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.007) 
 
      
% unemployed who are long term  
 0.063 -0.010  -0.260*** -0.231*** 
jobless 
 (0.136) (0.120)  (0.076) (0.075) 
 
      
Constant 1.820*** 2.021*** 2.219*** -0.535*** 0.585* 0.505 
 (0.141) (0.599) (0.538) (0.069) (0.310) (0.309) 
       
Observations 76 76 75 76 76 75 
F-statistics 11.230 22.611 21.469 13.134 58.367 54.596 
R2 0.225 0.735 0.731 0.258 0.747 0.758 
Source: ONS / ONOMAP.  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Table 11. Results for wages, employment and cultural diversity (country of birth measures). UK urban areas 2001-6.  
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Frac Index, birth country groups  0.988*** 0.643*** 0.685*** 0.184 0.026 0.138** 
 (0.162) (0.089) (0.133) (0.148) (0.071) (0.061) 
 
      
% 24 or less 
 -2.448*** -2.510***  -1.029*** -1.195*** 
 
 (0.559) (0.602)  (0.387) (0.364) 
 
      
% Female 
 -0.612 -0.566  -1.820*** -1.695** 
 
 (0.742) (0.761)  (0.682) (0.652) 
 
      
% degrees 
 0.969*** 0.948***  0.496*** 0.441*** 
 
 (0.226) (0.229)  (0.100) (0.092) 
 
      
% manufacturing  
 -0.461** -0.481**  0.122 0.067 
 
 (0.221) (0.224)  (0.114) (0.109) 
 
      
ln(population density)  
 -0.016 -0.016  -0.011 -0.009 
 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.007) 
 
      
% unemployed who are long term  
 -0.029 -0.012  -0.306*** -0.259*** 
jobless 
 (0.101) (0.111)  (0.077) (0.076) 
 
      
Constant 2.153*** 2.864*** 2.846*** -0.315*** 0.780** 0.732** 
 (0.020) (0.386) (0.394) (0.021) (0.311) (0.301) 
 
      
Observations 79 79 78 79 79 78 
F-statistics 37.171 43.423 32.475 1.546 34.223 31.607 
R2 0.384 0.812 0.793 0.058 0.715 0.734 
Source: ONS / LFS 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Table 12. Results for wages, employment and cultural diversity (ONS ethnic group measures). UK urban areas, 2001-2006. 
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Frac Index, ethnic groups 0.582*** 0.518*** 0.478*** 0.022 0.020 0.078 
 (0.181) (0.090) (0.107) (0.093) (0.055) (0.050) 
 
      
% 24 or less 
 -2.632*** -2.539***  -1.035*** -1.173*** 
 
 (0.608) (0.642)  (0.384) (0.363) 
 
      
% Female 
 -1.074 -1.099  -1.839*** -1.802*** 
 
 (0.814) (0.798)  (0.688) (0.675) 
 
      
% degrees 
 1.072*** 1.086***  0.501*** 0.480*** 
 
 (0.227) (0.230)  (0.095) (0.092) 
 
      
% manufacturing  
 -0.606*** -0.566**  0.116 0.058 
 
 (0.216) (0.225)  (0.120) (0.117) 
 
      
ln(population density)  
 -0.018 -0.019*  -0.011 -0.009 
 
 (0.011) (0.011)  (0.007) (0.007) 
 
      
% unemployed who are long term  
 -0.079 -0.099  -0.308*** -0.279*** 
jobless 
 (0.108) (0.111)  (0.076) (0.076) 
 
      
Constant 2.131*** 3.084*** 3.094*** -0.295*** 0.789** 0.774** 
 (0.047) (0.422) (0.413) (0.027) (0.319) (0.315) 
 
      
Observations 79 79 78 79 79 78 
F-statistics 10.292 33.936 27.434 0.058 35.011 33.924 
R2 0.159 0.794 0.775 0.001 0.715 0.728 
Source: ONS / LFS  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant a
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Table 13. Results for  alternative ‘super-diversity’ Index (migrant groups). UK urban areas, 2001-2006. 
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Frac Index, migrant groups 0.794*** 0.016 0.069 0.345*** 0.128 0.127 
 (0.245) (0.114) (0.118) (0.064) (0.106) (0.108) 
 
      
% 24 or less 
 -2.123*** -1.834***  -0.754* -0.762* 
 
 (0.631) (0.613)  (0.399) (0.411) 
 
      
% Female 
 -1.081 -0.935  -1.481** -1.485** 
 
 (1.085) (0.936)  (0.662) (0.663) 
 
      
% degrees 
 1.395*** 1.344***  0.510*** 0.512*** 
 
 (0.271) (0.269)  (0.100) (0.101) 
 
      
% manufacturing  
 -0.386 -0.270  0.257** 0.254** 
 
 (0.245) (0.239)  (0.112) (0.115) 
 
      
ln(population density)  
 0.000* 0.000  -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
      
% unemployed who are long term  
 -0.156 -0.191*  -0.305*** -0.304*** 
jobless 
 (0.119) (0.105)  (0.070) (0.071) 
 
      
Constant 1.580*** 2.886*** 2.746*** -0.590*** 0.374 0.378 
 (0.220) (0.594) (0.520) (0.057) (0.348) (0.350) 
 
      
Observations 79 79 78 79 79 78 
F-statistics 10.507 22.654 20.723 29.568 29.841 29.666 
R2 0.239 0.711 0.701 0.210 0.702 0.701 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.    
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Table 14. Results for alternative ‘super-diversity’ Index (minority ethnic groups). UK urban areas, 2001-2006. 
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment rates (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
       
Frac Index, minority groups 0.794*** 0.123 0.164** 0.220*** 0.055 0.048 
 (0.245) (0.083) (0.081) (0.066) (0.050) (0.051) 
 
      
% 24 or less 
 -2.119*** -1.835***  -0.986** -1.032*** 
 
 (0.597) (0.583)  (0.375) (0.384) 
 
      
% Female 
 -0.807 -0.687  -1.663** -1.683** 
 
 (1.036) (0.910)  (0.665) (0.675) 
 
      
% degrees 
 1.337*** 1.284***  0.490*** 0.498*** 
 
 (0.261) (0.261)  (0.095) (0.097) 
 
      
% manufacturing  
 -0.321 -0.219  0.147 0.131 
 
 (0.236) (0.229)  (0.106) (0.107) 
 
      
ln(population density)  
 0.000 -0.000  -0.000** -0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
 
      
% unemployed who are long term  
 -0.124 -0.156  -0.290*** -0.285*** 
jobless 
 (0.117) (0.106)  (0.070) (0.072) 
 
      
Constant 1.580*** 2.681*** 2.571*** -0.454*** 0.592* 0.610* 
 (0.220) (0.558) (0.493) (0.049) (0.318) (0.325) 
 
      
Observations 79 79 78 79 79 78 
F-statistics 10.507 25.649 24.756 11.259 35.185 32.961 
R2 0.239 0.729 0.725 0.159 0.727 0.725 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.    
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Table 15. Wage models. Results for robustness checks.   
 
Log hourly wages Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, CEL groups -0.042 -0.048 -0.063 -0.035 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.070) (0.078) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations  76 76 76 76 
F-statistic  22.296 18.256 19.704 20.070 
R2 0.703 0.706 0.734 0.709 
     
Log hourly wages Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, CEL super-diversity 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.252*** 0.260*** 
 (0.092) (0.086) (0.082) (0.095) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations  76 76 76 76 
F-statistic  22.611 19.351 20.205 20.153 
R2 0.735 0.738 0.760 0.737 
     
Log hourly wages Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, country of birth groups 0.643*** 0.649*** 0.599*** 0.640*** 
 (0.089) (0.100) (0.133) (0.093) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations  79 79 79 79 
F-statistic  43.423 38.808 31.809 37.674 
R2 0.812 0.812 0.818 0.812 
     
Log hourly wages Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, ethnic groups 0.518*** 0.520*** 0.475*** 0.510*** 
 (0.090) (0.092) (0.107) (0.090) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  79 79 79 79 
F-statistic  33.936 29.991 30.393 30.108 
R2 0.794 0.794 0.802 0.795 
 
Source: ONS / LFS/ONOMAP.  
Notes: Controls fitted = % working-age population 24 and under, % female, % with degrees, % with 
manufacturing jobs, % of unemployed who are long term workless, log (population density). ‘Outliers’ fits 
dummies for Hartlepool, Lanarkshire, and London. ‘Leverage’ fits dummies for Brighton, Exeter, Hastings, 
Lanarkshire, London and Southend. ‘Influence’ fits dummies for Chelmsford, Exeter, London and 
Southend. ‘Jobs gap’ fits dummies for 20 ‘deindustrialising cities’ identified by Turok and Edge (1999). 
These are Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire TTWAs), West Yorkshire (Leeds and 
Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, South Yorkshire (Sheffield and 
Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, 
Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Table 16. Employment models. Results for robustness checks.   
 
Log employment rates Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, CEL subgroups -0.140*** -0.151*** -0.138*** -0.141*** 
 (0.033) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations  76 76 76 76 
F-statistic  41.721 34.451 36.639 36.576 
R2 0.784 0.789 0.792 0.784 
     
Log employment rates Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, CEL super-diversity 0.095** 0.097** 0.085* 0.098** 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.050) (0.045) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  76 76 76 76 
F-statistic  58.367 49.771 51.984 50.363 
R2 0.747 0.748 0.753 0.747 
     
Log employment rates Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, country of birth groups 0.026 0.037 0.046 0.021 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.059) (0.073) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  79 79 79 79 
F-statistic  34.223 29.570 31.611 33.061 
R2 0.715 0.716 0.726 0.716 
     
Log employment rates Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, ONS ethnic groups 0.020 0.025 0.027 0.016 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.049) (0.057) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  79 79 79 79 
F-statistic  35.011 30.664 32.469 34.430 
R2 0.715 0.715 0.725 0.715 
 
Source: ONS / LFS/ONOMAP.  
Notes: Controls fitted = % working-age population 24 and under, % female, % with degrees, % with 
manufacturing jobs, % of unemployed who are long term workless, log (population density). Outliers are 
Hartlepool, Lanarkshire, and London. Leverage points are Brighton, Burnley, Hastings, and London. 
Influence points are Burnley, Hastings, Hartlepool, Lanarkshire, London, Swansea, and Wirral. ‘Jobs gap’ 
fits dummies for 20 ‘deindustrialising cities’ identified by Turok and Edge (1999). These are Birmingham, 
Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire TTWAs), West Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford), Merseyside 
(Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, South Yorkshire (Sheffield and Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, 
Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and 
Wigan. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper looks at the long term economic impacts of migration on British cities. Like the 
previous chapter, my starting point is the growing ethnic and cultural diversity of the UK in 
recent decades. It is clear that net migration is one of the main drivers of change. The past 
decade and a half represents ‘the single biggest wave of immigration in British history’ 
(Goodhart, 2010). Many new migrant communities have developed since the late 1990s; 
A8 accession in 2004 has led to a very large increase in arrivals from the Central and 
Eastern European countries joining the EU.  
 
The economic and social impacts of recent immigration have been hotly disputed. 
The rise in net migration largely took place under the 1997-2010 ‘New Labour’ 
government. By contrast, the current Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition is actively 
trying to reduce net migration back to the levels of the mid-1990s.  
 
Recent migration inflows to the UK have been heavily urbanised. Although many 
rural communities have seen very rapid growth in numbers of migrant workers, British 
cities have always had the biggest stocks of migrant (and minority) populations. Put 
simply, cities are ‘where the diversity is’, and much of this is migrant-driven. Has the 
growing immigration of the past fifteen years – and the diversity that migrants bring – been 
good for urban economies?   
 
There is a large existing literature on the economic impacts of migration in the UK 
and elsewhere (for recent summaries see Dustmann et al (2008) or Kerr and Kerr (2011)). 
We can divide these studies into three types. The first group – the bulk of the literature – 
focus on the effects of migrants in local or regional labour markets, and are built on 
neoclassical frameworks. These typically find little or no average impact of migrants on the 
wages or employment prospects of UK-born (so-called ‘native’) workers; some turn up 
welfare losses for less-skilled groups via relative scarcity effects.  
 
Over time, however, migration is also likely to have impacts on the wider urban 
economy – as new, more diverse communities become established. A second group of 
studies, most notably those by Ottaviano and Peri  (2005a, 2006), explore dynamic effects 
of migration in an spatial economy framework. These studies allow externalities from 
immigrants, and impacts at the urban level. For example, the dynamic effects of net 
migration may be productivity-enhancing for natives – say, if skilled migrants facilitate 
knowledge spillovers or reduce trade costs (Saxenian, 2006, Page, 2007). Skilled workers 
may also prefer diverse environments (Florida, 2002). Net migration then leads to higher 
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native productivity, wages and employment rates – and raises the local cost of living, if 
diverse cities become congested.  
  
A third perspective focuses on employers’ response to migration shocks, especially 
if these shocks are repeated or continuous (Lewis, 2005, Green, 2007b). If migrants are 
imperfect substitutes for natives, parts of the local economy may become progressively 
‘migrant-dependent’. Specifically, employers in low-cost sectors such as food processing 
become reliant on cheap migrant labour (Stenning et al., 2006). Net migration will impact 
negatively on native employment, especially if lower-skilled British-born workers are 
unable to move into better jobs. If this helps sustain low-skills equilibrium (Finegold and 
Soskice, 1988), wages and prices may also fall over the long term as the area’s economy 
continues to perform sub-optimally.  
 
This complex set of mechanisms will largely determine the long-term effects of 
migration on urban economies. Some of this will be captured via changes in wages and 
employment, but the effects of net migration should also show up in productivity and local 
prices. For this reason, it is important to look at migration’s effects beyond local labour 
markets. This paper is one of only a handful of UK studies addressing these wider 
processes (Frattini, 2008, Lee, 2010, Longhi, 2011, Sá, 2011). I am able to improve on 
those studies with a longer sample period, better-defined spatial units and finer-grained, 
richer data. It is also able to explore effects across different native and migrant skill 
groups.  
 
Robust time-series data on migration and diversity is very hard to find for British 
cities, so to overcome these limitations the analysis has several novel features. I assemble 
a new 16-year panel of urban economies from aggregated microdata. By using 2001 
Travel to Work Areas as spatial units, I am able to estimate actual impacts on local 
economies. I investigate links between migration and changes in UK-born wages, 
employment rates and local house prices, exploring in detail economic interactions 
between different skill groups of migrants and natives. The model also allows inference on 
migrant-related changes in urban labour productivity, exploiting the fact that over time, 
productivity changes tend to be reflected in wage rates (Combes et al., 2005).  
 
The results are robust to various checks for endogeneity issues, including 
instrumental variables regression. They suggest significant long term impacts of net 
migration on urban economies, within and beyond the labour market. Specifically, the 
diversity migrants bring helps drive up high skill native productivity and wages, suggesting 
the presence of both production complementarities and relative scarcity effects. 
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Conversely, increasingly migrant-intensive labour markets appear to be ‘locking out’ some 
intermediate and low-skilled British-born workers from employment opportunities, 
suggesting an endogenous employer response to shifts in net migration. Results from 
shorter panels suggest much of this took place after 2000. ‘Migrants taking British jobs’ is 
an oversimplification, however: the on-going impacts of long term industrial decline and 
the increasing casualisation of entry-level jobs also help explain the employment findings. 
Overall, the results differ both from previous UK research, and from US studies. I 
speculate that the UK’s urban structure, labour market transformations and immigrant 
populations help explain these differences.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next Section explores the background and 
policy context, and sets out key definitions and terms. Section Three reviews the UK and 
international evidence. Sections Four and Five introduce the datasets and estimation 
strategy. Section Six presents the main findings. Sections Seven and Eight explore 
potential native outflows and present IV results. Section Nine concludes.  
 
 
2. Background and motivation 
 
My research question is: what are the long-term effects, if any, of migration on the 
economic performance of British cities? I use changes in urban migrant populations as a 
way of exploring broader questions about the local economic impacts of cultural diversity. 
Both ‘migration’ and ‘diversity’ need careful definition. My analysis concentrates on ‘long 
term migrants’ – those people born outside the UK and resident in the country for at least 
12 months (Home Office and Department of Work and Pensions, 2007). Most public 
datasets, do not identify ‘short term migrants’ who may only stay for a few months.  
 
As the previous chapter makes clear, cultural (or ‘ethnic’) diversity is a multifaceted 
concept, with subjective and endogenous elements (Office of National Statistics, 2003, 
Aspinall, 2009, Green 2011). Therefore most attempts to quantify diversity with objective 
measures are incomplete (Mateos et al., 2007). Nevertheless, in the absence of reliable 
multidimensional indicators, country of birth is widely used as a proxy for diversity because 
it is objective, and because rich data is available (Ottaviano et al., 2007). In this chapter I 
am specifically interested in the diversity that immigrants bring, and use Fractionalisation 
Indices to measure the spread and distribution of birth country groups. These are 
discussed further below.   
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There are several reasons to be interested in the economics of migration, 
particularly at urban level.11 Long term migration flows into the UK are relatively small – 
between 1971 and 2006 the UK population grew by 8.2%, while the US population grew 
by 44.6%, with migration the main driver in both cases (Blanchflower, 2007). Compared 
with countries like Canada and Australia, where immigrants comprise over a quarter of the 
population, the UK is a low-immigration country – immigrants make up around 13% of the 
working age population (Wadsworth, 2010, Card, 2011).  
 
Since the late 1990s, however, ‘netflows’ to the UK have accelerated substantially. 
From just under 50,000 people per year in 1997, net annual migration rose to around 
140,000 in 1999, and rose again in 2004/5 to over 200,000. The latter date marks A8 
accession, when a number of East European countries joined the EU (Graph 1).12  Just 
before the downturn the net inflow of migrants to the UK was around 198,000 people per 
year. The share of migrants in the working-age population almost doubled over the past 15 
years, from 7.6% in 1992 to 13.6% in 2004 (Wadsworth, 2010).  The diversity of migrant 
communities in the UK has also expanded dramatically during this period (Kyambi, 2005, 
Vertovec, 2006).  
 
As a result, there are now high levels of interest in the impacts of migration on the 
economy, society and public services. Since 2003, ‘race and immigration’ has been one of 
the top three issues in the MORI organisation’s monthly omnibus surveys of public opinion. 
There have been five major re-organisations of immigration policy since 2001, four under 
the 1997-2010 ‘New Labour’ Government (Somerville, 2007) . The current Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition Government is now implementing a migration cap on non-EU 
migration, with the aim of reducing net migration ‘to the tens of thousands’ – a reduction of 
around 100,000 people per year (HM Government, 2010).  
 
There is also a broader on-going conversation about the wider effects of a bigger, 
more diverse society (Goodhart, 2004, Legrain, 2006, Wolf, 2008, Simpson and Finney, 
2009, Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah, 2010, Goodhart, 2010). This reflects the fact that 
growing cultural diversity in Britain and many other Western societies is also driven partly 
by migrant communities (Champion, 2006, Putnam, 2007). In 2007 UK net immigration 
accounted for 52 percent of overall population growth, with ‘natural change’ (net births) 
explaining the rest (Graph 1). But natural change includes a rising share of live births to 
mothers born outside Britain (Office of National Statistics, 2011). This reflects higher net 
                                               
11
 The focus of this paper is on migration in cities, which I will also refer to as ‘urban areas’ or ‘local 
economies’. In the analysis I will approximate cities using 2001 Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs).  
12
 ONS Total International Migration (TIM) figures. These will include some British return migrants.  
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migration and differential birth rates in some minority groups (Performance and Innovation 
Unit, 2003).  
 
Migrants are unevenly distributed across the UK. Since 2004, rural areas and small 
towns have experienced very rapid growth in migrant populations (Green, 2008). However, 
British cities still contain the largest migrant volumes and population shares. In 2002-3, 
over half of all net migration was to London, and over half of the rest was to other large 
cities (Table 1). The urban share of both migrant groups and visible minorities has been 
increasing over the past decade and a half. Put simply, cities are ‘where the diversity is’, 
and much of this is migrant-driven. 
 
In England alone, the 56 biggest urban areas contain over half the UK population 
and over two thirds of all employment (Parkinson et al., 2006). So any migrant-related 
changes to the economic performance of British cities might also impact on national 
economic trends. According to some commentators these impacts could be substantial.  In 
recent years a number of authors have suggested that there are significant economic 
gains from net immigration, and that cities help drive these gains (Florida, 2002, Legrain, 
2006, Leadbeater, 2008). These arguments are reviewed in the next section of the paper.  
 
 
3. Review of theory and evidence  
 
Changes in net migration affect urban economies by altering the size and composition of 
the urban population and labour force. The introductory chapter, above, provides a 
theoretical overview: these frameworks and relevant empirics are discussed in more detail 
below. I distinguish between frameworks focused on the labour market, the wider spatial 
economy models, and on employer business models and strategies. I argue that all three 
perspectives are needed to establish the effects of migration on urban areas.   
 
3.1 Labour market impacts 
 
Conventional economic analysis of the local impacts of immigration uses 
neoclassical assumptions and focuses on labour markets (Borjas, 2011). Assume an 
urban economy receives a one-off immigration ‘shock’. If migrants are perfect substitutes 
for UK-born workers (‘natives’), the increase in labour supply leads average native wages 
to fall in the short term. If wages are sticky, native employment may fall too. In an open 
economy – like a city – a combination of capital inflows and output composition changes 
then bid wages back up to their starting point (Dustmann et al., 2003, Dustmann et al., 
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2005). Within this, there are some distributional effects: typically migrants cluster at the 
bottom of the labour market, so that the main effect is on low skilled natives via labour 
market competition. Higher-skill natives receive wage gains through relative scarcity 
effects (Card, 2005, Dustmann et al., 2007) 
 
If migrants are not perfect substitutes with natives, they may cluster in ‘hard to fill’ 
jobs at the bottom of the labour market (Manacorda et al., 2006). This means competition 
with natives is minimal; we should see little change on native wages and employment, 
particularly if new migrants predominantly compete with existing migrant groups. (If 
employers react to repeated inflows by changing production functions and/or hiring 
patterns, impacts on natives may be more significant – see below.)  
 
A large number of empirical studies in the UK and elsewhere bear out these 
predictions, finding little or no significant effects of migration on average native wages, 
employment or unemployment. Some studies suggest small welfare losses for lower-
skilled natives and gains for higher-skilled groups (see Dustmann et al (2008) and Nathan 
(2008) for recent reviews).  Importantly, studies suggest that although migrants have 
similar skills profiles to natives and can be found across the occupational spectrum, they 
do not behave as perfect substitutes, particularly in the first few years of residence in the 
UK (Dustmann et al., 2007, Green et al., 2007a, Green et al., 2007b). 
 
3.2 Wider economy impacts  
 
Rather than replicate these labour market studies, I propose a broader approach. 
Net migration is also likely to have effects on the wider urban economy, particularly over 
longer timeframes as a) cities experience continuous inflows of immigrants and b) migrant 
communities are established. First, migration may generate human capital externalities – 
specifically, immigrants may raise the productivity of UK-born workers by facilitating 
market access, knowledge creation and diffusion. Second, some sectors of the local 
economy may become ‘migrant-dependent’ – if employers react to migrant inflows by 
permanently altering their production functions, low-skilled natives may become ‘locked 
out’ from entry-level employment.     
 
The first channel is likely to raise native productivity and wages, employment and 
prices. In the second case, outcomes are ambiguous. In both cases, welfare gains from 
migration are likely to accrue to higher-skilled British-born, with losses accruing to lower-
skilled native workers.  
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3.3 Migration, productivity and the spatial economy  
 
Ottaviano and Peri (2005a, 2005b, 2007) develop a broader framework for thinking 
through the impacts of immigration on urban areas. They model a system of open cities, in 
which net migration can enhance labour productivity through various spillover effects – as 
well as working through the labour market as in the models above. Migration-induced 
productivity shifts in a given city may then lead to further in-migration, congestion and 
impacts on real wages / living costs.   
 
Spillovers largely derive from the diversity that migrants bring. Endogenous growth 
theory highlights the importance of knowledge and human capital to long run economic 
development (Romer, 1990). Migrants play potentially important roles in knowledge 
creation, both as mobile carriers of human capital and by influencing ideas generation and 
diffusion. A number of lab and workforce studies suggest that ‘cognitive diversity’ in teams 
– a range of experiences and perspectives – helps problem-solving and can foster 
innovation. Cultural diversity is an important component: workforce diversity may be hard 
to manage initially, but tends to improve team performance over time (Page, 2007). These 
effects tend to be greatest in ‘knowledge-intensive’ sectors, which are largely concentrated 
in and around cities. 
  
Similarly, migrant diasporas may also improve forward and backward linkages for 
firms – both through access to new customer markets, and via increased possibilities for 
distributed / off-shored production (Saxenian, 2006). Again, these effects are likely to be 
urbanised, as cities both have the highest levels of physical connectivity and large, diverse 
consumer markets.  
 
By raising the productivity of ‘knowledge-intensive’ businesses and workers, these 
processes are also likely to raise wages and employment rates for the higher-skilled staff 
these firms typically employ. If productivity-enhancing effects are large enough they also 
may contribute to overall urban growth (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). As per spatial economy 
models, average wages and employment rates will rise, reflecting increased productivity. 
But as in-migration accelerates, pressures on space raise local living costs (Combes et al., 
2005, Overman and Rice, 2008). 
 
US empirical studies suggest that migration shifts are linked to both productivity 
and price gains in American cities, so that real welfare effects are close to neutral (Saiz, 
2003, Ottaviano and Peri, 2006, Sparber, 2007). Concentrations of migrant inventors 
make a difference to levels of urban innovation (Saxenian, 2002, Niebuhr, 2006, Peri, 
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2007, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008, Ozgen et al., 2010). Migrant networks also 
facilitate international links and reduce trade costs (Saxenian, 2006, Peri and Requena, 
2009). 
 
Ottaviano and Peri-type open cities models should also apply to the European 
context, where cities operate as small open economies in a large system. However, 
compared to the US, the UK and other European countries typically have fewer cities and 
less spatial variation in economic and demographic outcomes. So far there is almost no 
comparable European analysis – although there are a handful of studies on EU regions 
(Bellini et al., 2008, Huber et al., 2011), German regional wages (Südekum et al., 2009), 
UK regional prices (Frattini, 2008), UK employment growth (Lee, 2010), UK wages 
(Longhi, 2011) and house prices in England and Wales (Sá, 2011).  
 
Frattini finds some positive relationships between immigrant population shares and 
prices. Lee finds positive links between migrant diversity and employment growth in 
English cities, but is unable to establish a causal relationship. Similarly, Longhi finds 
positive links between ethnic diversity and wages, but results using instruments are non-
significant. Controlling for causality, Sa finds negative effects of immigrants on house 
prices at local authority level, but no effect at regional level.   
 
3.4 Migration, employer response and labour market institutional change  
 
A third perspective on the urban impacts of migration focuses on changes to labour 
market institutions and to individual employers’ business strategies.  As discussed above, 
new migrants tend to cluster in entry-level occupations – so that against a backdrop of 
rising net migration, there is effectively a ‘permanent’ rise in migrants’ share of the entry-
level workforce. This triggers outcomes which are distinctive from those set out in the 
neoclassical models above.  
 
Lewis (2005) notes that employers may react to repeated / continuous migration 
shocks by shifting to more labour-intensive production functions. In practice, this could 
take two forms. First, in urban areas with large numbers of entry-level positions, employers 
of low-wage labour may switch hiring patterns to take advantage of a constant flow of 
cheap, motivated workers (Stenning et al., 2006). Some sectors of the local economy – 
such as food processing, routine manufacturing or low-cost retail – may become 
progressively ‘migrant-intensive’ or ‘migrant-dependent’ (Green, 2008). Second, firms in 
other sectors may also adopt more labour-intensive production functions. They may then 
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fill new posts using migrant labour, particularly if the new jobs are of poor quality and 
unattractive to native workers.   
 
These dynamic feedback effects have consequences for native workers, especially 
those with intermediate or lower skills. If migrants increasingly provide the main source of 
entry level labour, UK-born low-skill workers may be able to move up the occupational 
hierarchy. The extent of this ‘bumping up’ critically depends on the quality of available 
education and on-going vocational training, and on whether employers increase their 
demand for skilled labour.  If low-skilled natives are bumped up, migration will leave their 
employment rates unaffected but their wages will increase.  If natives are unable to move 
into better jobs, however, the dynamic effect of migration will be to bid down low-skill 
natives’ employment rates. They will be unwilling to fill low-paid, insecure positions; 
migrants will dominate employment flows. Labour market competition becomes ‘lockout’. 
At urban level, average wages and employment rates may fall in places where low value-
added sectors dominate. As the area’s economic trajectory turns downward, prices fall too.  
 
There is some suggestive UK evidence to support this. Since the mid-1970s, 
technological and institutional changes have contributed to wage inequality and job 
polarisation, with rising employment shares for high-skilled ‘knowledge’ jobs and the least-
skilled manual occupations (Goos and Manning, 2007). This helps explain persistent 
spatial disparities in many urban areas, which have lost ‘middling’ jobs and seen the share 
of manual jobs increase. Some of these places have also seen large increases in net 
migration. In some parts of the country (such as the North East and Midlands) food 
processing and manufacturing firms are becoming dependent on the ‘quick fix’ of migrant 
labour  (Fitzgerald, 2007, Green et al., 2007b, Green et al., 2007a, Dawley and Stenning, 
2008, MacKenzie and Forde, 2009, Wills et al., 2010, Cook et al., 2011). Temporary 
employment agencies appear to play increasingly important roles in helping low-wage 
employers source staff (Coe et al., 2006). A8 Accession has accelerated these trends, 
bringing potentially millions of new workers into the EU’s transnational labour market 
(Ciupijus, 2011).   
 
There are also difficulties for low-skilled workers looking to move up the 
occupational ladder. Critics point to persistent problems in the UK adult skills system 
(Westwood and Jones, 2004). Most famously, Finegold and Soskice (1988) suggest some 
sectors of the UK economy are in ‘low-skills equilibrium’: employers operate low-cost, low-
quality business models and show little interest in changing task skill composition, or 
building workers’ human capital. 
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3.5 Diversity and the Creative Class 
 
An alternative view is suggested by Richard Florida (Florida, 2002). In this model, 
urban economies are increasingly dominated by a ‘Creative Class’ of skilled workers with 
strong preferences for cultural diversity. Open and tolerant cities attract the Creative Class, 
improving their human capital mix and attracting new investment. This implies that diverse 
cities might have stronger economic performance primarily because of the Creative Class, 
with cultural diversity contributing nothing directly. In practice, the Creative Class performs 
poorly in both US (Glaeser, 2005) and UK contexts (Nathan, 2007). Significantly, there is 
little UK evidence that a single ‘Creative Class’ exists – skilled workers have a range of 
location preferences covering city centres, suburbs and rural locations. 
 
 
4. Data and descriptives 
 
In order to examine potential effects on urban economies of migration and the diversity 
migrants bring, I construct a new panel of UK urban areas, from 1994-2008 inclusive. 
Unlike the previous chapter, the panel data structure allows me to fit area and time fixed 
effects, as well as develop more sophisticated strategies to try and establish causation. 
 
The main dataset in this analysis is the Labour Force Survey (LFS): this is the 
single best source of long term data on migration, demographic and economic data, but 
the relatively small survey size raises the risk of measurement error when used at local 
level (Dustmann et al., 2003). Specifically, I am using the LFS at sub-regional level, which 
requires trying to safeguard against biased estimates.  
 
LFS microdata13 are provided with spatial identifiers at Local Authority District level. 
I therefore aggregate local authority averages to Travel to Work Area level (2001 TTWAs), 
using a postcode share weighting system.14 TTWAs have the additional benefits of being 
                                               
13
 Microdata kindly provided by the Office of National Statistics Virtual Microdata Lab (VML). The quarterly 
LFS samples around 60,000 households. Each quarter consists of five overlapping ‘waves’, with an 80% 
overlap within that quarter. As per ONS recommendations, to ensure a sample of unique individuals I keep 
only observations from waves 1 and 5 in each quarter. I then pool the remaining data to produce calendar 
years. This approach gives me c.120000 individual-level observations per year, approximately 517 per 
TTWA. This will be considerably higher for both total and migrant sample in the final panel, which is 
restricted to urban areas only.  
14
 As in the previous chapter, I aggregate individual-level LFS data to local authority-level averages, and 
then aggregate these to TTWA-level using postcode shares. Local Authority District (LAD) boundaries are 
not congruent with TTWA boundaries, so straightforward aggregation is not possible. Using the November 
2008 National Postcode Sector Database (NSPD), I calculate the number of postcodes in each 2001 
TTWA and in each of its constituent LADs. For each TTWA, I then calculate constituent LADs’ ‘postcode 
shares’. Shares sum to one, and are used as weights to construct TTWA-level averages.  Example: 
suppose a TTWA consists of parts of three LADs. The TTWA has 100 postcodes, 60 of which are in 
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designed to represent self-contained local labour markets, act as good proxies for a spatial 
economy, and minimise the risk of spatial autocorrelation (Robson et al., 2006). To further 
strengthen the analysis I restrict the analysis to 79 ‘primary urban’ TTWAs where the 
sample sizes are biggest, following the approach of Gibbons et al (2011) (see Appendix C 
for details). Together, these precautions give me a panel with 1185 observations between 
the years 1994 and 2008 inclusive. I use this full panel for the descriptive analysis.  
 
The LFS provides information for wages, employment, migration and most controls. 
This is combined with Land Registry microdata (for house prices) and ONS mid-year 
population estimates (for controls and robustness checks). Because I am interested in 
productivity, wages and employment, I restrict observations to the LFS working age 
population (16-64 for men, 16-59 for women). For simplicity I drop observations from 
Northern Ireland. At the time of modelling Land Registry data was only available for 1995-
2006 inclusive, so house price data panels cover 1995-2006. As a final safety measure I 
pool years together, averaging observations across three years.  
 
4.1 Diversity measures 
 
To measure the diversity that migrants bring to the UK, I construct a 
Fractionalisation Index of country of birth groups. Following Ottaviano and Peri (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2006), this captures the cultural diversity migrants bring to urban economies. For 
group g in area a in year t, the Index is given by:  
 
FRACat = 1 – ∑g [SHAREgat]2               (1) 
 
Where g is one of (1 … n) birth country groups and SHARE is g’s share of the total area 
population.  The Index thus measures the probability that two individuals in an area come 
from different country of birth groups. Similar measures are used widely in the 
development literature, as well as some US city and state-level studies (Easterley and 
Levine, 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004).  
 
I estimate the Index using 79 individual country of birth groups, including UK-born, 
and construct separate Indices for high, intermediate and low skilled workers. The Index 
reflects both the number of different groups in an area and their relative sizes. Specifically, 
it takes the value 0 when everyone is in the same country of birth group and 1 when each 
individual is in a different group. For comparison with the bulk of labour market impact 
                                                                                                                                         
LAD_a, 30 in LAD_b and 10 in LAD_c. The relevant LAD weights are 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. The 
TTWA-level average of variable x  is given by (x)TTWA = 0.6*(x)_a + 0.3*(x)_b + 0.1*(x)_c. 
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studies I also show some results using migrant population shares. I run further cross-
checks using aggregated birth country groups.15   
 
4.2 Descriptives 
 
Summary statistics for TTWA-year cells are set out in Table 2. The first panel 
covers my main dependent variables: wages, employment and prices. Wages are 
measured as average hourly wages for the TTWA; employment rates as the percentage of 
the working-age population; house prices as TTWAs’ average prices for any residential 
property. As mentioned above, I use wage information to infer changes in labour 
productivity, following Combes et al (2005). Wages and employment rates are broadly 
similar between British-born and migrant workers, although migrants have slightly higher 
average wages and lower employment rates (thus higher unemployment rates).  
 
As expected, London accounts for the maximum values of overall and resident 
wages, as well as house prices; employment rates are highest in Guildford. Resident 
wages and employment rates are lowest in Hartlepool and Liverpool respectively, while 
Mansfield has the cheapest housing. For migrants, wages and employment rates are 
highest in Worcester and Norwich respectively; respective minima are in Calderdale and 
Hartlepool.  London has the highest value of the Fractionalisation Index and the largest 
migrant population share; Hartlepool has the lowest on both counts.   
 
The second panel of descriptives covers area-level demographic, economic and 
social characteristics used as controls.  I create three skill groups based on qualifications 
obtained, using the UK National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) system as a benchmark. 
‘High skill’ workers have qualifications at NVQ4 level or above (a university degree or other 
Higher Education qualification); ‘intermediate skill’ workers obtain NVQ3 or 2 (equivalent to 
A-levels or at least five GCSE’s at grades A*-C, respectively); ‘low skill’ workers obtain 
NVQ1, equivalent to other/no qualifications.16 High skill workers comprise just over a fifth 
of the sample, intermediate skill workers over two-fifths and low-skill workers a third.  
 
Table 3 breaks down these skill groups by migrant and native populations across 
the panel. Natives are slightly more likely than average to have intermediate skills: by 
contrast, migrants are slightly more likely to be high skilled, and substantially more likely 
than natives to be low skilled. For occupational groups, migrants are rather more likely 
                                               
15
 Specifically, I run further regressions using 1) migrant population shares from ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ 
countries, where ‘North’ is defined as EU25, North America, Japan and Australasia, and 2) a simple 
Fractionalisation Index using 18 country of birth groups. For 1) results were largely insignificant on native 
wages and employment.  For 2) results were very similar to the full Fractionalisation Index.   
16
 A-level exams are taken at age 18, GCSE’s at 16. 
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than average to be in high-level occupations (such as professional roles), reflecting the 
higher share of urban migrants with high skills. Migrants are less likely to be in 
intermediate roles (such as skilled trades, administration or secretarial jobs) but in entry-
level jobs (personal and protective services, sales, and routine occupations) migrant 
workers and natives have similar employment shares.   
 
Table 4 compares labour market performance for native and migrant skill groups. 
Average migrant wages are slightly higher than those for natives (first panel), but this is 
largely driven by wages for low-skilled migrants. The second panel looks at employment 
rates. In all three skill group categories, natives are more likely to be employed than 
migrants. Unemployment rates largely reflect this – although low-skilled migrants are less 
likely to be out of work than their low-skill native counterparts.  
 
Table 5 looks at how migrant characteristics and outcomes have shifted over the 
panel period. It turns out that the headline figures just discussed hide some significant 
shifts between the 1990s and 2000s. Most notably, while the skill composition of migrants 
has not changed substantially, migrants had substantially bunched into entry-level 
occupations by 2006/8. This national trend hides some very large local shifts: for example, 
the share of migrants in entry-level occupations increased by 33% in Hartlepool, 48% in 
Burnley, 64% in Doncaster and 116% in Hull. Similarly, while wages and employment 
rates differ little by skill group, migrants in high-level occupations now earn above average; 
those in entry-level roles somewhat below. These shifts reflect important changes in labour 
market institutions, especially in ‘migrant-intensive sectors’, and are discussed further in 
Sections 7 and 9.  
 
Table 6 shows the changing composition of the UK’s migrant communities.  The 
most striking fact here is that a third of the top 20 origin countries in 1994 do not even 
feature in the top 20 15 years later. The biggest-growing migrant community is Polish 
people in the UK (9.8% of migrants in 2008). Other important sending countries include 
Zimbabwe (2.76% of immigrants in 2008), China (2.49%), the former USSR (2.21%) and 
the Czech Republic / Slovakia (1.97%). Of the countries remaining major sources of 
immigrants, only Pakistan, South Africa and Bangladesh have seen a growing share of 
arrivals.  
 
Finally, we turn to the spatial aspects of these demographic changes (Table 7). 
Between 1994 and 2008, average migrant working-age population shares increased from 
six to just over 10 per cent (similarly, the average value of the Fractionalisation Index rose 
by around 10 percentage points, from just under 0.1 to just under 0.2). London maintains 
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the largest migrant stocks throughout the period, and records a 9.4% point rise in migrant 
population. Reading (9%), Luton and Watford (9.1%), Milton Keynes (10.1%) and 
Cambridge (12.3%) also record large increases.  
 
 The descriptives confirm the growing cultural diversity of urban areas, and highlight 
the role of immigration in this. The composition of the migrant population has shifted as 
new communities have emerged. Cities like London combine high wages, employment 
rates and large diverse populations; at the other end of the distribution are areas like 
Hartlepool with low wages, low employment rates and relatively small migrant numbers. 
Taken as a whole, migrants themselves are slightly more likely to be higher or lower skilled 
than natives, but are less likely to be employment.  Migrants also exhibit clustering into 
less well-paid entry-level jobs by the mid-2000s.   
 
 
5. Estimation strategy 
 
I now explore how these features of the UK’s immigrant population affect urban economic 
outcomes. I construct a simple model, linking urban economic outcomes to diversity and a 
range of demographic, economic and spatial controls. My estimation strategy is an 
example of the spatial correlations approach widely used in the migration and diversity 
literature (e.g. (Altonji and Card, 1991, Card, 2005, Dustmann et al., 2005, Ottaviano and 
Peri, 2006). The basic model is given by:  
 
 Yit = bDIVit + DEMitc + ECONitd + eSPATit + µt + ∂i + e         (2) 
 
Where Y is variously the log of average hourly wages for UK-born residents 
(‘resident wages’), log average employment rate for UK-born (‘resident employment’) and 
the log of average house prices (‘prices’). In further regressions wages and employment 
rates are also broken down for high, intermediate and low-skilled natives. As in the 
previous chapter, the log-linear specification means that coefficients of DIV can be 
interpreted as marginal effects.17   
 
Productivity gains in urban areas are typically reflected in higher long term wages 
(Combes et al., 2005). So this specification allows me to interpret wage changes as shifts 
in labour productivity.  
 
                                               
17
 Log-linear specifications could cause problems if values of dependent variables were ever zero. 
However, there are no zero cells in the panel.  
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Because the UK lacks robust cost of living data at sub-regional level, and even 
regional-level data is very hard to obtain (Frattini, 2008), I use the local house prices as a 
proxy for the local cost of living. This has some important limitations. First, including 
mortgage costs, housing-related expenditure is the single largest item of UK consumer 
spending, covering 22 percent of spend (Office of National Statistics, 2008a). However, 
three quarters of spending is not covered. Second, most migrants tend to rent rather than 
buy, so that some of the direct impacts of migrants on local housing markets will probably 
not show up in sales figures (Gordon et al., 2007).  
 
DIV is my variable of interest, and is given by the Fractionalisation Index of birth 
country groups. For comparison, I also present results where DIV is the population shares 
of migrant workers. Further regressions estimate the effects of migrant skill groups on 
native skill groups, and these use Fractionalisation Indices and population shares for high, 
intermediate and low-skilled migrants as appropriate.  
 
 I fit a number of control variables, following the approach of the previous chapter. 
DEM represents two demographic controls. Migrants are younger than average, and 
younger workers tend to earn less, so I fit the area share of workers age 24 and under to 
control for potentially spurious correlations between diversity, wages and employment 
(Dustmann et al., 2005, Goujard et al., 2011). I fit the share of female workers for 
precision: women still earn less than men, although in many areas female employment 
rates are higher than male (Swaffield, 2011).     
 
ECON is a set of economic structure controls (share of workers with degrees, 
share of workers in manufacturing sectors, share of jobless who are long term 
unemployed). Human capital is positively linked to urban productivity, and thus wage 
levels; urban areas with high nominal wages also tend to have higher house prices 
(Glaeser, 2008). The descriptives also suggest that migrants are slightly more likely to be 
high-skilled than natives. I therefore need to control for compositional effects which may 
drive diversity-productivity and diversity-prices relationships.  
 
Given the steady decline of manufacturing employment in the UK, manufacturing 
activity may be negatively linked to wages and employment; worklessness is negatively 
associated with both wages and employment rates (Berthoud, 2003). The descriptive 
analysis shows that migrants are more likely than natives to be unemployed. I therefore fit 
the share of manufacturing jobs for precision, and use the worklessness control to capture 
potentially spurious links between migrant presence, wages and employment rates.  
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SPAT is given by logged population density, measured as total population over 
surface area. This is a simple device for capturing agglomeration economies, which again 
may lead both to higher wages, prices and employment rates, and simultaneously to 
larger, more diverse urban populations. µt and ∂i denote time dummies and area fixed 
effects, respectively.  
 
The panel comprises 158 TTWA observations for 1994/6 and 2006/8, using moving 
averages to minimise measurement error. I estimate the model as a two-period model with 
area fixed effects and year dummies, which is equivalent to estimating in differences. As a 
cross-check I replicate the main regressions in differences, finding very similar results.   
 
There are a number of validity challenges here, in particular the issue of majority 
outflows and migrant selection (Borjas, 1994). I deal with the former in robustness tests, 
and the latter through a shift-share instrument based on Ottaviano and Peri (2006). See 
Sections Seven and Eight for further details.  
 
 
6. Main results  
 
The results from the main regressions are set out in Tables 8 through 10. In each table, 
specifications (1) to (4) give results for the Fractionalisation Index. Of these, (1) shows DIV 
only, (2) adds controls and year dummies, (3) adds fixed effects and (4) removes London 
from the sample. Specifications (5) – (8) repeat for migrant population shares.  
 
6.1 Results from whole sample 
 
Table 8 shows positive associations between migrant diversity and native 
productivity / wages. As measured by the Fractionalisation Index, DIV is 0.317, significant 
at 5% (column 3). This implies that a 10 point rise in the Index, the average change over 
the panel period, is associated with a [(0.1*0.317)*100] = 3.17% rise in UK-born workers’ 
productivity / wages.  Migrant population shares also show a positive link to native wages. 
Column 7 indicates the coefficient of DIV is 0.476, significant at 5% (column 3).  A one 
percentage-point rise in migrant population share is associated with a [(0.01 x 0.476]*100] 
= 0.476% rise in resident productivity / wages: a five percentage-point rise, roughly the 
average change in migrant population shares from 1994-2008, is linked to a 2.38% rise. 
 
In contrast, Table 9 shows a negative association between migrants and UK-born 
average employment rates. For the Fractionalisation Index, the coefficient of DIV is -0.13, 
significant at 5% (column 3). This implies that a 10 point rise in the Index is associated 
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with a [(0.1*0.213)*100] = 2.13% fall in resident employment rates. I also find a negative 
link between migrant population share and native employment in urban areas. Column 7 
shows the coefficient of DIV on native employment is somewhat larger than previously, at -
0.377. As with the Fractionalisation Index the result is significant at 5%. 
 
Table 10 gives results for the house price models. Once area fixed effects are 
added (column 3) I find no significant relationship between DIV and the local cost of living, 
as measured by average house prices. For migrant population shares results are very 
similar, and no significant link is established. In large part, this is likely to be driven by 
limitations in the dependent variable (see Section 5).  
 
6.2 Results by skill group 
 
 LFS data allows me to disaggregate the sample by migrant and native skill groups. 
I use this information in two ways. First, I look at the impact of overall diversity on different 
native groups, by regressing DIV on the wages/productivity and employment rates of high 
skill, intermediate skill and low skill natives. Results are given in Table 11. 
  
Labour market frameworks predict that migrants tend to benefit high-skill natives 
and put pressure on lower-skill natives via relative scarcity effects. The first panel of Table 
10 shows that as expected, migrant diversity is positive for the wages/productivity of higher 
skilled workers and slightly negative for low skilled workers.  However, DIV is not 
significant in any specification.18 Results for employment models are given in the second 
panel, and here coefficients of DIV are negative for all worker groups. The association is 
only significant for intermediate and low skilled natives, where the coefficients of DIV are -
0.272 and -0.514, significant at 5% and 1% respectively.19  For high skill natives, effects 
are insignificant and close to zero, as would be expected.   
 
 Second, I regress high, intermediate and low-skilled migration on the economic 
outcomes of respective native skill groups. Specifically, I regress diversity of the three 
migrant skill groups on the wages/productivity and employment rates of all native skill 
groups. This specification should allow me to disentangle relative scarcity effects from 
production complementarities. Relative scarcity effects should be manifest in positive 
effects of low-skill migrants on wages and employment of high-skill natives, but negative 
effects of low and intermediate skill migrants on outcomes for similar natives. By contrast, 
                                               
18
 This is partly explained by collinearity between the dependent variable and the human capital control, 
especially for high skill natives’ wages. When the latter is removed, DIV is weakly significant (at 10%) on 
productivity / wages. Employment results are unaffected.   
19
 I experiment with migrant population shares, finding similar results.  
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production complementarities should be characterised by positive wage effects of low 
(intermediate, high) skill migrants on low (intermediate, high) skill natives. 
 
Results are given in Table 12. Productivity / wage results are in the first panel. 
There is some weak support for production complementarities, with positive links between 
diversity and native productivity / wages for high skill and low skill cells. For example, the 
coefficient of low-skill diversity on low skill native productivity / wages is 0.177, significant 
at 5%, compared with 0.317 for the whole sample.  
 
There is also some support for relative scarcity effects. Specifically, low skill 
diversity is associated with increased wages for both intermediate and higher skill natives 
(both significant at 5%), and there is a negative – albeit insignificant – association of 
intermediate skill diversity and intermediate native wages. The coefficient of intermediate 
skilled diversity on low-skill native wages is rather larger, at -1.267 (significant at 5%).  
 
 The second panel looks at employment outcomes for natives. Here, there is very 
little evidence of production complementarities, with coefficients of high skill diversity on 
high skill native employment insignificant and, at 0.076, close to zero. Conversely, there is 
more evidence of relative scarcity effects: the presence of intermediate and low skill 
migrants both have negative links to employment rates in their respective native skill 
groups. The coefficient of low skill diversity on low-skill native employment rates is -0.178, 
significant at 10%.   
 
6.3 Robustness checks   
 
To test the robustness of these main results I run some basic checks. First, the 
descriptive analysis suggests London is a clear outlier on both diversity and dependent 
variables. My main results may therefore be skewed by the capital’s presence. Removing 
London from the sample makes some difference to the results, although less than one 
might expect (see columns 4 and 8 of Tables 8-10). For example, column 4 of Table 7 
shows that removing the capital slightly raises the coefficient of DIV on native productivity / 
wage rates, from 0.317 to 0.334. In Table 8, taking out London slightly lowers the effect of 
DIV on employment rates, from -0.213 to -0.210. For productivity / wage models 
significance remains unchanged, but removing London from employment models reduces 
significance to 10%.  
 
Second, I re-run the wage / productivity models by for native occupational groups. 
Given the clustering of migrants into high-end and entry-level occupations highlighted in 
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the descriptive analysis, we might expect to see some effects on native wage outcomes, 
as detected in other UK research by Nickell and Saleheen (2009). While none of the 
results is significant at this stage (Table 13), there are some changes once instruments are 
introduced (see section 8).  
 
Third, I repeat the main regressions without the principal outliers, leverage points 
and influential observations.20 As in the previous chapter, the descriptives suggest a 
number of areas with historically strong, or poor economic performance. Overall diversity-
performance relationships may be affected by omitted variables in these areas. Outliers 
are defined as maxima of resident wages, resident employment and the Fractionalisation 
Index; leverage and influence points are the five cells with the highest leverage scores and 
values of Cook’s D, and are specified separately for wage/productivity and employment 
models. Results are given in Table 14. Wage models are essentially unaffected by these 
additional controls, with coefficients of DIV of similar sign, magnitude and significance. 
However, employment models are sensitive to the presence of leverage and influence 
points. Controlling for leverage reduces the coefficient of DIV from -0.213 to just -0.139. 
Similarly, controlling for influence points reduces b to -0.154. In both cases the result is no 
longer significant.  
 
In employment models some of these outlying points are former industrial cities. I 
explore these issues further with a fourth set of checks for the influence of long term 
industrial change on the employment results. In past decades, many migrants arrived in 
the UK to take manufacturing jobs in areas such as Burnley and Bradford, which 
subsequently underwent substantial deindustrialisation during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
employment results may therefore be driven by a spurious correlation between large 
migrant populations and low employment rates.  
 
As in the previous chapter, to test the effects of industrial decline I examine 
economic activity and employment rates for the 20 de-industrialising urban areas identified 
by Turok and Edge (1999). It turns out that the areas losing the most employment during 
the 1980s and early 1990s also tend to have the weakest labour market performance 
during the panel period. I re-run the employment regressions without these TTWAs.21 
Results are given in the last column of Table 14. Again, productivity / wage models are 
                                               
20
 Because outliers etc are TTWA cells and the model fits area fixed effects, it is not possible to run models 
on a pooled sample with relevant dummies.  
21
 The 20 urban areas identified by Turok and Edge are Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire 
TTWAs), West Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, 
South Yorkshire (Sheffield and Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, 
Leicester, Nottingham, Plymouth, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan. 
 93
unaffected: but coefficients of DIV on native employment are now smaller and marginally 
significant.   
 
 Finally, I check model specification by re-estimating in first differences. Results for 
the main productivity/wages and employment models are given in Table 15. The size and 
sign of the diversity variables is very similar: however, model fit statistics are considerably 
worse, providing support for the original two period fixed effects specification.  
 
 Overall, the results so far suggest two broad themes. First, I find positive links 
between diversity and native productivity and wages, especially for higher skilled natives. 
Skill group regressions provide some support for underlying production complementarities, 
although relative scarcity effects are also present. As suggested by the literature, area-
level averages may hide much stronger channels in specific sectors. Second, I find 
negative associations between migrant populations, migrant diversity and native 
employment rates – particularly for intermediate and low skilled native groups. The results 
are sensitive to a few influential observations, and the effects of de-industrialisation partly 
explain the findings. However, immigration impacts cannot be ruled out.  
 
These results are simply the correlations of diversity and urban economic 
performance. The next two sections attempt to establish causality more precisely.  
 
 
7. Native outflows  
 
The UK-born population in a given area may respond to immigrants arriving by leaving that 
area – because they are displaced in the labour market, because of more expensive 
housing, or because they dislike diversity. If this occurs any economic impacts of the 
migration shock may not be picked up by a spatial correlations approach, and coefficients 
of DIV will be biased towards zero (Borjas, 1994, Borjas, 2006). 
 
Recent reviews of the international literature suggest there is still no consensus on 
the extent of native outflows (Card, 2007, Dustmann et al., 2008). In theory, there are 
reasons to think UK native outflows should be small. Despite declining internal mobility in 
in the United States (Molloy et al., 2011), levels of internal migration in the UK are 
relatively low compared to the US, and low-income groups are particularly unlikely to 
move. Gordon and colleagues (2007) suggest that as migrants are willing to live at high 
housing densities, net immigration will have little effect on the local cost of living and thus 
is unlikely to price out natives.  
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Empirical evidence is mixed. Hatton and Tani (2005) suggest outflows are quite 
large at regional level, especially in the Greater South East. By contrast, Lemos and 
Portes (2008) find no effect of migrants’ arrival on UK native ‘netflows’. Most recently Sa 
(2011) finds evidence of native inflows and outflows, with the latter outweighing the former. 
Both these latter studies use local authority data. Arguably, neither regional nor local 
authority scales are appropriate scales for approximating local housing markets.   
 
More broadly, there is a continued and  unsettled debate on ‘white flight’ in the UK. 
In 2005 Trevor Phillips – then head of the Equalities and Human Rights Commission – 
warned that Britain was ‘sleepwalking into segregation’, with white families exiting many 
urban areas.22 But Simpson and Finney (2009) provide evidence to show very little spatial 
segregation in British communities .23   
 
The choice of native outflows test is important.  Peri and Sparber (2011) conduct 
microsimulation tests on outflow models, finding some specifications contain inherent 
biases – and so report outflows even when none exist. The best-performing tests are 
those developed by Card (2001, 2005, 2007). Assuming migrants tend to compete with 
lower-skilled natives, Card regresses the share of all low-skilled workers on the share of 
low-skilled migrants. I adopt Card’s 2007 specification, adding controls, area fixed effects 
and year dummies allowed by the panel data structure. The model is given by: 
 
LOWSKILLit = a + bLOWSKILLMIGit + CONTROLScit + µt + ∂i + eit       (3) 
 
If migrants completely displace natives, b should be 0 or close to it. Conversely, if there is 
no displacement b should approach the value 1.   
 
Results are shown in Table 16. The first panel gives results by skill group. The 
naïve OLS results suggest native outflows are quite large (column 1): however, this model 
has little explanatory power. Once fixed effects and controls are introduced (columns 2 
and 3), the relationship is insignificant and coefficients of b are close to zero. The second 
panel gives results by occupational groups. Without controls values of b are quite similar to 
the skill group models: however, adding controls and area dummies does not remove the 
effect, which remains at 0.115, significant at 1%. While these results are correlations 
rather than causal effects, so need cautious interpretation. The approaching-zero 
coefficients suggest that native outflows are not present when the workforce is cut by skill 
                                               
22
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4270010.stm accessed 3 September 2009.  
23
 Although there is some evidence that increasing parental choice in education has led to some largely 
white or non-white schools (ibid).  
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group, but there is suggestive evidence of crowding out in entry-level occupations.  This is 
in line with some of the broader evidence discussed in Section 9.  
 
As a secondary test I also develop a very simple internal migration model, 
regressing the log population share of British-born workers on the logs of wages, house 
prices, employment rates and the share of long term unemployed, plus migrant population 
share. Results are shown in Table 17. While there is a negative association between 
migrant stock and the population share of British-born, other factors appear to play a 
larger role. Again, this suggests that native outflows play little part in my main results.  
 
 
8.  Migrant selection and instruments 
 
A more serious issue is migrant selection. If migrants are attracted to the cities with the 
highest economic performance, the best-performing place may also be the most diverse 
even if there is no causal relationship. This will bias coefficients of DIV upwards. Equally, if 
migrants are located in cities that suffer exogenous, negative economic shocks, DIV will be 
biased downwards if the shock is not controlled for.   
 
I use an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to deal with this issue. A number of 
potential instruments have been developed in the literature. Time lags are the simplest 
approach (see e.g. Dustmann et al (2005)) but are hard to interpret in a spatial economy 
framework. Accessibility measures have also been used, based on the fact that migrants 
tend to settle in and around major entry points such as ports and land borders (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2006, Bellini et al., 2008). Unfortunately, the geography of the UK makes it 
difficult to apply these instruments successfully: there are no land borders, and many key 
entry points are regional airports close to several urban cores, making it hard to link 
migrant flows to specific local communities.24 Compared to many other countries the UK 
has made relatively few policy changes that have significantly changed migrant flows 
(Ortega and Peri, 2009). The most suitable policy shock is the natural experiment created 
by A8 accession in 2004 (Lemos and Portes, 2008). However, accession effects arguably 
kick in too close to the end of the panel to be useful in this case.  
 
I therefore construct a shift-share instrument of the kind popularised by Card  
(2005, 2007). The intuition is that migrant populations tend to be attracted to existing 
migrant communities. In its simplest form, the instrument uses an area’s historical migrant 
                                               
24
 Lemos and Portes (2008) experiment with an instrument based on regional airports, numbers of flights 
and distance from airport to home countries. This performs poorly for the reasons above, and probably 
because their period of study (2004-2006) also saw considerable dispersal of migrants around the UK. 
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population to assign the area a share of the current national migrant population. By 
construction, the instrument builds local migrant populations on the basis of historical and 
non-local information only. It should thus remove the effect of local demand shocks that 
might otherwise affect net migration to a city.  
 
The specific instrument used here is based on Ottaviano and Peri (2006). Let SHgat 
denote the share of the total population accounted for country of birth group g, in area a,  
year t. Then SHgt is the corresponding national share of group g, summed across cities. tb 
denotes a base year. Then the predicted population share of g is given by:   
 
pSHAREgat = SHgatb + [SHgatb * (SHgt – SHgtb) / SHgatb ]              (4)   
       
 
The predicted migrant population share is given by summing pSHAREgat across all 
non-UK birth country groups. The predicted Fractionalisation Index is then given by:  
 
 pFRACgt = 1 - ∑g (pSHAREgat)2            (5)  
 
I set 1991 as the base year, which allows me to use 1991 Census population data.  
 
There are two other potential challenges for shift-share instruments. First, patterns 
of historic migrant settlement may be influenced by historical factors that also shape 
current economic outcomes. This would suggest choosing a base year deep in the past to 
ensure exogeneity. However, an overly distant base year may have little relevance to 
current migration patterns. I experiment with base years 1981 and 1991, with the latter 
performing best in first stage tests. The second problem is that local demand shocks within 
the panel might have an impact on national migrant stocks (for example, a construction 
boom in London during the late 1990s). This weakness is harder to deal with, although in 
theory one could do so by generating predicted national migrant stocks – using a country-
level model of international migration flows, for instance. Ortega and Peri (2009) offer one 
such model: further research could apply it at the sub-national level.   
 
8.1 Results from IV regressions  
 
Results from IV regressions are given in Table 18. First stage results show that the 
instrument is a good predictor of DIV with an F-statistic of between 21 and 39 and partial 
R2 between 0.28 and 0.33. The instrument also passes Kleibergen-Paap tests for under-
identification and weak identification, and the Stock-Yogo test at the highest critical value.   
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Second-stage results are given in Table 19. The top panel shows that the positive 
effect of DIV on resident wages disappears in the IV results (column 1). In the middle 
panel, the negative association between DIV and resident employment remains and is 
significant at 1%. Coefficients of DIV are now rather larger (-0.692 for the Fractionalisation 
Index). The right-hand panel shows that, as in the main regressions, DIV is not significant 
on average house prices. As in the main results, I experiment with simple robustness 
checks. For all three dependent variables, removing London, outliers, leverage and 
influence points and de-industrialising cities makes little difference to the results.   
 
 Table 20 looks at outcomes for different native skill groups (data limitations prevent 
a full replication of the skill group cells analysis). The top panel covers productivity/wages, 
and shows coefficients of DIV are positive for high and intermediate skill workers (columns 
1 and 2) and negative for low skilled natives (column 3). For the former, DIV is 0.653, 
significant at 10%. The middle panel repeats this analysis for native occupation groups. 
Results here suggest a weak negative effect of migrant diversity on the wages of natives 
in entry-level occupations.  The bottom panel gives employment results. Here, coefficients 
of DIV are negative for all three groups. For high-skill natives the result is marginal, but 
stronger for intermediate skilled workers (-0.926, significant at 1%) and low skilled workers 
(-0.772, significant at 10%). As before, experimenting with the various robustness checks 
does not change the overall pattern of these findings.  
 
Overall, these results confirm some elements of the main findings. The dynamic 
impacts of migration are not uniform. Any positive impacts on productivity/wages are 
driven by gains for skilled workers, particularly in London. Conversely, negative 
employment effects seem to be driven by losses for intermediate or lower-skilled native 
groups. The occupational group results provide some evidence of downwards wage 
pressure for natives in entry-level occupations.  As such, the IV results provide support for 
the existence of production complementarities and dynamic labour market change. 
 
 
9) Conclusions  
 
This paper has considered the economic effects of migration on a panel of UK cities 
between 1994 and 2008. Over this period the UK, and urban areas in particular, have 
become significantly more culturally diverse, with migration a main driver of change. 
Migration may have distinctive economic impacts in cities, as opposed to the UK as a 
whole. Investigating this is difficult for the UK. Unlike the bulk of British studies I have been 
able to look at causal effects beyond the labour market, over two decades, and across 
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‘real’ local economies. The trade-off is that the data is pushed very hard, but the 
estimation strategy takes care to minimise measurement error.  
 
The results imply there are significant dynamic effects of net migration on UK urban 
areas, over and above the labour market change considered in conventional analyses. 
First, there is some evidence that migration helps drive up native productivity and wages, 
particularly for high-skill UK-born workers and particularly for those in London. Second, 
more migrant-intensive economies may have a lockout effect on some lower-skilled 
natives, although others may be ‘bumped up’ the occupational hierarchy. Third, net 
migration appears to have no effect on average house prices at the urban level. All of 
these results are robust to various checks, including instrumental variables regression,. 
 
The paper proposes two main mechanisms by which net migration might change 
urban economic outcomes over the long term: production complementarities, particularly 
among skilled workers, and structural changes to entry level employment, concentrated on 
lower skilled workers. The empirical results suggest that both of these mechanisms are 
operating in UK urban areas. Productivity and wage gains largely accrue to skilled 
workers, although lower-skilled natives also gain; while employment pressure is largely felt 
by intermediate and low-skilled workers.25  
 
An alternative explanation is that all this simply reflects relative scarcity effects in 
the labour market. Results from skill group cells suggest that both are at least part of the 
answer. To test whether the results ‘collapse to the labour market’, I experiment with 
breaking the panel into shorter periods, covering 1994-1999 and 2000-2008. I find no 
statistically significant changes to average productivity/wages, or to particular worker 
types. In turn, this suggests that these results from the main panel are the result of longer 
term shifts in urban economies and firms, rather than simple labour market effects. 
Conversely, I also find significant negative associations of migration and resident 
employment rates in the period 2000-2008.  This suggests the very large increase in net 
migration during the 2000s partly drives the main employment results.  
 
Overall, these findings are less clear-cut than parallel studies in the US (Ottaviano 
and Peri, 2005a, 2006), Germany (Südekum et al., 2009) and the wider EU (Bellini et al., 
2008). And as might be expected, both my results differ from previous UK research on 
immigration and local labour markets, and from studies linking diversity to employment 
                                               
25
 A striking feature of the employment results is that the effects of migration appear to be strongest for 
intermediate skill British-born workers rather than for low skill natives. This is probably explained by the 
urban focus, which does not capture the large numbers of migrants in rural areas, working in agricultural or 
food processing sectors.  
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(Lee, 2010) and wages (Longhi, 2011). The UK’s urban structure, labour market 
transformations and immigrant populations help explain these differences. For example, 
the UK has fewer cities and smaller immigrant populations than the US; a number of UK 
cities have been affected by de-indutrialisation, while these trends affect a much smaller 
share of the US urban system.   
 
 In a UK context, the results help explain some of the current public conversation 
about migration and diversity. Net migration is good for high skilled workers, employers 
and Government, which receives migrants’ taxes but typically spends less on healthcare or 
education (Reed et al., 2005). On the face of it, outcomes seem to be less positive for 
‘blue-collar Britain’, as sceptical commentators such as Goodhart have suggested. 
However, the reality is likely to be more complex.  First, across the UK new migrants 
compete against previous migrant cohorts as well as natives (Manacorda et al., 2006). I 
run separate robustness checks to confirm this, comparing the main results with outcomes 
for all workers, including existing migrants.  Second, the employment results need to be 
put in the broader context of industrial decline and the restructuring of entry-level work in 
many urban labour markets.  
 
In particular, changes to labour market institutions are likely to condition the effects 
of migration: it is simplistic to ascribe the results to ‘migrants taking jobs’.  Several 
commentators have highlighted the growing share of part time and temporary positions in 
sectors such as retail, leisure, agribusiness and routine manufacturing, the increasing use 
of sub-contracting, and the growing dependence of many employers in these sectors on 
migrant employment (Fitzgerald, 2007, Green et al., 2007b, Green et al., 2007a, Dawley 
and Stenning, 2008, MacKenzie and Forde, 2009, Wills et al., 2010, Cook et al., 2011). 
One recent estimate suggests 40% of the 1.5m A8 migrants since 2004 work in agency-
dominated sectors such as manufacturing and process work, office employment or retail / 
hospitality.26 Wills and colleagues (2010) suggest that in some sectors of the London 
economy, such as cleaning, immigrants may account for 2/3 of all employees. Many 
‘migrant-intensive’ employers – particularly those in retail, agribusiness and routine 
manufacturing – operate low-quality, low-cost production models (Green, 2007b, Dawley 
and Stenning, 2008). They also depend heavily on temporary employment agencies – 
which play an important role in organising migrant employment, and in some cases take 
over firms’ overall Human Resources function (Green, 2008, Fitzgerald, 2007, Equality and 
Human Rights Commission, 2010).  
 
                                               
26
 Kath Jones and Kevin Ward (Manchester University) point out that 2008 WERS data suggests that since 
2004, 39% of migrants are employed in ‘administration, business and management’, food processing, 
manufacturing, hospitality or ‘temporary work’. 
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MacKenzie and Forde (2009) provide an illuminating case study of a glass 
packaging firm, based in Barnsley and employing around 90% migrant workers in a 
workforce of 200-300. Interviews with managers show the firm’s increasing focus on 
migrant workers – seen as ‘good workers’ with a strong work ethic – in preference to the 
local labour force. MacKenzie and Forde suggest this is an integral element of the firm’s 
“low road approach to competitive advantage” (p155), which they characterise as 
minimising labour costs, non-unionisation and ‘minimal compliance’ with regulatory 
interventions. However, as migrant workers “become more embedded in the local 
community and labour market, their aspirations develop beyond the willingness to accept 
long hours of work for low pay” (p156). They leave for new jobs, necessitating further 
rounds of migrant recruitment.  
 
Taken together, these changes have helped produce strata of insecure, poorly-paid 
‘lousy jobs’ (Goos and Manning, 2007), with employers increasingly dependent on 
networks of imported migrant labour to fill them. Migrant workers are often exploited or ill-
treated (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2010). UK-born workers may lack 
access to employment networks, or they may be unwilling to take low quality jobs 
(Samuels, 2008). At urban level, the migrant-employer-agency nexus may be supporting 
low-skills equilibrium in some places – particularly lower-growth areas, many of which now 
have large numbers of migrant workers in entry-level occupations. In turn, this suggests 
that policy responses need to encompass a number of elements – improving the 
employability of low-skilled native workers, re-regulating entry-level employment and ‘bad’ 
employers, and promoting economic development in de-industrialising areas. Conversely, 
evidence that higher-skill migration helps improve native productivity suggests that 
national immigration policy should actively encourage the arrival and settlement of high 
human capital migrant workers. On this basis, overall caps on immigration are undesirable 
to the extent that they conflict with these aims.  
 
Further research could take several directions. Sectoral, firm or individual-level 
analysis is needed to explore transmission mechanisms in more depth. Specifically, 
explorations of production complementarities, such as links from diversity to innovation 
could be valuable. Case study work could also explore different cities’ experiences in 
detail, particularly London. The next two papers tackle these issues in turn. More broadly, 
access to robust local cost of living data would allow a proper investigation into migration 
and local prices in the UK. Finally, it would be worth developing richer diversity measures 
to explore different facets of Britain’s increasingly cosmopolitan urban life.   
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Table 1. Net international migration across England, 2002-3. 
Area Net migration % England total 
London  77,276 53.0 
North / West Mets  23,822 16.4 
South / East large cities  13,605 9.3 
South / East small cities  10,760 7.4 
North / West large cities  7,064 4.8 
South / East large towns  5,902 4.1 
North / West small cities  3.977 0.0 
South / East small towns / rural  3,825 2.6 
North / West large towns  1,768 1.2 
North / West small towns / rural  -2,281 1.6 
England 145,688 100 
Source: Champion (2006), Office of National Statistics Total International Migration data.  
Note: percentages may not sum to 100 due to rounding. Area typology is based on Primary 
Urban Area geographies. ‘Mets’ = Birmingham, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle upon 
Tyne, Sheffield. ‘Large cities’ = cities not in metropolitan counties, with at least 275,000 
residents. ‘Small cities’ = 175,000-27500 residents. ‘Large towns’ = 50,000-175,000 residents. 
‘Small towns and rural areas’ = less than 50,000 residents.   
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Table 2. Summary statistics.  
Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Ave house price (£ ‘000s) 147 60.120 13.439 40.697 102.784 
Ave hourly wage 158 9.28 2.57 5.50 16.06 
Ave hourly wage, UK-born 158 9.30 2.61 5.50 16.74 
Ave hourly wage, migrants 158 9.58 3.15 4.75 29.48 
Ave employment rate 158 0.734 0.048 0.587 0.822 
Ave employment rate, UK-born 158 0.74 0.048 0.586 0.824 
Ave employment rate, migrants 158 0.677 0.094 0.399 0.848 
      
       
Ave unemployment rate 158 0.052 0.017 0.024 0.11 
Ave unemployment rate, UK-born  158 0.052 0.017 0.023 0.111 
Ave unemployment rate, migrants 158 0.056 0.026 0.001 0.154 
% long term unemployed share 158 0.301 0.105 0.103 0.548 
% long term unemployed share, UK-born 158 0.302 0.102 0.099 0.551 
% long term unemployed share, migrants 158 0.282 0.196 0 0.846 
      
      
% non-UK born  158 0.078 0.047 0.01 0.366 
Frac. Index, all birth countries 158 0.146 0.082 0.02 0.595 
Frac. Index, migrant populations  158 0.999 0.001 0.99 1 
% ethnic minority  158 0.057 0.055 0.002 0.305 
      
       
% aged 24 or less 158 0.172 0.016 0.131 0.218 
% aged 29 or less 158 0.506 0.009 0.484 0.53 
% female  158 0.494 0.009 0.47 0.516 
% male  158 0.228 0.063 0.106 0.409 
% with high skills  158 0.459 0.036 0.332 0.532 
% with intermediate skills  158 0.313 0.073 0.179 0.504 
% with low skills  158 0.172 0.016 0.131 0.218 
% in high-level occupations  158 0.383 0.065 0.243 0.559 
% in intermediate occupations  158 0.256 0.033 0.174 0.337 
% in entry-level occupations  158 0.361 0.046 0.239 0.489 
% employed in service sector  158 0.484 0.062 0.34 0.646 
% employed in manufacturing  158 0.16 0.057 0.044 0.316 
% employed in other sectors  158 0.344 0.033 0.281 0.493 
      
      
Population density (‘000s) 158 798.92 276.49 5824.01 1245.07 
Working age population (‘000s) 158 119.07 72.38 44.91 448.13 
      
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. 
 
Notes: Due to ONS disclosure rules some observations are suppressed. ONS population data is 
available from 1994-2007 inclusive. Land Registry house price data is for England and Wales, from 
1994-2006 inclusive. High skills = NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification), intermediate skills = NVQ2 or 
3 (A-levels / good GCSEs), low skills = NVQ1 (other / no qualifications). High-level occupations = 
professional / senior / associate professional. Intermediate occupations = admin and secretarial, / 
skilled trades. Entry-level occupations = personal and protective services / sales / routine / other. 
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Table 3. Human capital and occupational characteristics for the full sample, 
migrants and natives, 1994/6-2006/8.  
 
 Everyone  Natives  Migrants  
    
% with high skills  0.228 0.228 0.259 
% with intermediate skills  0.459 0.478 0.264 
% with low skills  0.313 0.294 0.477 
    
    
% in high-level occupations  0.383 0.382 0.434 
% in intermediate occupations 0.256 0.261 0.183 
% in entry-level occupations  0.361 0.357 0.383 
    
Source: ONS / LFS. 
Notes: Sample = 158 TTWA-level averages. High skills = NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification), 
intermediate skills = NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / good GCSEs), low skills = NVQ1 (other / no 
qualifications). High-level occupations = professional / senior / associate professional. Intermediate 
occupations = admin and secretarial, / skilled trades. Entry-level occupations = personal and 
protective services / sales / routine / other. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Labour market performance for migrants, natives and the full sample, 
1994/6-2006/8.  
 
Outcome Group Everyone  Natives Migrants  
     
Hourly wages All  9.28 9.30 9.58 
 High skill 13.10 13.14 12.89 
 lntermediate skill 8.20 8.20 8.04 
 Low skill  6.68 6.59 7.39 
     
 High level occs 12.97 12.94 13.44 
 Intermediate occs 7.70 7.71 7.65 
 Entry level occs 6.19 6.23 5.89 
     
Employment rate All  0.734 0.74 0.677 
 High skill 0.86 0.864 0.822 
 lntermediate skill 0.756 0.759 0.691 
 Low skill  0.615 0.616 0.605 
     
ILO unemployment rate  All 0.052 0.052 0.056 
 High skill 0.031 0.03 0.042 
 lntermediate skill 0.051 0.051 0.062 
 Low skill  0.068 0.07 0.06 
     
Source: ONS / LFS. 
Notes: Sample = 158 TTWA-level averages. High skills = NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification), 
intermediate skills = NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / good GCSEs), low skills = NVQ1 (other / no 
qualifications). High-level occupations = professional / senior / associate professional. Intermediate 
occupations = admin and secretarial, / skilled trades. Entry-level occupations = personal and 
protective services / sales / routine / other. 
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Table 5. Labour market shifts for natives and migrants, 1994/6-2006/8.   
 
Variable Natives Migrants 
 
1994/6 2006/8 1994/6 2006/8 
     
% with high skills  0.187 0.269 0.229 0.290 
% with intermediate skills  0.445 0.473 0.294 0.234 
% with low skills  0.367 0.258 0.477 0.476 
     
% high-level occupations  0.346 0.419 0.445 0.423 
% intermediate occupations 0.283 0.229 0.199 0.167 
% entry-level occupations  0.371 0.352 0.356 0.410 
     
     
Wages, high skills  10.58 15.62 10.13 15.65 
Wages, intermediate skills 6.39 10.00 6.24 9.84 
Wages, low skills  5.14 8.21 6.14 8.65 
     
Wages, high-level occupations 10.03 15.90 10.27 16.60 
Wages, intermediate occs 5.88 9.52 5.78 9.55 
Wages, entry-level occs  5.07 7.32 5.02 6.76 
     
Employment rate, high skills  0.852 0.868 0.823 0.820 
Employment rate, intermediate skills 0.751 0.762 0.689 0.693 
Employment rate, low skills  0.622 0.608 0.565 0.645 
     
Source: ONS / LFS. 
Notes: Sample = 158 TTWA-level averages. High skills = NVQ4 (degrees / HE qualification), 
intermediate skills = NVQ2 or 3 (A-levels / good GCSEs), low skills = NVQ1 (other / no 
qualifications). High-level occupations = professional / senior / associate professional. Intermediate 
occupations = admin and secretarial, / skilled trades. Entry-level occupations = personal and 
protective services / sales / routine / other. 
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Table 6. The 20 largest migrant groups in UK urban areas, 1994-2008 and 
changes. 
 
Country of birth 
% total migrants 
1994/6 2006/8 Change  
    
Ireland 13.02 4.72 -8.3 
India 12.84 10.44 -2.4 
Pakistan 10.37 10.58 0.21 
Germany  7.38 5.70 -1.68 
USA 3.20 2.20 -1 
Kenya 3.08 2.10 -0.98 
Italy 2.52 1.75 -0.77 
Jamaica 2.42 1.22 -1.2 
Bangladesh 2.32 2.76 0.44 
Canada 2.21 1.12 -1.09 
Hong Kong 2.02 1.85 -0.17 
South Africa 1.98 3.98 2 
Australia 1.95 1.87 -0.08 
France 1.86 1.85 -0.01 
Malaysia 1.69 1.01 -0.68 
Other West Indies 1.48 0.56 -0.92 
Uganda 1.45 0.76 -0.69 
Singapore 1.34 0.97 -0.37 
Cyprus 1.31 0.86 -0.45 
Malta and Gozo 1.30 0.65 -0.65 
    
% urban migrants  6.0 10.4 4.4 
    
 
Note: Sample is UK working-age population in urban areas. To ensure comparability over time, 
country of birth data is drawn from the LFS variable CRYO c.1992. This means that some 
countries which have emerged since are not included (e.g. former Yugoslavia) and there is 
limited detail on others (e.g. Middle East outside Israel and Iran). * = not Iran or Israel. Includes 
e.g. Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.  
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Table 7. Travel to Work Areas (TTWAs) with the 25 largest migrant working-age 
populations, 1994-2008 and changes. 
 
TTWA name 
% non-UK born 
1994/6 2006/8 Change  
    
London 27.4 36.8 9.4 
Bradford 12.7 17.5 4.8 
Birmingham 12.7 18.8 6.1 
Wycombe & Slough 12.3 20.2 7.9 
Bolton 10.9 12 1.1 
Leicester 10.8 19 8.2 
Coventry 10.4 16.2 5.8 
Luton & Watford 10 19.1 9.1 
Peterborough 10 15.1 5.1 
Rochdale & Oldham 9.5 13.6 4.1 
Manchester 9.4 12.9 3.5 
Brighton 9.2 14 4.8 
Guildford & Aldershot 9.2 13.5 4.3 
Reading & Bracknell 9 18 9 
Bedford 8.7 19.7 11 
Crawley 8.1 12.9 4.8 
Huddersfield 8.1 10.8 2.7 
Wolverhampton 7.9 13.8 5.9 
Oxford 7.8 13.9 6.1 
Stevenage 7.7 12 4.3 
Milton Keynes & Aylesbury 7.7 17.8 10.1 
Blackburn 7.5 14 6.5 
Cambridge 7.4 19.7 12.3 
Leeds 7 12.4 5.4 
Worthing 6.9 8.8 1.9 
Dudley & Sandwell 6.9 10.2 3.3 
    
All urban TTWAs 6 10.4 4.4 
    
 
Source: ONS/LFS.  
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Table 8. Native wage results, 1994/6-2006/8. 
 
ln(average hourly 
wages, UK born) 
DIV = Frac Index DIV = migrant population share  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
DIV 0.979*** 0.605*** 0.317** 0.334** 1.649*** 1.008*** 0.476* 0.545** 
 (0.122) (0.073) (0.146) (0.147) (0.213) (0.129) (0.241) (0.246) 
 
        
% 24 or under 
 -2.220*** -0.626 -0.629  -2.220*** -0.634 -0.638 
 
 (0.384) (0.419) (0.419)  (0.385) (0.421) (0.422) 
 
        
% female 
 0.416 1.644** 1.677***  0.349 1.611** 1.667*** 
 
 (0.586) (0.630) (0.625)  (0.585) (0.634) (0.628) 
 
        
% degrees 
 0.963*** 0.891*** 0.898***  0.986*** 0.898*** 0.903*** 
 
 (0.193) (0.230) (0.231)  (0.192) (0.231) (0.231) 
 
        
% manufacturing  
 -0.451*** -0.050 -0.035  -0.439*** -0.044 -0.025 
employment  
 (0.144) (0.213) (0.216)  (0.144) (0.213) (0.215) 
 
        
ln(population density) 
 0.010 0.149 0.155  0.010 0.150 0.155 
 
 (0.011) (0.157) (0.158)  (0.011) (0.157) (0.158) 
 
        
% unemployed who   -0.095 -0.003 -0.005  -0.106 -0.001 -0.006 
are long term jobless  (0.097) (0.109) (0.109)  (0.096) (0.109) (0.110) 
 
        
Constant 2.265*** 2.252*** 0.457 0.395 2.283*** 2.286*** 0.480 0.408 
 (0.021) (0.257) (1.148) (1.150) (0.020) (0.258) (1.151) (1.150) 
Area fixed effects N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 156 158 158 158 156 
F-statistic 2292.525 622.047 1333.541 1297.962 2252.748 615.290 1307.949 1288.839 
R2 0.889 0.956 0.989 0.989 0.887 0.955 0.989 0.989 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: All specifications include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) – (4) use Fractionalisation Index of birth 
countries, columns (5) – (8) use migrant population shares * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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 Table 9. Native employment rate results, 1994/6-2006/8. 
 
ln(ave employment  
rate, UK-born) 
DIV = Frac index DIV = migrant population share 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DIV 0.266* 0.207*** -0.213** -0.210* 0.415* 0.322** -0.377** -0.386** 
 (0.140) (0.070) (0.105) (0.108) (0.248) (0.128) (0.164) (0.179) 
 
        
% 24 or under 
 -0.938*** -0.182 -0.182  -0.939*** -0.179 -0.178 
 
 (0.241) (0.277) (0.277)  (0.242) (0.275) (0.274) 
 
        
% female 
 -1.166** -0.649* -0.643*  -1.205** -0.647* -0.653* 
 
 (0.513) (0.337) (0.339)  (0.524) (0.334) (0.338) 
 
        
% degrees 
 0.345*** 0.376*** 0.377***  0.364*** 0.380*** 0.379*** 
 
 (0.099) (0.117) (0.117)  (0.102) (0.117) (0.116) 
 
        
% manufacturing  
 0.200** 0.083 0.086  0.205** 0.084 0.081 
employment  
 (0.085) (0.137) (0.140)  (0.085) (0.137) (0.140) 
 
        
ln(population density) 
 -0.020*** -0.271*** -0.270***  -0.019*** -0.266*** -0.266*** 
 
 (0.007) (0.083) (0.083)  (0.007) (0.083) (0.083) 
 
        
% unemployed who   -0.355*** -0.220*** -0.221***  -0.358*** -0.219*** -0.218*** 
are long term jobless  (0.069) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.070) (0.058) (0.058) 
 
        
Constant 
-0.330*** 0.509** 1.837*** 1.819*** -0.322*** 0.524** 1.796*** 1.798*** 
 (0.025) (0.231) (0.589) (0.591) (0.024) (0.235) (0.588) (0.589) 
Area fixed effects N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 156 158 158 158 156 
F-statistic 40.126 35.720 28.162 27.532 40.350 34.660 28.282 27.772 
R2 0.188 0.677 0.718 0.718 0.173 0.671 0.720 0.720 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: All specifications include time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. Columns (1) – (4) use Fractionalisation Index of birth 
countries, columns (5) – (8) use migrant population shares * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 10. Average house price results, 1994/6-2006/8. 
 
 DIV = Frac index DIV = migrant population share 
ln(ave house prices)  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
DIV 1.667*** 0.828*** -0.281 -0.080 2.799*** 1.371*** -0.650 -0.154 
 (0.305) (0.177) (0.450) (0.442) (0.549) (0.306) (0.779) (0.769) 
 
        
% 24 or under 
 -4.157*** -1.468 -1.660  -4.104*** -1.421 -1.656 
 
 (1.321) (1.643) (1.630)  (1.324) (1.657) (1.632) 
 
        
% female 
 -3.465** -1.352 -1.336  -3.514** -1.366 -1.339 
 
 (1.656) (1.617) (1.592)  (1.652) (1.618) (1.590) 
 
        
% degrees 
 2.172*** 1.036** 1.000*  2.226*** 1.062** 1.002* 
 
 (0.413) (0.513) (0.520)  (0.408) (0.512) (0.520) 
 
        
% manufacturing  
 -1.221*** 0.603 0.670  -1.209*** 0.614 0.669 
employment  
 (0.395) (0.641) (0.643)  (0.396) (0.646) (0.647) 
 
        
ln(population density) 
 -0.012 1.747*** 1.800***  -0.011 1.773*** 1.802*** 
 
 (0.028) (0.339) (0.332)  (0.028) (0.337) (0.332) 
 
        
% unemployed who   -0.249 -0.310** -0.300**  -0.269 -0.312** -0.301** 
are long term jobless  (0.246) (0.145) (0.143)  (0.247) (0.145) (0.144) 
 
        
Constant 11.749*** 14.044*** 1.126 0.796 11.777*** 14.058*** 0.953 0.786 
 (0.053) (0.704) (2.311) (2.259) (0.052) (0.701) (2.301) (2.259) 
Area fixed effects N N Y Y N N Y Y 
Observations 147 147 147 145 147 147 147 145 
F-statistic 1792.911 502.649 1002.025 1060.740 1759.328 490.471 1037.504 1061.668 
R2 0.851 0.944 0.988 0.988 0.849 0.943 0.988 0.988 
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. 
Notes: House price data for England and Wales only, 1995-2006. All specifications include time dummies. Columns (1) – (4) use Fractionalisation Index of birth countries, columns (5) 
– (8) use migrant population shares. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 11. Results for diversity and native wages/employment, by skill groups. DIV = Fractionalisation Index, birth countries.  
 
ln(average hourly 
wages, UK born) 
High skills Intermediate skills Low skills 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Frac Index 0.301 0.273 0.289 0.303 -0.161 0.022 
 (0.221) (0.223) (0.218) (0.222) (0.275) (0.210) 
 
      
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F-statistic 397.130 387.141 552.294 540.850 431.511 501.349 
R2 0.971 0.970 0.976 0.976 0.973 0.978 
 
 
ln(ave employment  
rate, UK-born) 
High skills Intermediate skills Low skills 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
      
Frac Index -0.077 -0.068 -0.272** -0.237** -0.514** -0.500** 
 (0.100) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.227) (0.232) 
 
      
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Area fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 158 156 158 156 158 156 
F-statistic 10.538 10.398 7.902 8.018 11.410 11.132 
R2 0.475 0.476 0.411 0.419 0.455 0.451 
 
Source: ONS/LFS. Notes: All specifications include time dummies and controls (% 24 or under, % female, % manufacturing employment, ln(population density), share of 
unemployed who are long term jobless). Columns (2), (4) and (6) estimate the model without London. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = 
significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 12. Results for wages/employment, native and migrant skill group cells. 
DIV = Fractionalisation Index.  
 
ln(native wage), by skill group Native skill group High Int. Low 
    
Frac Index, high skill workers 0.081 0.064 -0.190 
 
(0.229) (0.214) (0.223) 
 
   
Frac Index of int. skill workers -0.236 -0.383 -1.267** 
 
(0.372) (0.396) (0.563) 
 
   
Frac Index of low skill workers 0.177** 0.230** 0.284** 
 
(0.088) (0.103) (0.108) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 351.178 462.936 386.912 
R2 0.971 0.977 0.977 
 
 
ln(native empl), by skill group Native skill group High Int. Low 
    
Frac Index, high skill workers -0.076 -0.025 -0.275 
 (0.062) (0.091) (0.202) 
    
Frac Index of int. skill workers 0.011 -0.255 0.291 
 (0.171) (0.206) (0.389) 
    
Frac Index of low skill workers -0.021 -0.096* -0.178* 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.091) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 8.447 6.856 9.211 
R2 0.481 0.427 0.463 
 
Source: ONS/LFS. Notes: All specifications include time dummies and controls (% 24 or under, % 
female, % manufacturing employment, ln(population density), share of unemployed who are long term 
jobless). Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 
10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 13. Results for native wages / productivity, by occupational groups.  
 
Log native hourly wages High-level occs Intermediate occs Entry-level occs 
    
Frac Index, country of birth 0.162 0.280 0.270 
groups (0.191) (0.285) (0.253) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 632.915 455.818 295.778 
R2 0.981 0.974 0.956 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: Controls fitted = % working-age population 24 and under, % female, % with degrees, % with 
manufacturing jobs, % of unemployed who are long term workless, log (population density). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
 
 
Table 14. Robustness checks: results for outliers, leverage and influence tests.    
 
Log native hourly wages Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, country of birth groups 0.284* 0.355** 0.394** 0.338** 
 (0.145) (0.160) (0.158) (0.158) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  152 148 148 112 
F-statistic  1368.631 1167.793 1220.037 1001.908 
R2 0.990 0.988 0.989 0.990 
 
Log native employment rate Outliers Leverage Influence Jobs gap 
     
Frac Index, country of birth groups -0.234** -0.139 -0.154 -0.217* 
 (0.105) (0.106) (0.108) (0.112) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations  152 148 148 112 
F-statistic  24.741 26.718 25.036 16.598 
R2 0.706 0.745 0.714 0.613 
 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: Controls fitted = % working-age population 24 and under, % female, % with degrees, % with 
manufacturing jobs, % of unemployed who are long term workless, log (population density). ‘Outliers’ fits 
dummies for Hartlepool, Liverpool, and London. ‘Leverage’ fits dummies for Burnley, Cambridge, 
Edinburgh, London, and Wirral. ‘Influence’ fits dummies for Cambridge, Chelmsford, Edinburgh, Hastings, 
and Southend. For employment models ‘influence’ fits dummies for Burnley, Cambridge, Hartlepool, 
London, and Swansea. For both models ‘Jobs gap’ fits dummies for 20 ‘deindustrialising cities’ identified 
by Turok and Edge (1999). These are Birmingham, Clydeside (Glasgow and Lanarkshire TTWAs), West 
Yorkshire (Leeds and Bradford), Merseyside (Liverpool and Wirral), London, Manchester, South Yorkshire 
(Sheffield and Rotherham), Bristol, Cardiff, Coventry, Doncaster, Edinburgh, Hull, Leicester, Nottingham, 
Plymouth, Stoke-on-Trent, Sunderland and Wigan. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Table 15. Robustness checks: results for first differences specification.   
 
∆ log native wages  All High skill Int. skill Low skill 
     
∆ Fractionalisation Index 0.331** 0.317 0.305 -0.143 
 (0.149) (0.232) (0.217) (0.279) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 158 
F-statistic 8.017 1.585 1.312 1.673 
R2 0.300 0.100 0.061 0.102 
 
∆ log native employment  All High skill Int. skill Low skill 
     
∆ Fractionalisation Index -0.209** -0.081 -0.261** -0.509** 
 (0.104) (0.098) (0.109) (0.220) 
     
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 158 
F-statistic 6.883 2.986 5.315 3.296 
R2 0.372 0.196 0.267 0.164 
 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: Controls fitted = % working-age population 24 and under, % female, % with degrees, % with 
manufacturing jobs, % of unemployed who are long term workless, log (population density). 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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Table 16. Results for native outflow tests, based on Card (2005).  
 
% all low skilled workers (1) (2) (3) 
    
% low skilled migrants 0.255*** 0.050 -0.004 
 (0.051) (0.052) (0.043) 
 
  
 
    
Area fixed effects, year dummies  N Y Y 
Controls N N Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 25.1296 503.0060 216.323 
R2 0.1194 0.9249 0.954 
 
% all workers in entry-level occs (1) (2) (3) 
    
% migrants in entry-level occupations 0.252*** 0.190*** 0.115*** 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.029) 
 
  
 
    
Area fixed effects, year dummies  N Y Y 
Controls N N Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 39.606 34.006 24.343 
R2 0.239 0.501 0.699 
 
Source: ONS/LFS.  
Notes: heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. Controls 
fitted in (3) are % 24 and under, % female, % manufacturing employment, ln(population 
density), share of unemployed who are long term jobless.  
* = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 17. Alternative test for native outflows: simple internal migration model, 1994-2006. Dependent variable = ln(% UK-born population).  
 
ln(% UK-born) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(% migrants) -0.0807*** -0.0771*** -0.0749*** -0.0833*** -0.0805*** -0.0767*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) 
 
      
ln(house prices) -0.0043 -0.0218 -0.0220** 0.0039 -0.0103 -0.0193* 
 (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
 
      
ln(wages) -0.0568** -0.0766** -0.0099    
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.025)    
 
      
ln(employment rate) 0.2280** 0.2896** 0.2201***    
 (0.096) (0.119) (0.044)    
 
      
% unemployed who are -0.0174 -0.0065 -0.0065    
long term jobless (0.013) (0.009) (0.006)    
 
      
ln(native wages) 
   -0.0711** -0.0881** -0.0239 
 
   (0.035) (0.042) (0.029) 
 
      
ln(native empl. rate) 
   0.2272** 0.2721** 0.2181*** 
 
   (0.098) (0.116) (0.044) 
 
      
% native unemployed 
   -0.0160 -0.0083 -0.0054 
long term jobless 
   (0.013) (0.010) (0.005) 
 
      
Constant -0.0839 0.2211 0.0528 -0.1554** 0.0908 0.0478 
 (0.094) (0.241) (0.120) (0.065) (0.193) (0.121) 
Year dummies  Y Y  Y Y 
Area fixed effects   Y   Y 
Observations 147 147 147 147 147 147 
R2 0.8197 0.8318 0.7672 0.8163 0.8251 0.7678 
Source: ONS / LFS / Land Registry. Notes: heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%.
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Table 18. Results for IV regressions: first stage.   
 
Fractionalisation Index, country of birth groups (1) (2) 
   
Predicted Frac Index, country of birth groups -3.637*** -5.570*** 
 (0.785) (0.888) 
   
Controls Y Y 
Observations 158 146 
F-statistic 73.258 29.765 
R2 0.879 0.800 
Partial R2 for instrument 0.281 0.330 
Excluded instruments test F-statistic 21.49 39.39 
P-value for excluded instruments test 0.000 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test 13.975 10.068 
P-value for under-identification test 0.0002 0.0015 
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test 21.489 39.93 
Stock-Yogo 10% critical value, weak ID test 16.38 16.38 
 
Source: ONS/LFS.  
Notes: heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. Column 
(1) fits productivity/wage and employment models, column (2) fits house price models. Controls 
fitted are % 24 and under, % female, % manufacturing employment, ln(population density), 
share of unemployed who are long term jobless. * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
 
 
 
 
Table 19. Results for IV regressions: second stage.  
 
Dependent variable Wages Employment  Prices (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
       
Fractionalisation Index 0.129 0.215 -0.692*** -0.779*** -1.045 -0.231 
 (0.308) (0.369) (0.173) (0.206) (0.803) (0.755) 
 
  
  
  
Area fixed effects  Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Controls  Y Y Y  Y Y Y 
Observations 158 156 158 156 146 144 
F-statistic 1311.988 1306.960 21.442 20.025 1208.685 1180.526 
R2 0.989 0.989 0.648 0.621 0.987 0.988 
 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: All specifications include time dummies and controls (% 24 or under, % female, % 
manufacturing employment, ln(population density), share of unemployed who are long term 
jobless). Column (2) fits the sample without London. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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Table 20. Results for IV regressions: skill and occupational group analysis.  
 
 Log native wages High skill  Intermediate  Low skill  
    
Fractionalisation Index 0.653* 0.142 -1.480 
 (0.372) (0.332) (0.970) 
    
Area fixed effects Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 442.151 557.171 317.728 
R2 0.970 0.976 0.965 
 
 
Log native wages High end occs  Intermediate occs Entry level occs  
    
Fractionalisation Index 0.047 0.508 -1.196* 
 (0.324) (0.374) (0.628) 
    
Area fixed effects Y Y Y 
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 730.597 458.759 201.853 
R2 0.981 0.974 0.942 
 
 
Log native employment  High skill  Intermediate skill Low skill  
    
Fractionalisation Index -0.241* -0.926*** -0.772*** 
 (0.143) (0.205) (0.296) 
    
Area fixed effects  Y Y Y 
Controls  Y Y Y 
Observations 158 158 158 
F-statistic 11.002 6.469 10.641 
R2 0.457 0.167 0.445 
 
Source: ONS / LFS.  
Notes: All specifications include time dummies and controls (% 24 or under, % female, % manufacturing 
employment, ln(population density), share of unemployed who are long term jobless). Heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in parentheses. * = significant at 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%. 
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FIGURES  
 
 
Graph 1. Drivers of population growth in the UK, mid-1991-mid-2008.  
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1. Introduction  
 
 
The previous two chapters looked at links between immigration, diversity and urban 
economic performance. This chapter shifts the emphasis to look at how minority 
communities and cultural diversity might affect economic outcomes. I focus on innovation 
for two reasons. First, innovation is a major driver of productivity, and the previous chapter 
found links between diversity and productivity, especially for higher skilled workers. 
Second, in recent years there has been growing academic, policy and public interest in the 
role of ‘ethnic inventors’ in innovative activity, both in the UK and elsewhere (Legrain, 
2006, Leadbeater, 2008, Kerr and Kerr, 2011).  
 
These discussions and debates have largely drawn on recent experience in the 
United States. Since the 1980s minority communities, particularly those of South / East 
Asian origin, have played increasingly important roles in ideas generation in the science 
and technology sectors (Stephan and Levin, 2001, Chellaraj et al., 2005). US ethnic 
inventors – who are often migrants – are spatially concentrated at city-region level (Kerr, 
2008a). High-tech US clusters like Silicon Valley have benefited from ‘ethnic 
entrepreneurs’ who both help connect South Bay firms to global markets, and are 
responsible for 52% of the Bay Area’s startups (Saxenian, 2006, Wadhwa et al., 2007, 
Foley and Kerr, 2011). There are positive links between the presence of migrants and US 
regional patenting (Peri, 2007, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle, 2008). Diasporic communities 
appear to play important roles in the diffusion of knowledge both across US cities, and 
between US regions and ‘home’ countries (Kerr, 2008b, Kerr, 2009). 
 
By contrast, surprisingly little is known about the role of ‘ethnic inventors’ on 
innovation in the UK. As documented in the past two chapters, over the past two decades 
Britain has become substantially more ethnically diverse. The number of people from non-
white ethnic groups grew by 53% between 1991 and 2001. For England and Wales 
between 2001 and 2009, non-‘White British’ groups have grown from 6.6m to 9.1m and 
now stands at one in six of the population (Office of National Statistics, 2011). Immigration 
has been a main driver, with a number of ‘new migrant communities’ forming since the 
early 1990s (Kyambi, 2005). This paper asks: has UK innovation benefited from these 
population shifts as it has in the US?  
 
Changing demography could affect innovation in at least four complementary ways. 
First, migrants or individuals from minority communities may be positively selected on the 
basis of skills or entrepreneurial behaviour, although this needs to be distinguished from 
other human capital endowments (Borjas, 1987). Second, by lowering transaction costs, 
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co-ethnic groups can accelerate within-group ideas generation and transmission, although 
discrimination may constrain knowledge spillovers (Agrawal et al., 2008, Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2011). Third, cultural diversity may improve ideas generation across all groups, 
if the benefits of a larger set of ideas, perspectives outweigh trust or communication 
difficulties between those groups (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, Page, 2007, Berliant and 
Fujita, 2009). Finally, these channels may be more pronounced in urban areas because of 
the spatial clustering of minority communities, agglomeration economies, or both. In 
addition, cosmopolitan urban populations may raise demand for new goods and services, 
especially in non-tradable sectors (Gordon et al., 2007, Mazzolari and Neumark, 2009). 
 
This paper looks at the role of ethnic inventors in innovation in the UK, using a new 
12-year panel of patents microdata. Kerr (2008a) and Agrawal et al (2008) have pioneered 
names analysis as a way of identifying ethnic inventors from patent data. I build on these 
studies, using the  novel ONOMAP name classification system to explore all four 
‘population-innovation’ channels. I estimate a knowledge production function linking 
inventors’ patenting activity to individual, group and area-level characteristics. Using 
techniques popularised by Blundell et al (1995), I exploit historic patent information to 
control for individuals’ human capital and other otherwise unobserved characteristics.    
 
Once human capital is controlled for, I find that simply being an ethnic inventor has 
no significant effect on an individual’s patenting rates. Conversely I find that members of 
specific co-ethnic groups – Indian, South Asian and Southern European inventors – do 
tend to patent more, even when other factors are controlled for. I also find small positive 
effects of inventor group diversity on individual patenting activity.   
 
Effects on majority inventors are less clear: increasing ethnic diversity has some 
negative links to individual majority inventors’ patenting activity, but I find no crowding out 
at area level. Urban location and density have small effects on individual patenting after 
other individual and area-level factors are included. The results survive extensive 
robustness checks, although alternative measures of area-level human capital weaken 
diversity effects. Overall, the UK’s ‘ethnic inventor’ communities and their effects are 
substantially different from those in the US: this has implications for current immigration 
and skills policy.  
 
The paper adds to a small but growing empirical literature on immigration, ethnicity 
and innovation. It also contributes to the emerging field of inventor microdata analysis 
(OECD, 2009). It is one of very few studies exploring multiple ethnicity-innovation 
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channels, at individual, group and area level. As far as I am aware, this is the first research 
of its kind in Europe.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 set out research questions and key 
terms. Section 3 reviews relevant theoretical frameworks and empirics. Sections 4 and 5 
introduce the main data sources and provide descriptive statistics. Section 6 outlines the 
model and estimation strategy. Sections 7 – 9 give results, extensions and robustness 
checks. Section 10 concludes. 
 
 
2. Research questions  
 
My research questions are:  
 
• Do ethnic inventors or co-ethnic groups influence patenting rates in the UK? 
• Does the cultural diversity of inventor groups influence patenting rates?  
• Do urban environments affect ethnicity- or diversity-innovation effects?  
 
‘Innovation’, ‘ethnicity’ and ‘diversity’ are fuzzy concepts that need to be carefully 
defined. The innovation process is commonly divided into three phases: invention, 
adoption and diffusion (Fagerberg, 2005): a standard UK definition of innovation is thus 
‘the successful exploitation of new ideas’ (Department of Innovation Universities and Skills, 
2008). My chosen measure of innovation, patenting, is primarily an indicator of invention 
(OECD, 2009). Specifically, I look at shifts in individual patenting rates, or ‘inventor 
productivity’.  
 
Patent data has several advantages: it has a positive relationship with other 
indicators of overall innovation ‘performance’ such as productivity and market share; it 
provides detailed information on geography and patent owners, both inventors and 
applicant firms; and is available for long time periods at relatively low cost. Not all 
inventions are patented, however, and patents have variable coverage across industries 
(with a well-known bias towards manufacturing) (OECD, 2009).  Patenting also responds 
to policy shocks – for example, US Supreme Court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s 
(particularly Re Alappat in 1994) led to spikes in software and information technology 
patenting activity (Li and Pai, 2010).  
 
I am able to deal with most of these challenges through careful identification 
strategies (see section 4). Unlike the majority of patent data studies, I am able to work at 
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individual inventor level – using the KITES-PATSTAT patents dataset developed at 
Bocconi University (more of which below).  
 
‘Ethnicity’ is as hard to pin down. Ethnic identity is a multifaceted concept with 
objective, subjective and dynamic elements (Aspinall, 2009). Quantitative measures of 
identity tend to be partial: they focus on identity’s visible, objective components, assuming 
away self-ascription and endogeneity issues (Ottaviano et al., 2007). Given these 
limitations, quantitative researchers working with ethnic identity will always need to use a 
‘least-worst’ proxy. I deploy two such measures, using the ONOMAP system to analyse 
inventor name information and read off likely ethnicity characteristics (see Section 4 for 
details).  The first proxy is the ethnic group classifications prepared by the UK Office of 
National Statistics (ONS). The ONS measures attempt to combine different aspects of 
ethnic identity, but operate at a high level of generality and tend to focus on ‘visible 
minorities’ such as Black and Asian communities (Mateos et al., 2007). 
 
I use ‘geographical origin’ as a second proxy measure. Geographical origin can 
offer very fine-grained information, but is one-dimensional as a measure of identity. In this 
case, because name data conflates migrants and their descendents, origin effectively 
operates as a measure of geographical ‘roots’.27  As such, it offers an alternative way of 
identifying likely ethnicity and co-ethnic group membership.  
 
To measure the diversity of these ethnic groups, I use a Fractionalisation Index as 
commonly used in the development literature. See Section 4 for details.  
 
 
3. Theoretical frameworks and evidence  
 
As noted in the introductory chapter, conventional theories of innovation have relatively 
little to say to about ethnicity or the composition of inventor communities. Schumpeter 
(1962) focuses on the ‘entrepreneurial function’ inside and outside firms, and the role of 
individuals in identifying and commercialising new ideas, in the face of social inertia or 
resistance. National ‘innovation systems’ approaches explore relationships between firms 
and public institutions such as government agencies and universities (Freeman, 1987). 
More recently, spatial approaches focus on clustering of innovative activity due to 
agglomeration-related externalities, particularly local knowledge spillovers (Jaffe et al., 
1993, Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
                                               
27
 Although not national identity: the vast majority of those born in the UK think of themselves as British 
(Manning and Roy 2007). More broadly, ethnicity, nationality, sexuality and class are all elements in a 
broader sense of self (Fanshawe and Sriskandarajah 2010).  
                              124 
 
Endogenous growth theories provide the basis for a number of newer studies 
linking demography to innovation. Endogenous growth models suggest that shifts in the 
technology frontier help determine economic development. They also highlight the 
importance of human capital stocks and knowledge spillovers to levels of innovation 
(Romer, 1990). In practice, access to knowledge is likely to be uneven across locations, 
sectors and social groups (Agrawal et al., 2008).  
 
Recent work suggests four ways in which demographic factors could positively 
influence ideas generation and transmission. Building on the material in the introduction, 
theoretical frameworks and empirics are discussed for each in turn. 
 
3.1 Individual selection  
 
Migrants are mobile carriers of ideas – so high-skilled migrants, in particular, may 
positively contribute to overall innovation rates (Kerr and Lincoln, 2010). More broadly, 
from an economic perspective, migration decisions reflect expected returns: potential 
migrants balance out economic gains from migration and costs of moving abroad (Borjas, 
1987). The income maximisation approach implies that migrants are ‘pre-selected’ – and 
are more likely to be entrepreneurial, seeking out new ideas (Wadhwa et al., 2007). 
 
Both these factors suggest migrant status may positively predict patenting rates, 
over and above other human capital attributes. Discrimination has ambiguous effects. It 
may lead to ‘lock-out’ from conventional labour market opportunities (Gordon, 2001). 
Conversely, it may operate as a spur to innovation if excluded minorities are forced to 
develop new economic opportunities (Rath and Kloosterman, 2000). The challenge is to 
distinguish ethnicity from wider human capital endowments and relevant industry / area 
characteristics.  
 
US experience suggests some positive selection effects in science and high-tech 
sectors of the economy, particularly for migrant workers. US employers in these sectors 
report heavy dependence on skilled migrants (Wadhwa et al., 2007, Kerr and Lincoln, 
2010). Indo- and Chinese-American communities make disproportionate contributions to 
US science and engineering, in terms of workforce membership as well as Nobel Prize 
counts, elections to scientific academies and patent citations (Stephan and Levin, 2001).  
 
Anderson and Platzer (2007) report that immigrants have founded 40% of venture 
capital-backed technology companies currently trading in the US, including Google, eBay, 
Yahoo and Sun Microsystems. Wadhwa et al (2007) find the national immigrant 
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contribution to patenting rose from 7.3% in 1998 to 24.6% in 2006. Using time series data, 
Chellaraj et al (2005) report that foreign graduate students and skilled immigrants have a 
significant positive impact on patent applications and grants. However, in a recent US 
study on immigrant patenting, Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008) suggest that once 
education and industry characteristics are controlled for, effects of individual migrant status 
disappear. 
 
There is much less evidence from the UK. In the next chapter, I report some 
evidence that migrant entrepreneurs in London are more likely to innovate than average 
company founders. Basu (2002, 2004) suggests considerable variation in levels of 
entrepreneurship across minority communities, with class, education and family status 
important mediating influences.  
 
3.2 Social networks and diaspora effects  
 
A second set of theories suggests that cultural ‘sameness’ or ‘proximity’ helps 
knowledge spillovers (Agrawal et al., 2008). Co-ethnic social networks – such as diasporas 
or transnational communities – provide network externalities that accelerate ideas 
transmission (Docquier and Rapoport, 2011). 
 
Social networks offer their members higher social capital and levels of trust, 
lowering transaction costs and risk. In turn, networks seem to positively affect innovative 
activity (Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006, Kaiser et al., 2011). Co-ethnic networks such 
as diasporas may be an important channel for knowledge spillovers and ideas flow – 
improving awareness of new technologies and passing on tacit knowledge, both within and 
across countries (Kerr, 2008b, Kerr, 2009).  
 
Of course, other social networks – such as family or kinship networks, or 
professional associations – might be equally or more important.  And co-ethnic effects on 
individual patenting are ambiguous. Matching and learning economies may be present 
within the group (‘enclave’ activity) and between different groups (‘middleman minority’ 
activities) (Bonacich, 1973). But externalities will be constrained by group size, majority 
attitudes and links between groups. First, within a minority group, individual members are 
less likely to match ideas than those in the majority group since there will be a smaller set 
of possible matches. Second, if members of majority group(s) discriminate against minority 
groups, or if minority groups lack social connections to majority actors, this will limit 
matches across groups and ‘middleman minority’ activity (Zenou, 2011).  
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In a closed economy, effects of co-ethnic groups are determined by group size and 
the level of interaction between groups.  Under globalisation, co-ethnic communities may 
be more influential. Increasing numbers of businesses in high-cost countries are looking to 
relocate research and development (R&D) activity into lower-cost countries (Mowery, 
2001, Archibugi and Iammarino, 2002, Cantwell, 2005, Yeung, 2009). Diasporic 
communities with members present in high-cost ‘host’ countries may help firms move into 
lower-cost ‘home’ countries, identifying collaborators or accelerating joint ventures (Kapur 
and McHale, 2005, Saxenian and Sabel, 2008). This raises both the size of the innovating 
co-ethnic community and the rate of information flow between its members, in both ‘home’ 
and ‘host’ locations.  
   
A number of case studies suggest that diasporas are important influences on 
knowledge flows (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 2004, Saxenian, 2006, Docquier and 
Rapoport, 2011). In a 2002 survey, Saxenian finds that 82% of Chinese and Indian 
immigrant scientists and engineers exchange technological information with colleagues in 
‘home’ countries.  Jaffe and Tratjenberg (1999) find that countries with a common 
language have larger R&D spillovers and international patent citation rates. Kerr (2008b) , 
studying co-ethnic inventors, finds that own-ethnicity citations are 50% higher than 
citations to other ethnicities, controlling for industry: co-ethnic communities in ‘host’ 
countries positively influence industrial performance in ‘home’ countries.  Patenting growth 
in US cities is also faster for technologies that depend heavily on communities of 
immigrant inventors (Kerr, 2009). By contrast, Agrawal et al (2008, 2011) compare co-
ethnic and co-location effects on patent citations, finding that physical location is up to four 
times more important.  
 
 US ethnic inventor communities are relatively recent phenomena largely shaped by 
migration flows since the 1960s (Saxenian, 2006). The UK’s immigration story is very 
different: migrant and minority communities are the result of both colonial history 
(Australasia, some African and South-East Asian groups) and geographical proximity 
(many European countries). British-based diasporas may not, therefore, share the 
characteristics of US-style transnational communities.  
 
The existing UK evidence base is mixed. I am unaware of any European studies 
that explicitly link co-ethnicity to patenting. Fairlie et al (2009) find some support for co-
ethnicity effects on British-Indian business performance, although innovation is not 
considered. Qualitative work by Nakhaie et al (2009) confirms that co-ethnicity effects both 
vary significantly across groups, and are shaped by wider socio-economic contexts.   
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3.3 Diversity effects  
 
‘Cultural distance’ between economic agents may also influence innovation rates. 
Specifically, individual inventors in a group may benefit from group-level diversity if this 
brings a richer mix of ideas and perspectives. Berliant and Fujita (2009) model a system of 
firm-level knowledge creation, showing that worker heterogeneity can accelerate ideas 
generation through individual-level production complementarities. Hong and Page (2001, 
2004) similarly model scenarios in which ‘cognitively diverse’ teams exploit a larger pool of 
ideas and skills, suggesting that cultural mix is a good proxy for cognitive diversity.  
 
On the other hand, group-level cultural diversity may have a negative effect if it 
leads to lower trust and poor communication between individuals – for example, because 
of language barriers, misunderstandings, discriminatory attitudes or both. Spillovers (and 
co-operation) will be limited, leading to fewer, lower-quality solutions (Alesina and La 
Ferrara, 2004). Fujita and Weber (2003) argue that positive diversity effects will be most 
likely observed in research-based or ‘knowledge-intensive’ activities – such as those 
leading to patenting. Parrotta et al (2011) suggest that while diversity of knowledge is likely 
to be positive for innovation, especially in research-intensive tasks, cultural diversity’s 
effects are much harder to predict. 
 
The overall empirical evidence here is positive, though not uniformly so. At 
organisation level, several recent studies link workforce diversity and innovation in 
knowledge-intensive environments. Parrotta et al (2011)  find positive effects of workforce 
cognitive and cultural diversity on Danish firms’ patenting rates. My study of London firms 
in the next chapter finds that both management and workforce diversity help raise product 
and process innovation.  
 
However Ozgen et al (2011) find weaker links between cultural diversity and 
product/process innovation in ‘white collar’ Dutch firms. Maré et al (2011) find no 
systematic links between workforce characteristics and innovation among businesses in 
New Zealand.  
 
More broadly, reviews of organisational and management literature find a small but 
significant workplace ‘diversity advantage’ on measures of business performance. 
Negative communication and trust effects are present in the short term but progressively 
decline (Landry and Wood, 2008).   
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3.4 Urban effects  
 
We might observe bigger co-ethnicity and diversity effects on innovative activity in 
cities because of population mix, agglomeration economies or both. Innovative activity, 
migrant and minority communities tend to be spatially clustered in urban areas. Kerr 
(2008a) finds that US ethnic inventors are spatially concentrated, largely in the biggest 
urban agglomerations. 
 
Urban areas may also have positive or negative ‘amplifying’ effects. For example, if 
cultural diversity contributes to economic diversity, it may help foster knowledge spillovers 
across sectors at urban level (Jacobs, 1969). Jacobs also argues that cities accelerate 
innovation by fostering the recycling and recombination of existing products and ideas into 
new forms. The more cosmopolitan the urban population, the greater the potential for 
hybridisation (Hall, 1998, Gordon et al., 2007). Conversely, members of minority 
communities may be physically isolated in particular urban neighbourhoods. Spatial 
segregation may limit the opportunity for knowledge spillovers and interaction with other 
groups (Zenou, 2011). 
 
A number of US and European studies suggest a link between area level diversity 
and innovative activity, although none look at the UK case. Peri (2007) finds that US 
states’ share of foreign-born PhDs is positively associated with levels of patenting. Hunt 
and Gauthier-Loiselle (2008)  find that immigrant population shares raise state-level 
patenting, and that these effects are greater than individual-level effects – suggesting 
urban, group and individual-level dynamics are all in play. Kerr and Lincoln (2010) use 
shifts in US visa quotas to identify effects of immigrant scientists on patenting in US cities, 
suggesting positive effects of skilled migrants on both ‘ethnic’ and overall innovative 
activity at urban level.  
 
Ozgen et al (2010), studying EU NUTS2 regions, find positive connections between 
migration, immigrant diversity and regional patenting. Niebuhr (2006) finds a positive link 
between the diversity of German regions and regional innovation, especially for highly 
skilled employees.  
 
 
4. Data and identification strategy   
 
I have three main data sources for the analysis. Patents information comes from the 
European Patent Office (EPO), which is made available through the OECD PATSTAT 
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database.28 Raw patent data cannot typically be used at inventor level, because of 
common/misspelled names, or changes of address: I use a cleaned form of the data 
provided by the KITES team at Bocconi University, which allows robust identification of 
individual UK-resident inventors (Lissoni et al., 2006).29  Ethnicity information is then 
derived from inventor names using the ONOMAP name classification system (see below 
and Appendix B). Finally, I combine this individual-level information with area-level 
controls, assembled from UK Labour Force Survey held in the Office of National Statistics 
Virtual Microdata Lab. My data assembly strategy builds on pioneering US studies of 
inventor activity by Kerr (2008a, 2008b, 2009, 2010), but makes important adaptations to 
the UK case. This is because of a number of methodological challenges linked to both the 
patents and diversity data, which are dealt with briefly below.   
 
4.1 Working with patents data  
 
The raw patents data covers the period 1977-2010, dated by priority year.30 The 
dataset contains geocoded information on 141,267 unique British-resident inventors and 
131,738 patents with at least one British-resident inventor.31 During this time the UK 
experienced generally low levels of immigration (from the late 1970s to the mid-90s), 
followed by an upshift from the late 1990s onwards (Wadsworth, 2010).   
 
I make a number of changes to the patents data to make it fit for purpose. First, 
there is typically a lag between applying for a patent and its being granted. This means 
that in a panel of patents, missing values typically appear in final periods. Following Hall et 
al (2001), I truncate the dataset by three years to end in 2004.  
 
Second, innovation and invention are processes, not events. Inventors typically work on an 
invention for some time before filing a patent. This means that year-on-year variations in 
patenting will not be driven simply by year-on-year variation in the things that drive 
innovation. In principle, the simplest way of dealing with this issue is to lag independent 
and control variables. However, it is not obvious a priori which length of lag should be fitted 
and there is also the problem that current drivers may still partly explain current patenting 
levels, even if other factors act with a lag. 
 
                                               
28
 In full: EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database. 
29
 Microdata from the PATSTAT-KITES database (http://db.kites.unibocconi.it/). For details of the 
algorithmic cleaning of the raw data, see Lissoni et al (2006).  
30
 ‘Priority dates’ represent the first date the patent application was filed anywhere in the world. The OECD 
recommends using priority years as the closest to the actual time of invention (OECD 2009). 
31
 The full dataset has 160,929 unique UK-resident inventors: 19,492 observations lack postcode 
information. In total 201,016 inventors are attached to these patents, indicating significant co-patenting.  
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I therefore follow the alternative approach of Menon (2009) and group patent 
observations together, using mean citation lags to specify the appropriate interval. If patent 
B cites patent A, the ‘citation lag’ between the two is the time period between the filing of A 
and the filing of B: the lag offers a rough way to capture the relevant external conditions 
affecting patenting.  The mean citation lag for EPO patents is four years (Harhoff et al 
2006, in OECD, 2009), so I group patents into four-year periods or ‘yeargroups’.  I 
organise independent variables and controls along the same lines (except for areas’ 
historic patent stocks, where lags are straightforward to apply).   
 
Third, the main analysis uses unweighted patent counts to measure ‘inventor 
productivity’, that is, the number of times an inventor engages in patenting activity in a 
given time period. Some of the extensions and robustness checks are done at area level. 
In this case I use weighted patent counts to avoid double-counting innovative activity: raw 
counts are divided by the number of inventors involved (OECD, 2009). For clarity, 
henceforth all patent counts are unweighted unless stated otherwise.  
 
Finally, I use a combination of technology field dummies and area-level industrial 
structure controls to control for structural biases in patenting activity across different 
industrial sectors. These are described further in section 6.  
 
4.2 Identifying ethnic inventors 
 
Kerr (2008a) and Agrawal et al (2008) both use name-based analysis to identify 
ethnic inventors from individual patent records. Agrawal and colleagues manually code 
Indian-ethnicity inventors; Kerr uses the MELISSA commercial names database. I build on 
these approaches by using the ONOMAP name classification system to generate ethnicity 
information for individual inventors.  
 
ONOMAP was originally designed for mining patient data for the UK National 
Health Service, and classifies individuals according to most likely cultural, ethnic and 
linguistic (CEL) characteristics identified from forenames, surnames and forename-
surname combinations. 
 
ONOMAP is built from a very large names database drawn from UK Electoral 
Registers plus a number of other contemporary and historical sources, covering 500,000 
forenames and a million surnames across 28 countries. These are then algorithmically 
grouped together, combining information on geographical area, religion, language and 
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language family. Separate classifications of surnames, forenames and surname-forename 
combinations are produced (see Appendix B).  
 
ONOMAP has the advantage of providing objective information at several levels of 
detail and across several dimensions of identity. It is also able to deal with Anglicisation of 
names, and names with multiple origins, giving it additional granularity and validity. Like 
Kerr’s similar work on US patents data (Kerr, 2008a), ONOMAP is unable to observe 
immigrants, and only observing objective characteristics of identity – the most conservative 
interpretation is that it provides information on most likely ethnicity. However, unlike the 
MELISSA commercial database used by Kerr, which only identifies high-level ethnicities, 
ONOMAP allows me to examine inventor characteristics from several angles and at 
several levels of detail. ONOMAP also matches 99% of inventor names (compared with 
Kerr’s 92-98% success rates). 
 
For the descriptive analysis I exploit the full range of CEL information, as well as 
ONS ethnic groups and geographical origin. For the regressions, I use ONS ethnic groups 
and geographical origin only. This is because CEL-coded information is not available for 
area-level controls, which would leave me unable to explore the influence of area-level 
demographic characteristics on inventor characteristics.  
  
ONS ethnic group information is based on the nine categories developed for the 
1991 Census. These are relatively dated and lose some important detail – for example, the 
second largest inventor group after ‘white’ is ‘other’ – so are likely to be subject to some 
measurement error.32 Geographical origin information provides finer-grained information 
on twelve zones across Europe, Africa, Asia and the Americas.33 Because name 
information does not distinguish migrants from their descendants, I use likely geographical 
origin as a measure of geographical ‘roots’ – an important, albeit partial, aspect of 
ethnicity. I use this as my preferred measure of ethnicity, as geographical origin is 
objective and provides a greater level of detail.   
 
Combining geography and name information in this way is not problem-free. 
ONOMAP does not distinguish geography if countries share a common language, so that 
North American and Australasian-origin inventors are largely identified as British-origin 
inventors (or unclassified). This may understate the true extent of inventor diversity. In 
practice, resulting measurement error is likely to be small. First, these groups’ spatial 
                                               
32
 The full set of ONS 1991 groups is White, Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, 
Bangladeshi, Chinese and Other.  
33
 The full set of twelve geographical origin zones is Africa, Americas, British Isles, Central Asia, Central 
Europe, East Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, Northern Europe, South Asia, Southern Europe and Rest 
of the World.  
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distribution is not very different from minority communities as a whole. Second, they 
represent a relatively small share of the UK’s minority population (see Appendix B).  
 
To measure diversity of ethnic groups, I use a Fractionalisation Index. For a set of 
identity groups g in area a in year t, the Index is given by:  
 
FRACat = 1 – ∑g [SHAREgat]2            (1) 
 
Where g is one of n groups, and SHARE is g’s share of the relevant population (here, all 
active inventors in a given area).  The Index measures the probability that two individuals 
in an area come from different geographical origin or ethnic groups. Similar measures are 
used widely in the development literature, as well as some city and state-level studies 
(Easterley and Levine, 1997, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004, Ottaviano and Peri, 2005a, 
Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). 
 
 
5. Data assembly and descriptive analysis   
 
I assemble a panel of UK-resident inventors’ patenting activity between 1993 and 2004 
inclusive, dividing the time period into three four-year ‘yeargroups’ as explained in the 
previous section. Each inventor-yeargroup cell records how many times an inventor 
patents in that time period. After cleaning, the basic panel covers 125,502 inventors across 
three four-year yeargroups, giving 376,506 observations. Cell counts vary from zero to 36, 
with a mean of 0.318.34  
 
I use postcode information to locate inventors in UK Travel to Work Areas 
(TTWAs), which are good approximations of local economies (and superior to 
administrative units such as local authority districts).35 Matching is done by postcode 
sector, which minimises the number of observations lost through incomplete or mistyped 
postcode information.36 I then fit an urban / rural typology of TTWAs developed in Gibbons 
et al (2011), allowing me to explore the potential effects of urban environments (see 
Appendix C for details and maps). 
 
                                               
34
 Just over 39% of inventors invent pre-1993, but do not invent during 1993-2004.  
35
 TTWAs are designed to cover largely self-contained labour markets: 75% of those living in a given 
TTWA also work in the TTWA, and vice versa. TTWAs are thus a good approximation for local spatial 
economies and for city regions (Robson et al 2006). 
36
 Matching on full postcodes drops around 12% of observations. Matching on postcode sector drops 
5.77% of observations. I exclude information on inventors resident in Northern Ireland. A small number of 
postcode sectors cross TTWA boundaries, so matching is not perfect. 
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Working with inventors (rather than patents or applicants) presents three linked 
areas where measurement error may arise. The first issue is robustly identifying 
individuals. I minimise this risk by using appropriately cleaned data. The second issue is 
about inventor activity. Inventors are only visible when patenting, and we do not know for 
certain what they are doing the rest of the time. The most conservative solution is to blank 
all cells where the inventor is not active. However, as most inventors – in the UK and 
elsewhere – patent only once, this would radically reduce sample size (and would miss 
instances where inventors were constrained from patenting for some reason). For the main 
analysis I thus zero all cells when no inventor activity is recorded. Using a sub-sample of 
inventors, I run robustness checks comparing both ‘zeroed’ and ‘blanked’ approaches. I 
find sample construction has no effect on the results (see Section 8).  
 
The third issue is about inventor location. We cannot be sure where inventors are 
when they are not actively patenting; and we need to identify those inventors who have 
moved location. I explore this issue by identifying likely movers. Following Agrawal et al 
(2006), I define movers as inventors with the same forename and surname, who patent in 
the same technology fields, in different TTWAs, at different points in time. As Agrawal and 
colleagues point out, this strategy minimises the risk of false positive errors – identifying 
inventors who are movers who are not – but does not deal with false negatives (identifying 
movers as non-movers). Measurement error from the latter is random, so will reduce the 
precision of, but not bias, my main results.  The conservative estimates that result, suggest 
around 14% of the sample are likely movers. This suggests firstly that the vast majority of 
inventors do not move during the sample period; and therefore it is reasonable to count 
non-movers as present in the same TTWA in which they first patent.   
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Some basic descriptives are set out in Tables 1-8, along with some wider 
population data from the Labour Force Survey.  
 
Table 1 breaks down inventors by CEL subgroup, showing the 30 largest groups. 
Because CEL classifications are not available in the LFS, I do not present comparison 
data for the wider population here (although see my first paper for some simple area-level 
analysis). We can see that while English, Welsh, Scottish and Celtic37 inventors make up 
the bulk of the sample, other inventor groups divide fairly evenly into geographically 
proximate communities (e.g. Irish, plus a series of European groups), groups reflecting the 
                                               
37
 ‘Celtic’ denotes names common to Scottish, Welsh and Irish CEL types.  
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UK’s colonial history in South and East Asia (e.g. Indian Hindi, Sikh, Pakistani, Hong Kong 
Chinese) plus some largely recent migrant communities (e.g. Polish, Vietnamese).  
 
Tables 2 and 3 recut the sample by probable geographical origin zones and by 
1991 ONS ethnic groups. Geographical origin zones (Table 2) allow me to preserve some 
of the detail from the full CEL classification, including several areas of Europe as well as 
South and East Asia. As highlighted in the previous section, ONS ethnic groups (Table 3) 
are much less flexible, focusing on visible majorities and minorities, relegating the rest of 
the inventors to ‘other’.  
 
Tables 4 – 6 cut the sample geographically. Table 4 presents the 40 Travel to Work 
Areas (TTWAs) with the largest shares of ethnic inventors by geographical origin, and for 
comparison provides migrant shares in the wider TTWA working-age population. High-
ranking TTWAs are predominantly urban, although a number of rural areas also feature, 
predominantly university towns (St Andrews, Lancaster, Canterbury) or areas adjoining 
TTWAs with universities (Bude and Holsworthy) and/or manufacturing clusters (Holyhead, 
Pembroke and Tenby, Louth and Horncastle).38 Comparing ethnic inventors with migrants 
in the overall population, we can see that areas in the top half of the table mostly have 
bigger shares of ethnic inventors than in the wider working-age population – London is one 
notable example. Table 5 presents the same data as location quotients, confirming that 
ethnic inventors are more spatially clustered than the wider migrant population.   
 
Table 6 compares Fractionalisation Index scores for active inventors and wider 
working age populations. The cultural diversity of inventors is greater than that of the wider 
population in most TTWAs (London, Bradford, Birmingham, Brighton, Leicester and 
Reading are the six exceptions in the top 40). Again, there are a number of rural areas in 
the table. As some rural areas have fairly few inventors, a small sample may lead to high 
values of the Fractionalisation Index.  
 
Finally, Table 7 gives weighted counts for the 40 TTWAs with the highest patenting 
activity: to minimise double counting, I weight each patent by the number of inventors 
involved. The results follow the familiar geography of UK innovative activity. A number of 
these high-patenting areas also have large ethnic inventor shares and diverse inventor 
groups (for example London, Southampton, Crawley, Oxford and Cambridge). However, 
                                               
38
 Many inventors will work in professional / technical occupations, which are characterised by longer-than-
average commuting distances. Building commuting zones on the basis of these workers’ commuting 
patterns substantially reduces the total number of zones (Robson et al 2006), suggesting that commuting 
across conventional TTWAs is not uncommon.   
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another group of high-patenting TTWAs have rather more homogenous inventor and 
general populations (for example, Bristol, Manchester, Reading and Ipswich).    
 
A number of broad lessons emerge from the descriptives. First, the UK’s population 
of ethnic inventors appears substantially different from that of the US. American ethnic 
inventor communities are dominated by South and East Asian groups (Kerr, 2008a). By 
contrast, the UK has a number of European groups, with South Asian and East Asian 
inventors drawn in large part from former colonies. Second, as in the US ethnic inventors 
are spatially concentrated, and more clustered than minority populations in general. Third, 
not all high-patenting locations have large ethnic inventor shares or diverse inventor 
communities.  
 
 
6. Regression analysis: estimation strategy 
 
I now explore whether these inventor, group and area-level characteristics influence 
individual inventor productivity. The descriptives highlight the distinctive composition of UK 
ethnic inventors, as well as their spatial concentration.  I use a knowledge production 
function (KPF) approach to model the links between inventors’ characteristics, group and 
area-level factors, and individual knowledge creation. KPF models were originally 
developed to explore national innovation systems (Griliches, 1979) before being extended 
to incorporate spatial processes and specificities (Cooke et al., 1997).  
 
In this case, the KPF is a useful way to incorporate channels operating at 
individual, group/community and territorial level. I am interested in whether these factors 
influence inventors’ ideas generation activity, specifically, the rate at which new knowledge 
is created. For an inventor, a new item of knowledge is measured by an unweighted 
patent, or ‘patent activity’: I consider demographic factors as one of many ‘inputs’ and 
patenting as the main ‘output’ of interest.  I therefore estimate a modified knowledge 
production function, linking counts of patenting activity to individual, group and area 
characteristics. The higher an individual’s patenting activity in a given time period, the 
higher is her ‘inventor productivity’.  
 
I use aggregated LFS client file microdata to construct a range controls. As LFS 
microdata is only provided with local administrative district-level identifiers, I aggregate to 
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TTWA level using a postcode weighting system developed in earlier analysis.39 Summary 
statistics for the 12-year panel are given in Table 8.  
 
For inventor i in area j and yeargroup t, I estimate:    
 
PCOUNTijt =  aINVi + bDIVjt + CONTROLSjtc + Pi + Uj + YGt + ei        (2) 
 
Where PCOUNT is a simple count of the number of times an inventor engages in 
patenting during a given four-year period. My first variable of interest is INV, a dummy 
variable taking the value one if the inventor is a likely ethnic inventor. (I later extend the 
model replacing INV with a set of dummies for various co-ethnic groups.) My second key 
variable is DIV, the diversity of active inventors in a given TTWA and time period. DIV is 
given by the Fractionalisation Index in Section 4.  
 
CONTROLS represents a vector of largely TTWA-level controls covering key 
spatial, economic, and demographic characteristics affecting relationships between INV 
and innovation, DIV and innovation or both. Unless otherwise stated, all controls are for 
the same 1993 – 2004 period as the patent data. 
 
For example, innovative activity and patenting are both spatially concentrated, 
reflecting benefits from agglomeration that may persist over time (Simmie et al., 2008). Co-
ethnicity or diversity effects on patenting might then simply reflect agglomeration and path-
dependence. I fit a dummy for primary urban areas, U, and fit log of population density to 
explore agglomeration effects more broadly. I also fit the model with measures of 1981-84 
area weighted patent stocks to control for historic asset effects, and experiment using 
different lags of the historic patent stocks control. 
 
Inventor demographic characteristics may be entirely explained by area 
demographic characteristics: for example, places with more diverse populations may 
produce more diverse inventor groups. Failing to account for this leads to bias on DIV. I 
control for this by using area-level fractionalisation indices (and cross-check using migrant 
population shares).  
                                               
39
 I aggregate individual-level data to local authority-level averages, and then aggregate these to TTWA-
level using postcode shares. Local Authority District (LAD) boundaries are not congruent with TTWA 
boundaries, so straightforward aggregation is not possible. Using the November 2008 National Postcode 
Sector Database (NSPD), I calculate the number of postcodes in each 2001 TTWA and in each of its 
constituent LADs. For each TTWA, I then calculate constituent LADs’ ‘postcode shares’. Shares sum to 
one, and are used as weights to construct TTWA-level averages.  Example: suppose a TTWA consists of 
parts of three LADs. The TTWA has 100 postcodes, 60 of which are in LAD_a, 30 in LAD_b and 10 in 
LAD_c. The relevant LAD weights are 0.6, 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. The TTWA-level average of variable x  
is given by (x)TTWA = 0.6*(x)_a + 0.3*(x)_b + 0.1*(x)_c. 
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 Human capital stocks are closely correlated with innovative activity (Romer, 1990) 
and as discussed in Section 3, may account for apparent ethnicity effects on patenting. 
Given the role of ‘ethnic scientists’ in the US and elsewhere, area-level human capital 
controls include the share of degree-holders with Science, Technology, Engineering and 
Mathematics (STEM) qualifications in the local working-age population. (The share of 
degree-holders with PhDs in any subject is used as an alternative control, as it is less 
precise in terms of subject.) Patent data provides very little individual-level information on 
human capital, but I am also able to fit P, an individual-level human capital control, 
explained below. 
 
I fit various further controls for precision. Patenting is known to be higher in 
‘knowledge-intensive’ high-tech and manufacturing sectors, so I include measures of the 
share of workers employed in ‘knowledge-intensive’ manufacturing, following The Work 
Foundation’s definition of ‘knowledge-intensive’ firms (Brinkley, 2008).40 Patenting activity 
is also vulnerable to sector-specific shocks, and the spike in software patenting since the 
mid-1990s is well-covered in the literature (Li and Pai, 2010). To account for this I fit a 
dummy for the IPC technology field ‘electrical engineering and electronics’.41 Patenting is 
likely to be lower in areas with a lot of entry-level jobs or areas of joblessness, so I include 
the share of workers in entry-level occupations and the share of long term unemployed as 
further controls.  
 
6.1 Controlling for individual-level heterogeneity  
 
Area-level controls for human capital may not fully account for differences between 
individual inventors, most obviously human capital endowments. In theory, the panel data 
structure should allow this to be controlled through individual fixed effects (Hausman et al., 
1984).  However, fixed effects panel estimators for nonlinear models require observations 
to have a non-zero value in at least one time period (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). As I am 
as interested in whether or not inventors patent as the number of times they patent, such 
an approach is not ideal.42  
 
                                               
40
 This follows standard OECD definitions but adjusts for the UK context. The final list of 3-digit SIC sectors 
includes medium and high-tech manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, aerospace, computers and office 
machinery, electronic communications, software, other chemicals, non-electrical machinery, motors and 
transport equipment). 
41
 I also experiment with a more precise information technology dummy (OST30_4), with similar results. 
42
 Random effects estimators are a potential alternative strategy, but Hausman tests (chi-squared = 
19979.75, pr = 0.000) suggest these are not justifiable.  
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Blundell et al (1995) develop a now widely-used43 alternative, exploiting historic 
information to control for permanent unobserved differences between agents (such as 
human capital). They argue that firms’ capacity to innovate is largely explained by the 
build-up of knowledge in the firm at the point in which it enters the sample. With long 
enough time series data, pre-sample activity ‘approximates an individual fixed effect’.  
 
For individual inventors, historic patenting activity is likely to work in a similar way. 
The patent data provides information on inventor activity from 1977, 16 years before the 
start of the regressions panel in 1993: around 23% of inventors in the sample period also 
invent before 1993, covering 40% of cells. I replicate this ‘entry stock’ estimator, using the 
pre-sample mean of inventors’ patent counts as a control for individual human capital 
endowments. Because the control is constructed as a continuous variable, it is never 
collinear to the ethnicity dummy, allowing me to fit both individual-level parameters 
together.   
 
I exclude inventors with no pre-sampling history – they may have been inactive or 
not in the labour force – and run the model on a reduced sample of 89,309 observations. 
The new sample removes younger inventors and recent migrants. As such it may 
understate true inventor diversity (or indirectly affect results if younger people are more 
open to diverse environments). Critically, however, the restriction allows me to distinguish 
ethnicity, diversity and human capital effects. I experiment with the full sample to check 
robustness, finding key variables and overall model fit are poor.44 
 
6.2 Model specification  
 
Count data is usually modelled using Poisson or negative binomial estimators. My 
panel exhibits excess zeroes (78%) and over-dispersion (the variance of PCOUNT is over 
2.5 times the mean). This means the basic assumptions of the Poisson model are not met, 
leading to likely inefficient estimates (Greene, 1994). As such, a negative binomial or zero-
inflated model may be preferred. Diagnostic tests suggest the negative binomial is the 
better fit, and has the added benefit of running a Poisson model as a base case.45 Against 
this, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue that once raw coefficients are converted into 
                                               
43
 A Google Scholar search turns up 351 citations, for example Baptista and Swann (1998), Katila and 
Ahuja (2002), Beaudry and Breschi (2003), Dushinitsky and Knox (2005), O’Shea et al (2005), Aghion and 
Howitt (2006).  
44
 Fundamentally, I argue the reduced sample preferable to running a bigger sample of inventors for whom 
historic patenting information is ambiguous. Firm-level studies, in contrast, typically have information on 
exactly when agents enter/exit the market.   
45
 Log-likelihood tests and AIC scores. I also experiment with zero-inflated models (ZIP and ZINB). Both 
perform well on diagnostic tests, although interpretation is extremely complex. Results from Poisson 
regressions are available on request. 
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marginal effects, non-linear modelling offers little over standard linear regression. I 
therefore fit the model with both negative binomial and OLS estimators.  
 
 
7. Regression analysis: results  
 
Results from the main regressions are given in Tables 9 (negative binomial) and 10 (OLS). 
In each table, column 1 shows a bivariate regression for the main variables of interest 
only, column 2 adds controls and column 3 adds the fixed effect. For ease of interpretation 
and comparison with OLS models, negative binomial results are presented as marginal 
effects at the mean. Negative binomial models show a significant log alpha term, 
confirming over-dispersion. Controls are generally of the expected size and sign.  
 
7.1 All inventors 
 
Ethnic status and inventor group composition have no significant effect on 
individual inventor productivity (column 1). The coefficient of INV is close to zero and DIV 
is negative insignificant. When controls are added (column 2), both INV and DIV become 
positive. Coefficients get bigger, and in the OLS results DIV is now significant at 5%.   
 
As explained above, I am able to control for individual inventors’ human capital 
endowments, allowing identification of the various ethnicity channels. As expected, once 
the human capital controls are included (column 3) overall model fit improves and the 
results change substantially. INV remains insignificant but its coefficient more than 
doubles, for both sets of models. For negative binomial models, the marginal effect of DIV 
is now 0.087, significant at 5%.  
 
Specifically, a 10-point increase in the inventor Fractionalisation Index – increasing 
active inventor diversity in Bristol to that in Oxford, for example – is linked to an average 
marginal effect of 10*(0.087) = 0.87 extra patents per inventor. For OLS models, diversity 
effects are slightly larger. DIV is 0.099, significant at 10%: a 10-point rise in inventor group 
diversity is associated with a 0.99 unit increase in expected patenting, or an extra patent 
per inventor. Interestingly, coefficients of area population diversity are negative (significant 
at 10% for negative binomials, not for OLS). 
 
To put this into perspective, effects of diversity on patent counts are smaller and/or 
weaker than human capital, whether the latter is measured at the area level or at individual 
level. This fits with the existing empirical eviden
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generally fairly small, where they exist (see Section 3). For negative binomial models, for 
example, the marginal effect of STEM degrees is 0.304, significant at 5%. This suggests 
that a 10-point increase in the area’s share of science graduates is linked to 3 extra 
patents per inventor. This is as expected given that patenting is concentrated in science 
and technology sectors. The marginal effect of the individual endowments control is 0.101, 
significant at 1%: past patenting activity is strongly linked to current patenting rates.  
 
Results for ONS ethnic groups function as a basic cross-check (Table 11). These 
broadly confirm the main findings. For negative binomial models, INV remains close to 
zero throughout; with controls and individual endowments in the model, the marginal effect 
of ethnic DIV is 0.125, significant at 5%. For OLS models, coefficient sizes and 
magnitudes are similar but none of the results is significant.   
 
Table 12 shows results from three initial robustness checks. First, I fit the TTWA 
share of degree holders with PhDs in any subject as an alternative area-level human 
capital control (column 2).  PhDs are a prerequisite in many research positions, and as 
specialists, PhD-holders may be more likely to patent. I find that an area’s share of PHDs 
strongly positively associated with inventor productivity, and dominates DIV in both model 
specifications. One interpretation of this result is that places that are attractive to PHDs 
also attract a diverse group of inventors, due to some other factor – such as a ‘tolerant’ 
milieu as suggested by Florida (2002).  
 
An alternative explanation is that high-patenting PHDs are themselves ethnic 
inventors, as suggested by US studies on star scientists (Stephan and Levin, 2001, 
Chellaraj et al., 2005).  In this case, diversity is the fundamental driver and the PhD 
variable is a so-called ‘bad control’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). As discussed in section 3, 
one then needs to disentangle the ethnic and human capital components of stars’ 
performance. I am unable to observe whether or not inventors have PHDs, so am unable 
to make these checks. Further research is needed here, perhaps with a subset of 
inventors in academic institutions where PHDs are more or less essential. In the remainder 
of this chapter I continue to focus on diversity because this is my main interest. But the 
results when including the PHD variable urge caution in interpreting these results as purely 
causal (of course, this is not the only identification challenge, as discussed further below). 
 
Second, I fit the model with a lagged dependent variable to control for effects of 
past patenting within the sample (column 3). Diversity effects persist: coefficients are now 
rather smaller but also more precise, with DIV significant at 1% (negative binomial) and 
5% (OLS).  Third, I fit the model without London – a city with high levels of cultural 
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diversity and relatively low levels of patenting per head of population (Wilson, 2007).46 
Results, in column 4, show that diversity effects persist in the negative binomial 
specification (significant at 5%), but are insignificant in OLS.   
 
Overall, the main results suggest no significant effect of ethnic inventor status on 
inventor productivity relative to other inventors, once individuals’ human capital and area 
conditions are accounted for. However, the composition of the inventor group matters: 
more diverse inventor communities have a small positive effect on individual inventor 
productivity. The rest of this section examines other channels –urban location and co-
ethnicity – in more detail.  
 
7.2 Urban areas and urban inventors  
 
The evidence review (Section 3) suggests that urban areas may ‘amplify’ ethnicity-
innovation processes via population composition effects, agglomeration effects or a 
combination of the two. However, the main results (Tables 9 and 10) find a weakly 
negative relationship between urban TTWAs and inventor productivity. In the negative 
binomial, for example, the marginal effect the urban TTWA dummy is -0.021, significant at 
10%; in the OLS results the coefficient is not significant and is close to zero. By contrast 
the agglomeration control, log population density, is positive at 0.0005 in the negative 
binomial specification, 0.008 in OLS, although neither is significant.   
  
In order to identify the separate effects of urban location and urban density, I fit the 
two separately and then interact them. The pairwise correlation between the urban TTWA 
dummy and log population density is 0.565, suggesting some differences in urban 
characteristics. Results are given in Table 13. Column 2 includes urban TTWA dummies 
only, column 3 log population density only, column 4 an interaction effect. We can see that 
fitted separately, each is negative on inventor productivity (although marginally significant 
at best). Fitted together, each is positive – with a negative interaction effect, suggesting 
some diseconomies of agglomeration on inventor productivity in the largest conurbations.    
 
 Columns 5-7 explore specific effects of diverse urban areas. Column 5 interacts the 
Fractionalisation Index with the urban TTWA dummy. The coefficient of DIV is now higher 
(0.136, significant at 5%) but the interaction term is negative insignificant at -0.066. 
Column 6 repeats the exercise with population density.  DIV is now much larger (0.284), 
but is insignificant with large standard errors: the interaction term is also negative 
insignificant. Finally, column 7 includes both urban variables and interacts the 
                                               
46
 Although London has relatively high patenting per inventor – see Table 8. 
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Fractionalisation Index with population density. DIV is now very large and significant, but 
noisy: the interaction term is negative and marginally significant.  
 
Taken together, these results suggest that agglomeration is helpful for inventor 
productivity, although has some diseconomies in bigger urban areas. Diverse urban areas 
do not seem to amplify inventor productivity, however. Overall, I find a weak effect of urban 
areas on inventor productivity, which is perhaps surprising given the emphasis on 
geographical proximity in the innovation literature. The UK context helps explain the 
discrepancy. Raw patent counts are highest in relatively small cities, notably Oxford and 
Cambridge. Conurbations, particularly London, are dominated by service sector activities 
where patenting is less likely to occur. The next chapter explores the London experience in 
more detail, using survey data which captures a broader range of innovative activity.    
 
7.3 Co-ethnicity / diaspora effects 
 
The data also allows me to explore co-ethnic / diasporic group effects. Specifically, 
rather than estimating INV as a single ‘ethnic inventor’ dummy, I now include a series of 
dummies taking the value one if the inventor is a member of each geographical origin 
zone. I run the model for all minority co-ethnic groups, taking UK-origin as the reference 
category. Results for negative binomial models are given in Table 14: for simplicity I 
restrict my analysis to the five biggest geographical origin zones (South Asia, Central 
Europe, East Asia, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe). Results are interpreted as the 
marginal effect of being in one of these co-ethnic groups, relative to membership of the 
majority group of UK-origin inventors. 
 
I find significant positive effects of South Asian- and Southern European–origin 
inventors on expected patenting rates, and negative significant effects of East Asian-origin 
inventors, relative to UK-origin inventors. Specifically, marginal effects are 0.025 for South 
Asian inventors, significant at 10%, -0.037 (1%) for East Asian inventors; and 0.053(10%) 
for Southern European inventors.   
 
The South Asian result is intuitively plausible given the strong historic connections 
between the UK and South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) and the 
presence of large migrant and established minority communities here. It also accords with 
US research showing significant diaspora effects of Indo-American communities. The 
Southern European result is likely to reflect the relatively large shares of inventors in the 
UK with Spanish, Italian or Portuguese backgrounds (Table 1). The East Asian result is in 
stark contrast to US research showing strong diaspora effects for Chinese and Taiwanese 
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communities (Saxenian, 2006, Dahlman, 2010). This may reflect the lack of strong 
diasporas in the UK outside Hong Kong-origin Chinese, and the different circumstances 
behind recent community formation in the US (economic migration of skilled workers) and 
the UK (handover of Hong Kong to China between 1984 and 1997).  
 
Results may also be driven by the large geographical origin zones I am using to 
proxy diasporic communities. I experiment with ONS ethnicity measures of Indian and 
Chinese inventors to conduct a partial cross-check using more tightly-defined groups, 
confirming my main result.47 Overall, then, these results suggest that co-ethnic group 
membership, as well as the diversity of the local inventor community, both have small 
positive effects on individual patenting rates. 
 
 
8. Further robustness checks  
 
I conduct checks on a series of potential endogeneity problems. These fall into two broad 
categories: robustly identifying diaspora and diversity channels, and dealing with path-
dependence. Results are shown in Tables 15 and 16.   
 
8.1 Identifying human capital, diversity and diaspora effects  
 
I face two immediate identification challenges. First, the combination of area-level 
controls and individual endowments may not be fully capturing inventors’ human capital. 
Assuming that human capital has a positive effect on patenting, the resulting omitted 
variable bias will overstate effects of DIV, pushing coefficients of DIV upwards.  
 
 To explore, I include an alternative individual-level control in the main model, again 
exploiting pre-sample information. Alongside overall output, intellectual range is another 
plausible indicator of overall human capital. My original endowments control measures 
knowledge accumulation by summing pre-sample patents. In addition, I identify 
‘generalists’ as inventors patenting across at least two technology fields (for example, filing 
patents in both electronics and biotechnology). The new control is a dummy with value one 
if an inventor patents across technology fields in the pre-sample period.48   
 
                                               
47
 Indian inventors make up just over three quarters of South Asian inventors (see Table 9), so I also break 
down the South Asian result in more detail. I find a positive non-significant link between Pakistani inventors 
and inventor productivity, but a very strong negative link with Bangladeshi inventors. Given their small 
representation in the sample, this may be largely explained by measurement error.  
48
 The dummy will also be capturing the minority of inventors who patent more than once.  
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Results are given in Table 15. Columns 1-3 compare the original human capital 
control, the ‘generalist’ control and both together. INV remains insignificant throughout; 
marginal effects of DIV fall from 0.087 to 0.05, 10% significance with the generalist control 
(column 2). Fitting both controls together (column 3) slightly increases the size and 
strength of the DIV marginal effect (to 0.055, 5% significance) and improves model fit. 
Columns 4-5 rerun this model for co-ethnic groups: with both controls in play, the main co-
ethnic group effects remain significant albeit smaller.    
 
Second, inventor diversity effects might collapse to simple size effects. 
Fractionalisation Indices tend to be highly correlated with group population shares (in this 
case, the pairwise correlation between DIV and the share of non-UK origin inventors in the 
TTWA is 0.8039). To test this, I replace the Fractionalisation Index of inventors with the 
share of ethnic inventors in the local inventor population. Results, in Table 16, show that 
the coefficient on ethnic inventor share is similar to group diversity, but is not significant on 
individuals’ expected patent rates either when fitted individually (column 2) or with DIV 
(column 3). Interacting the two raises the marginal effect of DIV, which stays significant at 
5%, but with a large negative value for the interaction term (column 4). This suggests that 
the overall diversity of inventors, rather than an aggregation of ethnic inventors, drives the 
main results. Column 5 repeats the analysis for diasporic groups, with similar outcomes.   
 
8.2 Historic patent stocks / path-dependence 
 
As explained in section 6, innovative activity is spatially concentrated, and these 
concentrations tend to persist over time as inventors and firms select into innovative 
locations, as areas progressively build innovative ‘capacity’. If the historic patent stocks 
term in the main model is mis-specified, agglomeration and path-dependence will not be 
adequately controlled for. To test for this I plug a range of pre-sample historic patent 
counts into the main model. Negative binomial results are given in Table 17. I find as that 
as the historic lag decreases, the coefficient and significance of historic patenting activity 
rises (from -0.000 for 1981-84 to 0.001 for 1993-96, significant at 5%). The marginal effect 
of inventor diversity get smaller and weaker as the historic lag shortens – from 0.087, 
significant at 5%, for 1981-84 stocks to 0.067 (10%) for 1989-92 stocks. This suggests that 
historic area-level characteristics help explain some of the inventor diversity effect – but do 
not eliminate it.   
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8.3 Sample construction  
 
I construct my sample by zeroing all inventor-yeargroup cells when an inventor is 
not patenting. As discussed in Section 5, this is not the most conservative way of treating 
inventors when they are not active, and there is some risk it may introduce measurement 
error into the results. To check for this I compare results from two samples – one with 
zeroed observations and one with non-active periods set as missing observations.   
 
My identification strategy depends on using inventors’ historic patenting activity, so 
blanking out non-activity has the effect of restricting the sample to inventors who patent 
more than once. I thus compare estimates for the set of multiple inventors across two 
different samples, one with zeroed and one with missing observations for non-activity. 
Results are given in Table 18. We can see that estimates for the two sub-samples are 
identical; suggesting that sample construction has no effect on my main results.  
 
Overall, the results from these cross-checks suggest that my main results are 
robust to the main endogeneity challenges: omitted variables, path-dependence and 
sample construction issues. However, further research is required to identify the relative 
contribution of majority and ethnic PHDs to patenting. 
 
 
9. Impacts on majority groups 
 
The analysis has established some positive connections between inventor group 
composition, the presence of diasporic groups and individual inventor productivity. 
However, this has ignored distributional effects – that is, specific impacts of ethnic 
inventors on majority inventors. Given that immigration is a major driver of cultural 
diversity, it is important to look at these distributional impacts.  
 
A number of studies in the immigration literature look at ‘native outflows’, in which 
UK-born physically leave an area after migrants arrive (Borjas, 1994). ‘Geographical 
crowd-out’ of this kind is hard to assess here – as explained in section 5, although the 
number of mobile inventors seems low, movers cannot be definitively identified. I conduct 
exploratory logit regressions to identify individual and area-level factors which might 
influence mover status. Results suggest individual human capital (measured by the 
endowments control) has a substantial, significant positive link to mover status. By 
contrast, coefficients for areas’ share of migrant inventors are much smaller and 
statistically insignificant.   
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‘Resource crowd-out’ is a potentially more serious issue. There are two ways in 
which this might happen. First, the presence of ethnic inventors might affect majority 
patenting rates at the individual level. A given majority inventor may benefit from ethnic 
inventors via the production complementarities outlined in section 3, or may ‘lose’ from 
disbenefits such as lower trust or communications difficulties.  The balance of these two 
effects on the average majority inventor needs to be identified. 
 
Second, even if there are human capital externalities at the group level, majority 
individuals may lose out from the presence of minority inventors (Borjas, 2011). In this 
case, ethnic inventors might crowd out majority inventors from relevant jobs and 
resources, such as space in R&D labs; or diaspora benefits might only be accessible to 
group members. This will affect the composition of overall patenting at area level. At the 
extreme, increases in area-level patent counts might be partly or wholly explained by a 
rising share of ‘ethnic’ patents – majority patenting shares could be static or even falling. 
Conversely, there might be multiplier effects from ethnic inventors to majority group 
inventors, raising everyone’s patent counts.  
 
I test for both forms of resource crowd-out. At the individual level, I first re-run 
model (1) for majority inventors only. Results are given in the first panel of Table 18. The 
marginal effect of DIV on majority inventor productivity is 0.072, significant at 10%. This 
implies a positive multiplier effect of inventor diversity on majority groups – but it is smaller 
and weaker than on all inventors.   
 
Next, I run model (1) for the whole sample but fit INV as a majority inventor 
dummy. Results are given in the second panel of Table 18. As with minority status, 
majority status has no significant effect on inventor productivity when other factors are 
controlled for (columns 1 and 2). However, interacting majority status with inventor 
diversity produces a positive significant effect of majority status, a larger and stronger 
effect of diversity – but a significant negative effect on majority inventors in diverse areas 
(column 3). Unlike the previous test, this suggests that while inventor diversity brings 
benefits, majority inventors in diverse inventor communities lose out. 
 
To explore area-level effects, I draw on recent work by Card (2005), Kerr and 
Lincoln (2010) and Faggio and Overman (2011). I assemble a panel of TTWA-level 
weighted patent counts for 1993-2004. I define ‘ethnic’ patents as patents with at least one 
ethnic inventor; all other patents are ‘majority’ patents. Following Faggio and Overman 
(2011), I then regress the percentage change in total weighted patents during the period 
on the percentage change in ethnic patents. For TTWA j I estimate: 
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 ∆TPATENTSj = a + b∆EPATENTSj + CONTROLScjtbase + ej        (3) 
 
Where:  
 
∆TPATENTSj = TPATENTSj2004 – TPATENTSj1993 / TPATENTSj1993       (4) 
 
And ∆EPATENTSj is assembled similarly. CONTROLS is a vector of area-level controls for 
the base period 1993.49 The coefficient of interest is b. As explained by Card (2005), if 
estimates of b are less than one, increases in ethnic patenting lead to a smaller increase in 
overall patenting, implying some crowd-out of majority patenting by ethnic inventors. 
Estimates of b larger than one imply multiplier effects; if b is equal to one, there are no 
distributional impacts either way. 
 
OLS results are given in Table 19. The simplest specifications of (4) suggest some 
crowd-out, with b estimated at 0.199 and 0.259, significant at 1%. However, b becomes 
insignificant once controls and standard errors clustered on TTWAs are introduced 
(column 4). An alternative specification using shifts in TTWAs’ technology field shares 
delivers very similar results (column 5). This suggests there is little evidence of crowd-out.  
 
Model (4) does not fully control for simultaneity or reverse causality. I experiment 
with lags of ethnic patents as an instrument, but none pass the required first-stage tests.   
Results should therefore be interpreted with caution.  
 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
 
In recent years there has been growing academic and policy interest in links between 
immigration, ethnic diversity and innovation. This paper looks at the role of ethnic inventors 
on innovative activity in the UK, using a new 12-year panel of patents microdata. I have 
been able to explore a number of potential ‘ethnicity-innovation’ channels – individual 
positive selection, externalities from diasporic groups and from the cultural diversity of 
inventor communities, as well as ‘amplifying’ effects of urban environments. The research 
is one of very few studies to explore these links, and as far as I am aware is the first of its 
kind outside the US. 
 
                                               
49
 Log of population density, % STEM degree, % employed  in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, % 
migrant working-age population, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban dummy. 
Alternative specifications control for TTWA change in OST7 technology field shares 1993-2004. 
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The results suggest that individual minority status has no significant effect on 
inventor patenting rates once other factors are controlled for. Conversely some diasporic 
groups, and group cultural composition, have small positive effects on inventor 
productivity. Effects on ‘majority’ inventors are unclear: there are some indications of 
individual-level crowd-out, but not at area level. Although patenting activity is very spatially 
clustered in the UK, in contrast to the wider literature, I find little evidence that urban 
environments improve individuals’ patenting activity once other individual and area-level 
controls are taken into account.   
 
Overall, ethnic inventors are a net positive for patenting in the UK, although the 
British experience is significantly different from the US. This partly reflects distinctive 
patterns of US migrant settlement: most notably, the recent emergence of ethnic inventor 
communities from Cold War science research, which have attracted very large numbers of 
skilled workers into a small number of locations (Saxenian, 2006). By contrast, recent 
‘calls’ for migrant workers in the UK since the mid-20th century have been largely focused 
on less skilled occupations, although policy is now becoming more skill-biased. Results 
may also reflect culturally distinctive US attitudes to entrepreneurship, as evidenced by 
sociological studies of Jewish and Afro-Caribbean migrant communities in New York and 
London (Gordon et al., 2007), and by the complex interplay between class, skills, 
resources and attitudes that influence real-world entrepreneurial behaviour (Basu, 2002).   
 
There are three important caveats to these results. First, diversity and diaspora 
effects are relatively small – human capital and patent field / industry effects are more 
important determinants of inventors’ productivity. This is intuitive, and echoes much of the 
existing literature (see above). Second, working with inventor data presents a number of 
potential measurement error challenges. Most seriously, my data only allows a fuzzy 
identification of ethnic inventors and diasporic groups. Using geographical origin as a 
proxy for co-ethnicity also presents conceptual challenges, although cross-checks support 
my results. Third, although the results survive a number of robustness checks, alternative 
measures of area-level human capital weaken effects of DIV. Further work is needed on 
the relative contribution of majority and ethnic PHDs to patenting. Conversely, data 
restrictions mean that my sample understates the true numbers of ethnic inventors. The 
real benefits of ethnic inventors may thus be larger.   
 
The results may have implications for the current Coalition government’s migration 
policies. Net immigration is one of the main factors behind the growth of ethnic inventor 
communities in the UK: a phenomenon which appears to raise rates of innovation through 
a combination of diversity and diaspora effects, with no hard evidence of negative 
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distributional effects on native inventors. A migration cap that places restrictions on skilled 
immigration from outside Europe is likely to put some constraints on innovative activity, 
leading to welfare losses both to the UK and to UK-born workers. Similar welfare losses 
may arise from proposed restrictions on post-study routes to work for non-EU students.  
 
The paper leaves a number of questions for future research. Further work could 
explore social networks, co-ethnicity and geographical location in more detail – via 
analysis of patent citations and international co-invention / co-patenting. Within the UK, 
data offering better identification of ethnic and migrant inventors, in particular recent 
immigrants, would provide a clearer picture of current developments. Alternatively, 
qualitative methods could shine further light on migrant and diaspora dynamics. Further 
work could also examine sectoral and area differences, as well as distributional impacts in 
more detail. The next chapter takes some of these ideas forward, exploring the 
experiences of London firms in a number of industries. 
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Table 1. UK-resident inventors: 30 biggest Cultural-Ethnic-Linguistic (CEL) 
subgroups, 1993-2004.  
 
CEL subgroup Freq. % Cumulative % 
ENGLISH 86,118 69.17 69.17 
CELTIC 10,653 8.56 77.73 
SCOTTISH 6,557 5.27 82.99 
IRISH 3,583 2.88 85.87 
WELSH 2,523 2.03 87.9 
INDIAN HINDI 1,255 1.01 88.91 
GERMAN 1,205 0.97 89.87 
ITALIAN 975 0.78 90.66 
FRENCH 958 0.77 91.43 
CHINESE 920 0.74 92.16 
POLISH 886 0.71 92.88 
OTHER MUSLIM 793 0.64 93.51 
OTHER EUROPEAN 665 0.53 94.05 
HONG KONGESE 588 0.47 94.52 
GREEK 574 0.46 94.98 
PAKISTANI 551 0.44 95.42 
SIKH 500 0.4 95.82 
SPANISH 438 0.35 96.18 
VIETNAMESE 427 0.34 96.52 
JEWISH 351 0.28 96.8 
PORTUGUESE 326 0.26 97.06 
JAPANESE 293 0.24 97.3 
EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC 263 0.21 97.51 
DANISH 216 0.17 97.68 
OTHER SOUTH ASIAN 209 0.17 97.85 
SRI LANKAN 209 0.17 98.02 
DUTCH 207 0.17 98.19 
TURKISH 198 0.16 98.34 
SWEDISH 191 0.15 98.5 
RUSSIAN 138 0.11 98.61 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT. 
 
Notes: 
 
1) ‘OTHER MUSLIM’ subgroup includes CEL name types ‘BALKAN MUSLIM’, ‘MALAYSIAN MUSLIM’, 
‘MUSLIM INDIAN’, ‘SUDANESE’, ‘WEST AFRICAN MUSLIM’, ‘OTHER MUSLIM’ (SMALLER MIDDLE 
EASTERN COUNTRIES, N/AFRICAN COUNTRIES, CENTRAL ASIAN REPS) 
2) 'JEWISH' includes CEL name types ‘JEWISH / ASHKENAZI’, ‘SEPHARDIC JEWISH’ 
3) ‘EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC’ includes CEL name types ‘BURMESE’, ‘CAMBODIAN’, ‘FIJIAN’, 
‘HAWAIIAN’, ‘LAOTIAN’,‘MAORI’, ‘MAURITIAN’, ‘POLYNESIAN’, ‘SAMOAN’, ‘SINGAPOREAN’, 
‘SOLOMON ISLANDER’, ‘SOUTH EAST ASIAN’ , ‘THAI’, ‘TIBETIAN’, ‘TONGAN’, ‘TUVALUAN’, ‘EAST 
ASIAN & PACIFIC OTHER’ 
4) ‘OTHER SOUTH ASIAN’ includes CEL name types ‘ASIAN CARIBBEAN’, ‘BENGALI’, ‘BHUTANESE’, 
‘GUYANESE ASIAN’, ‘KENYAN ASIAN’, ‘NEPALESE’, ‘PARSI’, ‘SEYCHELLOIS’, ‘SOUTH ASIAN’, 
‘TAMIL’ 
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Table 2. UK-resident inventors: geographical origin groups, 1993-2004.  
 
Probable geog. area of origin, CEL Freq. % Cumulative % 
BRITISH ISLES 109,429 87.89 87.89 
SOUTH ASIA 3,074 2.47 90.36 
CENTRAL EUROPE 3,035 2.44 92.8 
EAST ASIA 2,557 2.05 94.85 
SOUTHERN EUROPE 2,394 1.92 96.78 
EASTERN EUROPE 1,395 1.12 97.9 
MIDDLE EAST 1,060 0.85 98.75 
NORTHERN EUROPE 606 0.49 99.24 
REST OF WORLD 568 0.46 99.70 
AFRICA 324 0.26 99.96 
CENTRAL ASIA 31 0.02 99.98 
AMERICAS 29 0.02 100.00 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. UK-resident inventors: biggest ONS ethnic groups, 1993-2004.  
 
Probable ethnic group in 1991 Census 
categories, CEL  % Cumulative % 
WHITE 94.28 94.28 
ANY OTHER ETHNIC GROUP 1.76 96.04 
INDIAN 1.69 97.73 
CHINESE 1.41 99.14 
PAKISTANI 0.54 99.68 
BLACK - AFRICAN 0.24 99.92 
BANGLADESHI 0.08 100 
BLACK - CARIBBEAN 0 100 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT.  
Notes: Ethnic groups typology taken from 1991 Census to allow comparability pre and post-
2001. Frequencies have been supressed to avoid disclosure.  
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Table 4. Shares of migrants and ethnic inventors in Travel to Work Area (TTWA) 
working-age populations, 1993-2004. Top 40 areas.  
 
 
% ethnic 
inventors 
% migrants 
/population TTWA name TTWA type 
0.287 0.158 Crawley Primary Urban 
0.241 0.148 Southampton Primary Urban 
0.206 0.359 London Primary Urban 
0.171 0.173 Oxford Primary Urban 
0.169 0.169 Cambridge Primary Urban 
0.166 0.113 Dundee Primary Urban 
0.158 0.101 Oban N Scotland rural 
0.153 0.174 Guildford & Aldershot Primary Urban 
0.152 0.147 Swindon Primary Urban 
0.147 0.113 St Andrews & Cupar N Scotland rural 
0.147 0.143 Edinburgh Primary Urban 
0.143 0.141 Colchester Primary Urban 
0.143 0.092 Pembroke & Tenby Welsh rural 
0.141 0.104 Carlisle N England rural 
0.138 0.114 Bude & Holsworthy SW England rural 
0.136 0.127 Aberdeen Primary Urban 
0.133 0.106 Holyhead Welsh rural 
0.129 0.174 Brighton Primary Urban 
0.126 0.122 Lancaster & Morecambe N England rural 
0.124 0.170 Bedford Primary Urban 
0.122 0.107 Livingston & Bathgate N Scotland rural 
0.121 0.136 Cardiff Primary Urban 
0.120 0.128 Glasgow Primary Urban 
0.120 0.098 Inverness & Dingwall N Scotland rural 
0.119 0.101 Lanarkshire Primary Urban 
0.119 0.114 Newcastle & Durham Primary Urban 
0.116 0.210 Birmingham Primary Urban 
0.115 0.092 Haverfordwest & Fishguard Welsh rural 
0.114 0.119 York Primary Urban 
0.114 0.200 Leicester Primary Urban 
0.114 0.184 Reading & Bracknell Primary Urban 
0.113 0.215 Wycombe & Slough Primary Urban 
0.111 0.109 Wirral & Ellesmere Port Primary Urban 
0.109 0.157 Leeds Primary Urban 
0.109 0.143 Newbury SW England rural 
0.108 0.111 Louth & Horncastle Rest England rural 
0.107 0.108 Liverpool Primary Urban 
0.106 0.139 Canterbury Rest England rural 
0.106 0.129 Margate, Ramsgate & Sandwich Rest England rural 
0.106 0.144 Harlow & Bishop's Stortford Rest England rural 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT/ONS. 
Note: TTWAs use 2001 boundaries. ‘Primary urban’ TTWAs contain an urban core with at least 
125,000 people. TTWAs with fewer than 10 inventors suppressed.  
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Table 5. Ethnic inventor Location Quotients (LQs), 1993-2004. Top 40 areas.  
 
LQ TTWA name TTWA type 
2.372 Crawley Primary Urban 
1.989 Southampton Primary Urban 
1.703 London Primary Urban 
1.414 Oxford Primary Urban 
1.394 Cambridge Primary Urban 
1.375 Dundee Primary Urban 
1.304 Oban N Scotland rural 
1.266 Guildford & Aldershot Primary Urban 
1.252 Swindon Primary Urban 
1.216 St Andrews & Cupar N Scotland rural 
1.213 Edinburgh Primary Urban 
1.180 Pembroke & Tenby Welsh rural 
1.180 Colchester Primary Urban 
1.162 Carlisle N England rural 
1.139 Bude & Holsworthy SW England rural 
1.122 Aberdeen Primary Urban 
1.101 Holyhead Welsh rural 
1.062 Brighton Primary Urban 
1.044 Lancaster & Morecambe N England rural 
1.024 Bedford Primary Urban 
1.005 Livingston & Bathgate N Scotland rural 
1.000 Cardiff Primary Urban 
0.995 Glasgow Primary Urban 
0.988 Inverness & Dingwall N Scotland rural 
0.981 Lanarkshire Primary Urban 
0.980 Newcastle & Durham Primary Urban 
0.955 Birmingham Primary Urban 
0.953 Haverfordwest & Fishguard Welsh rural 
0.941 York Primary Urban 
0.940 Leicester Primary Urban 
0.938 Reading & Bracknell Primary Urban 
0.932 Wycombe & Slough Primary Urban 
0.917 Wirral & Ellesmere Port Primary Urban 
0.898 Leeds Primary Urban 
0.897 Newbury SW England rural 
0.893 Louth & Horncastle Rest England rural 
0.886 Liverpool Primary Urban 
0.876 Canterbury Rest England rural 
0.875 Margate, Ramsgate & Sandwich Rest England rural 
0.872 Harlow & Bishop's Stortford Rest England rural 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT/ONS. 
Note: TTWAs use 2001 boundaries. ‘Primary urban’ TTWAs contain an urban core with at least 
125,000 people. TTWAs with fewer than 10 inventors suppressed.  
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Table 6. Fractionalisation Index (FRAC) scores for inventors and TTWA working-
age populations, 1993-2004. Top 40 areas.  
 
Inventor 
FRAC 
Population 
FRAC TTWA name TTWA type 
0.384 0.498 London Primary Urban 
0.354 0.188 Southampton Primary Urban 
0.310 0.206 Crawley Primary Urban 
0.308 0.225 Oxford Primary Urban 
0.305 0.133 Dundee Primary Urban 
0.293 0.139 Honiton & Axminster SW England rural 
0.288 0.122 Lancaster & Morecambe N England rural 
0.283 0.226 Cambridge Primary Urban 
0.282 0.184 Swindon Primary Urban 
0.279 0.099 Bangor, Caernarfon & Llangefni Welsh rural 
0.273 0.168 Colchester Primary Urban 
0.256 0.106 Carlisle N England rural 
0.255 0.126 St Andrews & Cupar N Scotland rural 
0.255 0.122 Bude & Holsworthy SW England rural 
0.250 0.234 Guildford & Aldershot Primary Urban 
0.244 0.179 Edinburgh Primary Urban 
0.241 0.275 Bradford Primary Urban 
0.239 0.143 Glasgow Primary Urban 
0.237 0.263 Birmingham Primary Urban 
0.234 0.148 Aberdeen Primary Urban 
0.226 0.104 Wirral & Ellesmere Port Primary Urban 
0.225 0.164 Cardiff Primary Urban 
0.224 0.104 Livingston & Bathgate N Scotland rural 
0.222 0.206 Bedford Primary Urban 
0.218 0.135 Lincoln Rest England rural 
0.217 0.121 Liverpool Primary Urban 
0.215 0.225 Brighton Primary Urban 
0.213 0.289 Wycombe & Slough Primary Urban 
0.210 0.126 Newcastle & Durham Primary Urban 
0.208 0.172 Bristol Primary Urban 
0.208 0.269 Leicester Primary Urban 
0.207 0.184 Eastbourne Rest England rural 
0.203 0.134 Monmouth & Cinderford Rest England rural 
0.202 0.190 Leeds Primary Urban 
0.201 0.244 Luton & Watford Primary Urban 
0.199 0.142 Norwich Primary Urban 
0.194 0.158 Rugby Rest England rural 
0.194 0.239 Reading & Bracknell Primary Urban 
0.193 0.169 Harlow & Bishop's Stortford Rest England rural 
0.192 0.114 Stafford Rest England rural 
Source: ONOMAP/KITES-PATSTAT/ONS. 
Note: TTWAs use 2001 boundaries. ‘Primary urban’ TTWAs contain an urban core with at least 
125,000 people. TTWAs with fewer than 10 inventors suppressed.
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 Table 7. TTWAs’ weighted patent stocks, 1993-2004. Top 40 areas.  
 
Weighted patent 
count TTWA name TTWA type 
1697.14 London Primary Urban 
1155.59 Cambridge Primary Urban 
719.36 Oxford Primary Urban 
705.62 Harlow & Bishop's Stortford Rest England rural 
531.69 Manchester Primary Urban 
489.87 Guildford & Aldershot Primary Urban 
483.41 Southampton Primary Urban 
440.96 Bristol Primary Urban 
428.15 Reading & Bracknell Primary Urban 
416.01 Crawley Primary Urban 
379.21 Ipswich Primary Urban 
365.63 Swindon Primary Urban 
342.90 Wycombe & Slough Primary Urban 
341.67 Stevenage Primary Urban 
312.93 Newcastle & Durham Primary Urban 
309.40 Wirral & Ellesmere Port Primary Urban 
301.75 Leicester Primary Urban 
289.82 Birmingham Primary Urban 
260.66 Nottingham Primary Urban 
223.87 Leeds Primary Urban 
218.49 Edinburgh Primary Urban 
213.60 Worcester & Malvern Primary Urban 
183.83 Margate, Ramsgate & Sandwich Rest England rural 
181.10 Coventry Primary Urban 
169.36 Bedford Primary Urban 
167.98 Luton & Watford Primary Urban 
165.09 Cardiff Primary Urban 
163.87 Glasgow Primary Urban 
161.37 Warwick & Stratford-upon-Avon Rest England rural 
161.20 Warrington & Wigan Primary Urban 
152.70 Hull Primary Urban 
148.04 Derby Primary Urban 
147.14 Aberdeen Primary Urban 
138.16 Portsmouth Primary Urban 
136.70 Milton Keynes & Aylesbury Primary Urban 
130.99 Middlesbrough & Stockton Primary Urban 
121.67 Chelmsford & Braintree Primary Urban 
121.35 Chester & Flint Welsh rural 
118.13 Northampton & Wellingborough Primary Urban 
113.95 Maidstone & North Kent Primary Urban 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS. 
Note: TTWAs use 2001 boundaries. ‘Primary urban’ TTWAs contain an urban core with at least 
125,000 people. Patents are weighted by number of inventors, not area population. 
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Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
        
Inventor patent count / 4-year period  89312 0.114 0.694 0 25 
Inventors' ave. patent count, pre-1993 89312 0.405 0.351 0.286 11.143 
Inventor likely techfield mover 89312 0.256 0.437 0 1 
Inventor likely TTWA mover  89312 0.143 0.35 0 1 
            
      
Inventor is UK geog. origin  89312 0.937 0.243 0 1 
Inventor is foreign geog. origin 89312 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Inventor African origin 89312 0.002 0.041 0 1 
Inventor Americas origin 89312 0.000 0.013 0 1 
Inventor Central Asia origin 89312 0.000 0.018 0 1 
Inventor Central Europe origin 89312 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Inventor rest of world origin 89312 0.003 0.058 0 1 
Inventor East Asian origin 89312 0.007 0.084 0 1 
Inventor East Europe origin 89312 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Inventor Middle East origin 89312 0.006 0.075 0 1 
Inventor Northern Europe origin 89312 0.003 0.052 0 1 
Inventor South Asian origin 89312 0.015 0.123 0 1 
Inventor South European origin 89312 0.007 0.086 0 1 
Frac. Index, geog. origin groups 89312 0.209 0.118 0 0.612 
            
Inventor is white ethnicity 89312 0.97 0.172 0 1 
Inventor is minority ethnic  89312 0.03 0.172 0 1 
Inventor Black Caribbean 89312 0 0.01 0 1 
Inventor Black African  89312 0.002 0.04 0 1 
Inventor Indian 89312 0.012 0.107 0 1 
Inventor Pakistani 89312 0.003 0.052 0 1 
Inventor Chinese 89312 0.004 0.064 0 1 
Inventor other ethnic group 89312 0.01 0.099 0 1 
Frac. Index, ethnic groups  89312 0.108 0.066 0 0.449 
            
      
TTWA Frac Index, geog. groups 89309 0.225 0.142 0 0.528 
TTWA Frac Index, ethnic groups 89309 0.169 0.141 0 0.459 
% graduates  89309 0.238 0.051 0.106 0.362 
% graduates with STEM degrees 89309 0.121 0.032 0.041 0.196 
% graduates with PhDs 89309 0.007 0.005 0 0.029 
% employed hi-tech manufacturing 89309 0.027 0.014 0 0.194 
% employed medium-tech m’facturing 89309 0.046 0.023 0 0.135 
% in entry level occupations  89309 0.338 0.049 0.25 0.667 
% unemployed >=12 months  89309 0.016 0.012 0 0.08 
log(population density) 89309 6.605 1.053 2.06 8.359 
Electronics patent  89312 0.009 0.093 0 1 
TTWA weighted patent count  89312 493.094 578.301 0 1888.03 
TTWA weighted patents, 1981-84 88726 144.814 201.789 0.25 613.859 
            
 
 
Table 8. Summary statistics. 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Note: Area-level controls not available for all TTWAs. 
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Table 9. Negative binomial results for inventor productivity: ethnicity measured 
by geographical origin zones, 1993-2004.  
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic inventor, geog. -0.000 0.004 0.009 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) 
    
Frac Index of inventors, geog. -0.061 0.079 0.087** 
origin groups (0.101) (0.050) (0.042) 
    
Frac Index, TTWA country of birth   -0.203* -0.140* 
  (0.110) (0.085) 
% STEM degrees, TTWA  0.372** 0.304** 
  (0.176) (0.147) 
Log of TTWA population density  0.005 0.005 
  (0.008) (0.007) 
Area weighted patents, 1981-84  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
% hi-tech mf empl, OECD defn.  -0.159 -0.111 
  (0.281) (0.226) 
% medium-tech mf, OECD defn.  0.048 0.051 
  (0.172) (0.134) 
% entry-level occupations   0.042 0.113 
  (0.123) (0.106) 
% unemployed >=12 months   -0.313 -0.000 
  (0.441) (0.354) 
Electronics / OST7 type 1 patents  2.074*** 1.697*** 
  (0.132) (0.176) 
Urban TTWA  -0.018* -0.021* 
  (0.015) (0.015) 
Individual human capital    0.101*** 
   (0.007) 
    
ln(alpha)    
Constant 2.991*** 2.683*** 2.491*** 
 (0.052) (0.063) (0.069) 
    
Observations 89312 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -25328.463 -24379.554 -23859.107 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 376.947 3520.345 2693.200 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: Notes: All models use time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust 
standard errors clustered on TTWA. Except for ln(alpha) term, coefficients are marginal effects 
at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 10. OLS results for inventor productivity: ethnicity measured by 
geographical origin zones, 1993-2004.  
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic inventor, geog. 
-0.002 0.004 0.011 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
   
Frac Index of inventors, geog. 
-0.055 0.119** 0.099* 
origin groups (0.088) (0.058) (0.055) 
 
   
Frac Index, TTWA country of birth  
 -0.137 -0.079 
 
 (0.127) (0.115) 
% STEM degrees, TTWA 
 0.302 0.334 
 
 (0.292) (0.278) 
Log of TTWA population density 
 0.006 0.008 
 
 (0.010) (0.009) 
Area weighted patents, 1981-84 
 -0.000 -0.000 
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
% hi-tech mf empl, OECD defn. 
 -0.166 -0.245 
 
 (0.385) (0.367) 
% medium-tech mf, OECD defn. 
 0.120 0.093 
 
 (0.240) (0.216) 
% entry-level occupations  
 0.084 0.149 
 
 (0.166) (0.154) 
% unemployed >=12 months  
 -1.211 -0.934 
 
 (0.747) (0.719) 
Electronics / OST7 type 1 patents 
 2.356*** 2.305*** 
 
 (0.139) (0.135) 
Urban TTWA 
 -0.024 -0.028 
 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
Individual human capital 
  0.266*** 
 
  (0.036) 
Constant 0.196*** 0.122 -0.034 
 (0.010) (0.107) (0.105) 
    
Observations 89312 88726 88726 
F-statistic 76.283 52.523 50.226 
R2 0.007 0.107 0.125 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard 
errors clustered on TTWA. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 11. Negative binomial and OLS results for inventor productivity: ethnicity 
measured by ONS ethnic groups, 1993-2004.  
 
 
Negative binomial  
 
Individual patent counts  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic inventor, ONS minority ethnic group -0.006 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) 
    
Frac Index of inventors, ONS ethnic groups -0.165 0.101 0.125** 
 (0.145) (0.067) (0.056) 
    
Controls N Y Y 
Individual human capital N N Y 
Observations 89312 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -25319.277 -24386.644 -23864.136 
Chi2 goodness of fit statistic (Wald) 414.921 2706.003 2426.458 
 
 
OLS  
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic inventor, ONS minority ethnic group -0.010 -0.002 0.003 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) 
    
Frac Index of inventors, ONS ethnic groups -0.155 0.123 0.097 
 (0.131) (0.082) (0.077) 
    
Controls N Y Y 
Individual human capital N N Y 
Observations 89312 88726 88726 
F-statistic 75.337 54.477 58.197 
R2 0.007 0.107 0.125 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS. 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM 
degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation index of area birth 
country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Negative 
binomial models show marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 12. Robustness checks. Negative binomial and OLS results.  
 
Negative Binomial 
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ethnic inventor, geographic origin 0.009 0.007 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Frac Index of inventors, geog. origin   0.087** 0.046 0.016*** 0.016*** 
groups (0.042) (0.039) (0.006) (0.006) 
     
% with PhDs in TTWA  2.649***   
  (0.504)   
     
#times inventor patents in previous YG    0.053*** 0.057*** 
within sample   (0.002) (0.002) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Individual human capital Y Y Y Y 
Include London? Y Y Y N 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 75571 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -23821.523 -16507.273 -21524.746 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 2693.200 2181.073 4008.364 2095.403 
 
 
OLS 
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ethnic inventor, geographic origin 0.011 0.009 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
    
Frac Index of inventors, geog. origin   0.099* 0.050 0.072** 0.047 
groups (0.055) (0.048) (0.035) (0.033) 
 
    
% with PhDs in TTWA 
 3.567***   
 
 (0.689)   
 
    
#times inventor patents in previous YG  
  0.638*** 0.640*** 
within sample 
  (0.021) (0.023) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Individual human capital Y Y Y Y 
Include London? Y Y Y N 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 75571 
F-statistic 50.226 36.783 223.531 53.932 
R2 0.125 0.125 0.451 0.130 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM 
degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation index of area birth 
country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Negative 
binomial models show marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 13. Further exploration of urban areas’ role in inventor productivity, 1993-2004. Negative binomial results.    
 
Individual patent counts  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
             
Ethnic inventor, geographic origin 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
 
       
Frac Index of inventors, geog. 0.087** 0.085** 0.066 0.080* 0.136** 0.284 0.494** 
origin groups (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.041) (0.067) (0.201) (0.231) 
         
urban TTWA -0.021 -0.016  0.054 -0.007  -0.028* 
  (0.015) (0.010)  (0.043) (0.010)  (0.015) 
         
log of TTWA population density 0.005  -0.002 0.016  0.004 0.016** 
  (0.007)  (0.005) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.008) 
           
urban TTWA * ln(pop density)      -0.016    
       (0.014)    
           
Frac Index * urban TTWA       -0.066   
       (0.076)   
           
Frac Index * ln(pop density)         -0.037 -0.067* 
         (0.033) (0.037) 
            
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 88726 88726 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -23861.196 -23871.085 -23853.923 -23859.802 -23868.311 -23850.578 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 2693.200 2594.921 3234.725 2754.837 2720.994 4245.201 3717.697 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: all models use time dummies and individual fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM degrees, % employed 
in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, frac. index of birth country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, individual human capital control. Coefficients are 
marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.   
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Table 14. Negative binomial results for inventor productivity and co-ethnic 
groups: ethnicity measured by geographical origin zones, 1993-2004.  
 
 
Inventor patent count Marginal effect 
  
Africa origin -0.037* 
 (0.022) 
  
Americas origin 0.176 
 (0.166) 
  
Central Asia origin 0.045 
 (0.055) 
  
Central Europe origin -0.003 
 (0.014) 
  
Diasporic origin -0.019 
 (0.014) 
  
East Asia origin -0.037*** 
 (0.007) 
  
Eastern Europe origin 0.032 
 (0.034) 
  
Middle East origin -0.008 
 (0.025) 
  
Northern Europe origin 0.001 
 (0.045) 
  
South Asia origin 0.025* 
 (0.015) 
  
Southern Europe origin 0.053* 
 (0.040) 
  
Frac Index of inventors, geog. origin groups 0.087** 
 (0.042) 
  
Controls Y 
Observations 88726 
Log-likelihood -23843.642 
Chi-squared 4438.933 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: all models use time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Controls fitted: log of 
population density, % STEM degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation 
index of ONS ethnic groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy, 
individual human capital control. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 
5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 15. Robustness checks using alternative human capital measures, 
negative binomial results.  
 
Individual patent counts (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Ethnic inventor, geog. origin 0.009 0.003 0.005   
 (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)   
      
Africa origin    -0.037* -0.020* 
    (0.022) (0.011) 
      
Americas origin    0.176 0.028 
    (0.166) (0.049) 
      
Central Asia origin    0.045 0.016 
    (0.055) (0.028) 
      
Central Europe origin    -0.003 -0.001 
    (0.014) (0.009) 
      
Diasporic origin    -0.019 -0.008 
    (0.014) (0.014) 
      
East Asia origin    -0.037*** -0.016*** 
    (0.007) (0.006) 
      
Eastern Europe origin    0.032 0.013 
    (0.034) (0.022) 
      
Middle East origin    -0.008 0.001 
    (0.025) (0.016) 
      
Northern Europe origin    0.001 0.014 
    (0.045) (0.040) 
      
South Asia origin    0.025* 0.012* 
    (0.015) (0.009) 
      
Southern Europe origin    0.053* 0.024 
    (0.040) (0.017) 
      
Frac Index of inventors, 0.087** 0.050* 0.055** 0.087** 0.055** 
geog. origin groups (0.042) (0.028) (0.027) (0.042) (0.026) 
      
Average patents pre-sample 0.101***  0.028*** 0.100*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007)  (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) 
      
Patents in >1 IPC7 field  0.217*** 0.184***  0.183*** 
  (0.010) (0.009)  (0.009) 
      
Controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -22138.191 -21926.052 -23843.642 -21917.627 
Chi-squared 2693.200 3670.001 5323.670 4438.933 6041.785 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: all models use time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Controls fitted: log of 
population density, % STEM degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation 
index of birth country / ONS ethnic groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban 
dummy. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 16. Robustness checks using diversity effects versus size effects, negative 
binomial results 
 
Individual patent counts  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Ethnic inventor, geog. origin 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008  
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)  
      
Africa origin     -0.037* 
     (0.022) 
      
Americas origin     0.181 
     (0.163) 
      
Central Asia origin     0.045 
     (0.055) 
      
Central Europe origin     -0.003 
     (0.014) 
      
Diasporic origin     -0.020 
     (0.014) 
      
East Asia origin     -0.037*** 
     (0.008) 
      
Eastern Europe origin     0.032 
     (0.034) 
      
Middle East origin     -0.008 
     (0.025) 
      
Northern Europe origin     0.001 
     (0.044) 
      
South Asia origin     0.024* 
     (0.015) 
      
Southern Europe origin     0.054* 
     (0.041) 
      
Frac Index of inventors, geog. 0.087**  0.108*** 0.191** 0.189** 
origin groups (0.042)  (0.041) (0.080) (0.079) 
      
% ethnic inventors, geog. origin  0.068 -0.058 0.060 0.057 
as share of all inventors   (0.145) (0.138) (0.121) (0.121) 
      
Frac index * % ethnic inventors    -0.676* -0.662** 
   
 (0.345) (0.336) 
    
 
 
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -23868.208 -23858.221 -23851.433 -23836.126 
Chi-squared 2693.200 3064.329 2830.487 3853.584 5748.078 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: all models use time dummies. Robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Controls fitted: log of 
population density, % STEM degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation 
index of birth country / ONS ethnic groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban 
dummy, individual human capital control. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant 
at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 17. Robustness checks using alternative historic patent stocks: influence 
on inventor productivity. Negative binomial results.  
 
Individual patent counts  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Ethnic inventor, geog. 0.009 0.008 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
    
Frac Index of inventors, geog. 0.087** 0.083** 0.067* 
origin groups (0.042) (0.041) (0.040) 
    
Area historic weighted stock  -0.000   
of patents, 1981-1984 (0.000)   
    
Area historic weighted stock   -0.000  
of patents, 1985-1988  (0.000)  
    
Area historic weighted stock    0.000 
of patents, 1989-1992   (0.000) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Individual human capital Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 89196 89268 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -23994.163 -24030.991 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 2693.200 2720.995 2865.519 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM 
degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation index of area birth 
country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Coefficients 
are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
  
166 
Table 18. Sample construction test for multiple inventor sub-sample, 1993-2004. Negative binomial results.  
 
Individual patent counts  All, zeroed Multiple, zeroed Multiple, blanked (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
Ethnic inventor, geographic origin 0.009 -0.095 -0.093 -0.095 -0.093 
 (0.007) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) 
      
Frac Index of inventors, geog. origin groups 0.087** 0.856 4.103** 0.856 4.103** 
 (0.042) (0.575) (2.057) (0.575) (2.057) 
      
Urban TTWA -0.021 -0.170  -0.170  
 (0.015) (0.134)  (0.134)  
      
Log of TTWA population density 0.005 0.025 0.056 0.025 0.056 
 (0.007) (0.058) (0.072) (0.058) (0.072) 
      
Frac Index * log population density   -0.579  -0.579 
   (0.370)  (0.370) 
      
Controls  Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 4842 4842 4842 4842 
Log-likelihood -23859.107 -8526.503 -8527.051 -8526.503 -8527.051 
Chi-squared 2693.200 173.503 185.897 173.503 185.897 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, 
fractionalisation index of area birth country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy, individual human capital control. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors clustered on TTWA. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 
1%. 
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Table 19. Distributional effects of minority inventors on majority inventor 
productivity, 1993-2004. Individual level results  
 
Native patent counts  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Frac Index of inventors, geog.  -0.069 -0.057 0.072* 
origin groups (0.097) (0.077) (0.041) 
    
Controls N N Y 
Individual fixed effects N Y Y 
Observations 83672 83672 83098 
Log-likelihood -23726.567 -23236.532 -22334.827 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 343.508 628.231 2536.289 
 
 
Individual patent counts  (1) (2) (3) 
       
UK inventor -0.010 -0.009 0.027*** 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) 
      
Frac Index of inventors, geog.    0.087** 0.253*** 
origin groups   (0.042) (0.077) 
       
UK * Frac Index    -0.172*** 
     (0.056) 
       
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 88726 88726 88726 
Log-likelihood -23870.231 -23859.107 -23852.425 
Chi2 fit statistic (Wald) 3421.238 2693.200 2866.909 
 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM 
degrees, % employed in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, fractionalisation index of area birth 
country groups, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban TTWA dummy, 
individual human capital control. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors 
clustered on TTWA. Coefficients are marginal effects at the mean. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, 
*** 1%. 
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Table 20. Distributional effects of minority inventors on majority inventor 
productivity, 1993-2004. Area level results  
 
% change in total weighted  
patents, 1993-2004 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
      
% change in weighted ethnic 0.199*** 0.259*** 0.248*** 0.248 0.259 
patents, 1993-2004 (0.065) (0.066) (0.068) (0.177) (0.178) 
      
Controls N Y Y Y Y 
OST7 technology field dummies  N N Y Y N 
HAC standard errors N N N Y Y 
Observations 220 220 210 210 206 
F-statistic 9.299 1.467 3.646 1.144 0.966 
R2 0.041 0.041 0.141 0.141 0.151 
Source: KITES-PATSTAT/ONS/LFS 
Notes: All models use time dummies. Controls fitted: log of population density, % STEM 
degrees, % employed  in knowledge-intensive manufacturing, % migrant working-age 
population, % entry-level occupations, % long term unemployed, urban dummy. Technology 
field dummies cover OST7 fields 1 -6: electrical engineering and electronics; instruments; 
chemicals and materials; pharmaceuticals and biotechnology; industrial processes; mechanical 
engineering, machines and transport. Consumer goods and civil engineering patents are used 
as the reference category. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
This chapter continues to examine connections between migrants and minority 
communities, diversity and innovation. It focuses on the firm and on individual 
entrepreneurs; it also focuses on the experiences of a single city, London.  
 
As we know innovation is an important driver of long-term national economic 
growth and an important goal of policy intervention (Schumpeter, 1962, Romer, 1990). 
Cities and urban economic diversity enable innovative activity (Jacobs, 1969). A growing 
body of evidence also suggests that culturally diverse cities may be more innovative, as 
they benefit from a wider range of international links, diverse decision-making and being 
able to attract more innovative people (Niebuhr, 2006, Peri, 2007, Hunt and Gauthier-
Loiselle, 2008, Ozgen et al., 2010). The last chapter found limited evidence that urban 
diversity helps patenting; this chapter explores a much large set of invention and diffusion 
measures.  
 
Diversity-innovation effects should largely operate at individual, group or firm level, 
but will be amplified in an urban context (Berliant and Fujita, 2009). Yet as far as we are 
aware, no research has so far considered the impact of cultural diversity on innovation 
within firms in a highly diverse city. This paper looks at urban cultural diversity and 
innovation in detail, using a unique sample of 7,600 businesses in London.  The UK capital 
is one of the world’s major cities and one of its most culturally diverse – in terms of country 
of birth, language and ethnicity.  London is substantially more diverse than 20 years ago: 
its cosmopolitanism is seen as a social asset. Does it help London firms to innovate?  
 
Existing theory and evidence suggest that diversity-innovation channels for firms 
may run both ways. Culturally diverse teams may be better at generating new thinking or 
problem solving, particularly in knowledge-intensive environments (Fujita and Weber, 
2003, Page, 2007). Through diasporic networks, migrant or minority staff and business 
owners can access additional upstream and downstream markets, assisting process 
innovation and the commercialisation of new ideas (Saxenian, 2006). But diverse 
organisations may also face higher communication costs, lower trust and discrimination, all 
of which will hold back innovation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). 
 
More generally, ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ are argued to play a number of critical roles 
in urban innovation. They are seen as more likely to develop new ideas (Stephan and 
Levin, 2001) and can act as ‘reputational intermediaries’ between firms in different 
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countries (Kapur and McHale, 2005). Conversely, minority ethnic communities may be 
excluded from mainstream economic opportunities (Gordon et al., 2007).  
 
At city level, urbanisation economies may aid access to international markets; 
conversely, large and diverse domestic markets provide more opportunities for product 
hybridisation (Mazzolari and Neumark, 2009). In both cases diverse firms may be best 
placed to take advantage of these processes. 
 
We use London as a test case for exploring these issues. We use data from 
London Annual Business Survey (LABS), using repeat cross-sections from 2005 to 2007.  
We exploit the survey’s unique structure to look at links between the ownership 
characteristics of firms in London, the extent to which they innovate, the importance of 
these innovations and firms’ success in commercialising them. We make use of the natural 
experiment conditions created by A8 accession in 2004, a policy shock that led to a large 
increase in net migration to the UK, and London in particular.   
 
Our results suggest small but robust positive effects of management diversity on 
the development of new products and processes. In contrast to the wider literature, we find 
diversity-innovation effects in both high-value knowledge-intensive sectors and in ‘ordinary’ 
innovations in less knowledge-intensive activity. London’s large and diverse home 
markets, diasporic communities and international connectivity play important roles, as do 
entrepreneurial migrant business owners.  
 
Our results pass a series of robustness tests, although the cross-sectional 
structure of the data means that firm-level reverse causation cannot fully be ruled out. 
Since this likely creates upward bias, our preference is to treat the main results as upper 
bounds. Overall, our findings suggest a small but significant ‘diversity effect’ and support 
claims that London’s cultural diversity acts as an economic asset. As far as we know, 
these are new findings for the UK, and the first research exploring firm-level diversity-
innovation effects in an urban context. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out motivation and 
background for the research. Section 3 frames the ways in which urban cultural diversity 
may influence innovation. Sections 4 and 5 introduce data, descriptives and estimation 
strategy. Section 6 summarises our main results. Sections 7 and 8 set out extensions and 
robustness checks. Section 9 concludes and makes suggestions for further research. 
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2. Background and motivation  
 
This paper asks the question: what effect, if any, does the cultural diversity of London’s 
businesses have on their innovative activity? It looks at different aspects of diversity and 
innovation, focusing on the roles of management, owners and business partners in the 
capital.  
 
2.1 Defining terms 
 
Both ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘innovation’ are complex concepts and need careful 
definition. We follow the common definition of innovation as ‘the successful exploitation of 
new ideas’ (Department of Innovation Universities and Skills, 2008). Innovative activity is 
generally held to involve both ideas generation and the commercialisation of those ideas, 
both around new products and new processes (Fagerberg, 2005). Individual entrepreneurs 
and entrepreneurial individuals within larger organisations are essential to the innovation 
process (Schumpeter, 1962). As a determinant of technical change and thus total factor 
productivity, innovation helps shape overall national productivity: innovative firms’ 
discoveries permeate across the economy as a whole (Faggian and McCann, 2009). Our 
data allow us to look at both the generation of new products and processes, and – to an 
extent – their commercialisation.  
 
Cultural or ethnic diversity is harder to pin down. 50  It is a multifaceted concept, with 
subjective elements, and with categories that alter over time (Office of National Statistics, 
2003). The key dimensions include kinship, religion, language, shared territory, nationality 
and appearance (Bulmer, 1996). Group membership ‘is something that is subjectively 
meaningful to the person concerned’. And both culture and ethnicity are ‘context-driven 
social and psychological concepts’ whose meaning may shift as society evolves (Aspinall, 
2009).   
 
For these reasons, attempts to quantify cultural diversity generally lose something 
in the process.  We focus on two specific measures, diversity of country of birth and mix of 
ethnic group, which are widely used in the literature as proxies for diversity generally. As a 
proxy for identity, country of birth has the advantage of being objective, but is one-
dimensional and does not capture established minority communities. Ethnic groups 
attempt to combine different aspects of diversity, but operate at a very high level of 
generality (Mateos et al., 2007). Ethnicity classifications also focus on classifying ‘visible 
                                               
50
 For the purposes of this paper, we use ‘cultural diversity’, ‘ethnic diversity’ and ‘diversity’ 
interchangeably. 
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minorities’ such as Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) groups, without looking at ethnicity 
more broadly.   
 
There are two potential problems with using these diversity proxies. First, if we 
believe identity is entirely self-ascribed, it becomes very hard to link behaviour to our 
measures (Casey and Dustmann, 2009). This may affect measures based on ethnic 
groups, which are partly self-ascribed. However, it is difficult to think that (for example) 
commercial success might lead business owners of South Asian origin to identify as ‘White 
British’. So we are relatively confident ‘identity uncertainty’ is not a major source of bias.  
 
The second issue is that country of birth and ethnic group are distinct but 
overlapping: some migrants will be members of BME groups, and some recent minority 
communities may be largely non UK-born.  In London the overlap is greater than in many 
other British cities. In the late 1990s and again from 2004, the UK experienced two large 
jumps in net migration. Many ‘new migrant communities’ have developed  (Kyambi, 2005).  
This means that the capital’s current cultural diversity is largely driven by migrants from 
visible minorities, alongside groups captured in the ‘other’ category.51 For example, Labour 
Force Survey data shows pairwise correlation between migrant and minority working-age 
population shares in Greater London is over 95% (Gordon et al., 2007). 
 
Bearing in mind the caveats above, we feel justified in using both country of birth 
and ethnic group as interchangeable proxies for London’s cultural diversity.  However, we 
highlight individual diversity channels likely to be specific to migrant or minority-ethnic 
groups and explore a number of migrant-specific processes.  
 
2.2 Wider context  
 
Links between diversity, cities and business success matter for policymakers, both 
in London and at national level. The UK’s productivity gap with competitor countries – 
particularly the US – is an area of major policy concern. Innovation and entrepreneurship 
were two of the previous Government’s ‘five drivers of productivity’ (Department of 
Innovation Universities and Skills, 2008); the current Coalition has maintained a focus on 
innovation-led growth (HM Treasury and BIS, 2011). There is also a political consensus 
that growing diversity brings economic benefits, although there is disagreement about 
longer-term effects (Home Office and Department of Work and Pensions, 2007, House of 
Lords Economic Affairs Committee, 2008).  
                                               
51
 In 2008, the 10 largest country of birth groups in UK cities were (in order of population share): Poland, 
India, Pakistan, Germany, Eire, Rep. South Africa, Zimbabwe, Bangladesh, and USA (Nathan 2009).  
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Urban areas also play a number of important roles in the UK. They are the locus of 
most people and economic activity (Parkinson et al., 2006). Increasing returns in cities 
confer productivity payoffs and help support innovative activity (Glaeser, 2008), although 
the subsequent contribution of innovation to urban growth is less clear-cut (Christopherson 
and Clark, 2007). British cities also contain the vast majority of the UK’s migrant and 
minority populations (see previous chapters).  
 
London is our test case: it exemplifies the idea of the cosmopolitan world city.  The 
UK capital is one of the original ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 1991). Alongside New York, 
London remains a hub of the global financial system (Gordon et al., 2009).  The capital 
dominates the UK economy: in 2006-7 it contained around 13% of the UK population but 
contributed nearly 20% of national GVA (Gordon et al., 2007). London is also one of the 
most culturally diverse cities on the planet (Burdett and Sudjic, 2011). Over the past 15 
years it has become substantially more cosmopolitan, both by receiving the majority of 
new UK migrants and via the emergence of settled new communities in the city. As 
Guardian journalist Leo Benedictus (2005) wrote in a recent survey:   
 
London in 2005 is uncharted territory. Never have so many different kinds of 
people tried living together in the same place before. What some people see as the 
great experiment of multiculturalism will triumph or fail here. 
 
London’s schoolchildren speak over 300 languages (Baker and Eversley, 2000).  In 
2006, London contained 40% of the UK migrant population (Greater London Authority, 
2008b). At least 50 ‘new migrant’ communities with over 10,000 members live here 
(Benedictus, 2005). The city’s cultural diversity is widely seen as an economic strength, by 
national and city government as well as London’s business community (Home Office and 
Department of Work and Pensions, 2007, Greater London Authority, 2008a, London First, 
2008).   
 
In particular, London’s diversity is seen as driving forward ideas generation and the 
emergence of new products and services (Legrain, 2006, Leadbeater, 2008). London’s 
service-dominated economy means that it performs poorly on traditional innovation 
metrics, such as research and development spending or patenting activity (Wilson, 2007). 
So there is considerable interest in aspects and drivers of innovative activity in the city. 
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3. Diversity, innovation and business performance  
 
Recent years have seen increasing interest in the links between aspects of urban diversity 
and cities’ economic performance.  A number of studies find that innovative activity is 
spatially concentrated, suggesting that cities and regions have an important role to play in 
fostering innovation by firms (Jaffe et al., 1993, Zucker et al., 1998). Spatial clustering 
seems to reflect localised knowledge spillovers (Storper and Venables, 2004); sectoral 
composition (Griffith et al., 2006); the presence of both very large firms and small 
businesses (Kelley and Helper, 1999); and concentrations of skilled workers (Faggian and 
McCann, 2009).  
 
Economic diversity is related to urban innovation. Increasing returns in cities are 
linked to economically diverse environments (Jacobs, 1969, Glaeser et al., 1992); 
embryonic firms can benefit from diverse ‘nursery cities’ (Duranton and Puga, 2001). 
There is also some suggestive evidence that cultural diversity plays a role in enabling 
innovation in urban areas. Peri (2007) finds that US states’ share of foreign-born PhDs is 
positively associated with levels of patenting; Niebuhr (2006) finds a positive link between 
the diversity of German regions and regional innovation, with a stronger effect for the 
diversity of highly skilled employees.  Most recently, Ozgen et al (2010) find the diversity of 
migrants helps drive patenting rates in European NUTS2 regions. 
 
These studies throw up obvious questions about how diversity effects may operate 
at the firm level in urban areas. In theory, the effects of diversity in firms are ambiguous on 
innovation. The introductory chapter summarises the four main ways in which firm-level 
diversity may influence innovative activity, two positive and two negative. The material 
below provides a more detailed discussion, plus relevant empirical results.  
 
3.1 Diversity and innovation: firm-level processes 
 
First, diverse workforces may be more effective than homogenous workforces in 
problem solving or generating new ideas – and thus for product and process innovation. 
‘Cognitively diverse’ teams leverage a wider pool of perspectives and skills.52 Crucially, 
cultural diversity is a good proxy for cognitive diversity (Page, 2007). Hong and Page 
(2001, 2004) show that in experiments with large teams of problem-solvers, the best 
problem-solvers often come up with similar solutions. So a diverse group may outperform 
a homogenous group, even if the latter have higher ability. These dynamics may be 
                                               
52
 Page (2007) suggests that given a group of predictive models, the greater the diversity of modellers, the 
smaller the chances of error. This also implies that in some circumstances, the diversity of the problem- 
solving group is more important than individual talent. 
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particularly important in research-based or knowledge-intensive activities (Fujita and 
Weber, 2003). This has been modelled formally by Berliant and Fujita (2009) who show 
how in a system of firm-level knowledge creation worker heterogeneity can accelerates 
ideas generation through individual-level production complementarities.  
 
Second, diverse firms may have access to diasporic networks, which confer 
externalities. Co-ethnic networks may reduce information and communication costs as 
knowledge is exchanged through groups with greater mutual understanding and trust 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Storper, 2006). This means firms with diaspora connections may 
have better access to international upstream and downstream markets. Access to ‘global 
pipelines’ should help firms to innovate, via access to new ideas and improvements to 
supply chains or production functions (Bresnahan and Gambardella, 2004). 
 
Third, and conversely, diverse teams may find it harder to communicate, and levels 
of trust may also be lower (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2004). As a result, organisations may 
find it harder to make decisions or allocate resources, and the quality of those decisions 
may be lower than in more homogenous organisations. This will negatively affect both 
ideas generation and commercialisation activity.  
 
Fourth, migrant and minority-owned firms may face additional constraints in the 
marketplace. They may have greater difficulty in raising finance, for example, finding 
affordable space or developing client relationships. These reflect management and 
product quality, but may also be the result of lack of connections into mainstream 
economic institutions or discrimination (Gordon, 2001). Lockout will make 
commercialisation harder. It is also likely to be a problem for minority-ethnic owned 
businesses.   
 
Cultural diversity is thus good for firm performance if its on-going benefits outweigh 
initial disadvantages (Lazear, 1998). 53  Empirical evidence comes from the management 
literature, case studies and organisation-level research.  The management literature 
broadly suggests diversity in firms is a net benefit. In a study of 165 Swiss firms, Nielsen 
finds that nationality mix in top management teams is linked to higher rates of foreign 
market entry and to higher firm profitability (Nielsen, 2010, cited in Hart (2010)).  
 
In turn, Hart analyses 24,000 ‘high-impact’ US firms, finding suggestive evidence 
that team diversity is linked to employment (used here as a rough proxy for business 
                                               
53
 Firms which are wholly run by members of a single migrant / minority community should benefit from the 
second channel, but may lose from the fourth.  We test for this separately in section six. 
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success). Wider reviews of the evidence find that there is a small but significant workplace 
‘diversity advantage’ (Page, 2007, Landry and Wood, 2008). Negative communication and 
trust effects are often present in organisations, but are outweighed by positive effects of 
diversity over time. So younger firms may find it harder to knit diverse teams together. 
  
More broadly, there is international evidence that diasporas can engage in 
innovative activity. Saxenian (2006) and Saxenian and Sabel (2008) provide detailed 
evidence on the roles of migrant diasporas in Silicon Valley, which have strong links to 
production clusters in India, Taiwan and (increasingly) China. Similarly, Kapur and McHale 
(2005) and Kerr (2008b) detail the influence of diasporas in ICT clusters across Ireland, 
Israel and South East Asia. Foley and Kerr find evidence that access to diasporas helps 
US firms ‘globalise’ their activities, for example by forming new affiliates abroad (Foley and 
Kerr, 2011).  
 
There are still very few empirical studies looking specifically at diversity and 
innovation at firm level. Ozgen et al (2011) find some positive links between migrant 
worker share, workforce diversity and innovation in knowledge-intensive Dutch firms. In 
Denmark, Parotta and colleagues (2011) find significant positive effects of cultural diversity 
on firms’ propensity to innovate – but again, only in ‘white collar’ sectors employing 
predominantly skilled workers. But Maré et al (2011) find no systematic links between 
workforce characteristics and innovation among businesses in New Zealand. 
 
3.2 City-level effects  
  
There will also be city-level channels linking innovation and diversity, which may 
amplify the firm-level effects on both products and processes. For example, if cultural 
diversity contributes to economic diversity, it may help foster knowledge spillovers across 
sectors (Jacobs, 1969). Specifically, diverse urban populations may demand a greater 
variety of goods and services, particularly in non-traded sectors. This will be driven both by 
the presence of new communities, and in some cases by shifting preferences in the 
majority population (Gordon et al., 2007). The more cosmopolitan the environment, 
therefore, the greater the potential for hybridisation. In principle, there is no reason why 
any firm should not be able to take advantage of these opportunities. In practice, diverse 
firms may be better placed to spot and act on emerging opportunities.  
 
A few studies have investigated these city-level effects. Hunt and Gauthier-Loiselle 
(2008) find that immigrant population shares raise levels of patenting at the state level, and 
that state-level effects are greater than individual-level effects – suggesting some 
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interaction between diversity, urban co-location and  knowledge spillovers. Immigration is 
positively associated with an increased range of restaurants in California (Mazzolari and 
Neumark, 2009). And UK case studies highlight the role of migrant communities in the 
emergence of new sub-sectors of retail and leisure (Smallbone et al., 2006).   
 
3.3 ‘Ethnic entrepreneurs’  
 
Schumpeter (1962) highlights the importance of ‘the entrepreneurial function’ in 
fostering innovation. Individual entrepreneurs push against social inertia, identifying and 
commercialising new ideas through new firm formation; ‘collective entrepreneurship’ in 
large organisations plays a similar function within the firm.  
 
Research on diversity and innovation places similar emphasis on so-called migrant 
or ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’. Migration decisions reflect both expected returns and the taste 
for risk-taking. So migrants may be highly entrepreneurial, and more likely to look for and 
develop new products (Wadhwa et al., 2007). Ethnic entrepreneurs can also act as 
‘reputational intermediaries’, forging partnerships and helping new processes (Kapur and 
McHale, 2005, Saxenian and Sabel, 2008, Honig et al., 2010). 
 
Empirical evidence on ethnic entrepreneurship is mixed. Some migrant and 
minority communities make disproportionate contributions to knowledge creation in US 
science and high-tech sectors (Stephan and Levin, 2001). Migrants account for a 
disproportionate number of start-ups in US regions like Silicon Valley and the Raleigh-
Durham Triangle (Wadhwa et al., 2007). More prosaically, UK case studies have 
highlighted the role of migrant communities in retail and leisure hybridisation, as migrants 
create new products influenced by their backgrounds and tailored to the needs of 
particular groups (Henry et al., 2002, Jones et al., 2004, Ram and Jones, 2008, Kitching et 
al., 2009). But levels of self-employment seem to vary by migrant group, host country and 
class structure (Basu, 2002, Basu, 2004, Nakhaie et al., 2009).  
 
The phenomenon of ethnic entrepreneurship suggests a research focus on 
business owners and partners. But it also makes it harder to identify the specific role of 
cities: we need to test for positive and negative selection bias, in case diversity-innovation 
effects are actually explained by the individual characteristics of the entrepreneurs.  
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3.4 The 'Creative Class' and diversity 
 
An alternative explanation for these results comes from ‘Creative Class’ theory 
(Florida, 2002). Florida suggests that liberal, tolerant skilled workers are now the driving 
force of Western economies. This group is attracted to diverse firms and environments. 
The Creative Class is largely responsible for knowledge creation, so that culturally diverse 
firms will be more innovative – although diversity itself may have no direct effect. It is 
plausible that in a consciously cosmopolitan city like London, at least some of the 
workforce is deliberately seeking a diverse milieu. However, Creative Class approaches 
have been criticised for their theoretical foundations (Glaeser, 2005), and appear to lose 
predictive power in the UK (Nathan, 2007).  
 
 
4. Data and descriptives 
 
Our main dataset is the London Annual Business Survey (LABS), an annual survey of 
firms conducted across the London region (‘Greater London’) by the London Development 
Agency (LDA).54   The questionnaire asks a range of questions covering firm formation, 
workforce and management characteristics, firm performance and constraints. Until very 
recently, the survey was the UK’s only single firm-level source of information about 
organisational characteristics, business innovation and performance.  
 
In a previous paper we conducted preliminary analysis of 2007 LABS data (Lee 
and Nathan, 2010). In this paper we improve the analysis in a number of ways. First, we 
pool together cross-sections from 2005-2007 inclusive. This allows us to significantly 
increase the sample size to 7,615 firms. Second, although the sample is a repeated cross-
section, we are able to use time-consistent industry codes to construct year and industry 
fixed effects (at three-digit SIC level).55 Both steps will improve the precision of our 
estimates. 
 
Third, we explore the natural experiment conditions created by A8 accession in 
2004. An obvious objection to our approach is that both firms’ innovative activity and 
workforce composition might be affected by external factors not captured in firm-level data. 
This could be a shock to the London economy that simultaneously influences innovation 
                                               
54
 The LDA was one of nine Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in England established in 1998. The 
RDAs were abolished in early 2011; the LDA’s functions have transferred to the Greater London Authority.  
55
 We restrict the sample to SIC3 sectors represented in all three years. Sectors excluded include 
agriculture, forestry and hunting; fishing; mining and quarrying; and secondary manufacture related to 
these sectors, such as food processing.  
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and diversity; or the positive selection problem discussed in previous chapters, where 
London’s historic economic performance results in a larger, more diverse workforce.  
 
The ‘policy shock’ of A8 accession provides a way around these problems. Policy 
choices made by the UK government of the time led directly to a very large, exogenous 
rise in net immigration to London and other cities from a particular set of sending 
countries, which subsequently increased both the number of migrant /minority groups in 
London, and their relative sizes. It thus exogenously raised levels of diversity in the city – 
and hence firm-level diversity – for reasons independent of the level of innovative activity 
in those firms. It thus helps address the concern that causality runs from innovation to 
diversity rather than vice-versa.  
  
Specifically, eight Central and East European countries (the ‘A8’) joined the 
European Union in 2004. All existing member states apart from the UK and Sweden 
placed heavy restrictions on potential A8 migrants (notoriously, studies commissioned at 
the time by the UK Home Office suggested entry numbers would be very small). However, 
the lack of entry barriers then prompted very large immigration flows from A8 countries to 
the UK. Overall, Britain experienced one of the largest increases in net migration since 
World War II, of which London received the lion’s share (Economist, 2006). These inflows 
significantly increased London’s diversity by growing both the number of overall migrant 
groups and their relative sizes. Inflows began falling during the second half of 2008 as 
national economic conditions declined (Office of National Statistics, 2008b).  
 
For all these reasons, LABS data allows us to explore diversity-innovation 
mechanisms in previously unavailable detail. However, focusing on London may limit the 
external validity of our results: the city’s economy and demography are significantly 
different to other parts of the UK. We discuss this further in the concluding section.  
 
4.1 Diversity measures  
 
The data structure allows us to construct multiple diversity measures from LABS’ 
coverage of ownership characteristics, country of birth and ethnicity. Our principle 
measures are proxies for different aspects of diversity, specifically the mix (or otherwise) of 
owners / partners.  
 
Our first dimension is country of birth. We begin by defining ‘migrant-diverse’ firms 
as companies with a mix of UK-born and foreign-born owners / partners. Second, we 
define ‘migrant firms’ as those with all foreign-born owners / partners: in over 92% of cases 
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these come from a single ethnic group. Finally we define ‘UK firms’ as those with no 
migrant owners / partners. We fit dummies for all three types of firms, taking the value 1 if 
the firm falls into the relevant category.  
 
Our second dimension is the Office of National Statistics ethnic groups typology. 
We build a dummy for ‘ethnic diverse’ firms derived from Q16a in LABS, ‘whether at least 
half the owners are White British’. We define the variable so it takes the value 1 if at least 
half the owners are not White British, i.e. from minority ethnic groups.  Because we are 
unable to precisely identify whether ‘ethnic diverse’ firms are wholly minority-run, we use 
this as a cross-check for our preferred migrant-based measures.  
 
4.2 Innovation and commercialisation measures  
 
We develop a number of innovation measures covering both ideas generation and 
commercialisation activities, and product and process innovations. Our first set of 
dependent variables cover aspects of ideas generation and adoption. We term these 
‘innovation’ variables. We construct four dummies taking the value one if the firm has a) 
introduced a major new product or service in the past 12 months; b) significantly modified 
its product range or services during the year; c) introduced major new equipment, or d) 
introduced major new ways of working during the year.   
 
These variables cover important aspects of innovation – the introduction of new 
products and processes. However, they have two important limitations.56 First, although 
they focus on ‘major’ changes they do not attempt to directly rank the quality or importance 
of innovations. We can indirectly put a value on innovative activity by observing the kind of 
firm that innovates. Specifically, we are able to identify ‘knowledge-intensive’ and ‘non-
knowledge-intensive’ firms using OECD definitions refined by The Work Foundation. The 
former include pharmaceuticals, electronics, software, finance and business services; the 
latter include low-tech manufacturing, retail, and personal and protective services.57 We 
also identify innovation by ‘knowledge-intensive business services’ or KIBS, which may 
better represent the knowledge economy in a service-based city like London (Wood, 
                                               
56
 Just as with patents data, there are some caveats with innovation survey data. Smith (2005) highlights 
the danger of ‘response bias’ towards innovating firms, and the difficulty of constructing survey questions 
that can capture the very different innovation processes across manufacturing and service sector firms. 
LABS deals with the latter by applying very broad definitions of ‘innovation’ in questions asked. It may thus 
risk capturing some trivial innovations, especially around ‘new ways of working’. Results from this measure 
should be interpreted carefully.  
57
 The Work Foundation follows the OECD definition of knowledge-intensive industries, but adjusts for the 
UK context (Brinkley 2008). The final list of 3-digit SIC sectors includes medium and high-tech 
manufacturing (pharmaceuticals, aerospace, computers and office machinery, electronic communications, 
software, other chemicals, non-electrical machinery, motors and transport equipment) plus a range of 
‘knowledge services’ (post and telecoms, business services, finance and insurance, education, health, 
recreational and cultural activities).  
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2006).58 We suggest that firms in knowledge-intensive or KIBS sectors are more likely to 
deliver ‘high-value’ innovations. By contrast, firms in less knowledge-intensive industries 
are generally more likely to conduct ‘ordinary’ innovation. 
 
Second, the basic measures also take no account of whether implementation has 
been successful. We construct measures of commercialisation to account for this. A 
commonly used proxy for commercialisation is rapid revenue growth: innovation 
researchers define ‘high-growth’ or ‘gazelle’ companies as those achieving annual 
turnover growth of 20% or more (Council on Competitiveness 2005). LABS provides 
limited turnover information in bands, so we define high-growth firms as companies in the 
sample that have achieved annual revenue growth of 10% or more. Just over 36% of firms 
are ‘high-growth’ by this definition (see below). This is a weaker definition than is 
commonly used in the literature, and may reflect other factors feeding revenue growth 
(such as a change in tastes).  
 
We then construct four dummy ‘commercialisation’ variables that take the value 
one if firms have innovated along each of the dimensions a) to d) above, and seen annual 
revenue growth of at least 10%. Given the complex nature of much innovative activity in 
London, not many companies will be able to commercialise ideas at such a rapid rate.  We 
therefore conduct some robustness checks using alternative commercialisation measures.  
 
4.3 Descriptives  
 
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1: we briefly discuss some key variables 
here and return to controls in the next section.  
 
The first panel of Table 1 covers innovation variables. Depending on the variable 
selected, between 25-30% of firms in the sample engaged in some kind of product or 
process innovation (for example, 31.4% of firms introduced a major new product or 
service). Just over 36% of firms are ‘gazelles’, and as expected, fewer firms were able to 
successfully commercialise new ideas (less than half the number who innovated around 
products or processes). The first panel also shows, for a subset of firms, the share of 
company turnover from new products and processes during that year. As only a minority of 
respondents answered this question we reserve it for robustness checks.   
 
                                               
58
 We use the definition of KIBS from Wood (2006). The mix of 3 and 4-digit SIC sectors includes financial 
intermediation, insurance and pension funding, auxiliary financial activities, real estate, legal, accountancy, 
hardware / software consultancy, data processing / database activities, advertising, market research, 
business / management consulting, architecture and engineering, technical testing, research and 
development. 
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The second panel covers diversity variables, and reflect London’s rich people mix. 
Over 39% of firms have at least one migrant owner / partner: 18% are ‘migrant diverse’, 
with a mix of UK-born and migrants, and 21.3% are ‘migrant firms’ with all migrant owners 
/ partners. Looked at it another way, of the firms with at least one migrant owner / partner, 
53% are migrant-run. Around 21% of firms are ‘ethnic diverse’, i.e. have at least half 
owners/partners from minority ethnic communities.  
 
The third panel shows that are 3594 ‘knowledge-intensive’ firms, around 48% of 
the sample. The smaller set of KIBS firms make up 19% of the sample. Table 2 expands 
on this, breaking down levels of innovation by firm type. In the first instance we divide firms 
into knowledge intensive and non-knowledge intensive groups, following the OECD 
definitions above.  As expected, in almost all cases knowledge intensive firms are more 
likely than average (and non-knowledge intensive firms) to engage in innovative activity, 
and more likely to successfully commercialise their ideas. On this basis, innovation in 
London’s firms is more likely to be ‘important’ than ‘ordinary’.  
 
We then disaggregate knowledge-intensive firms into the subset of KIBS firms. 
KIBS firms are also more likely than average to engage in product innovation (although not 
process innovation) and to commercialise innovations. Interestingly, KIBS firms are slightly 
less likely to innovate than the set of knowledge-intensive firms. However, they are slightly 
more likely to successfully commercialise their innovations.   
 
 
5. Estimation strategy  
 
The descriptive analysis shows that London’s cosmopolitan population is matched by a 
diverse workforce, and indicates sectoral differences in innovative activity. Our data allows 
us to explore links between firms’ characteristics, their innovative activity and the 
commercialisation of innovations.  
 
We develop a simplified firm-level knowledge production function (KPF), linking the 
probability of innovative activity occurring to a diversity measure, firm-level controls, and 
sector, industry and year effects. Widely used to measure the innovative capacity of 
nations and regions (Griliches, 1979, Cooke et al., 1997) the KPF approach makes 
intuitive sense at firm level, where a range of business inputs (human and physical capital) 
are put to work generating new products and processes (innovations); these processes 
being influenced by other firm-level characteristics (age, size, sector and so on).  
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For firm i in year t, we estimate:  
 
Pr(Yit = 1) = aDIVit + CONTROLSitb + SECTORi + YEARt + ei         (1) 
 
Where Y is variously one of our measures of ideas generation or commercialisation, as 
described above; DIV is the variable of interest, and covers whether firms are migrant 
diverse, ethnic diverse or migrant-only. CONTROLS represents a set of control variables. 
SECTOR and YEAR are dummies for SIC3 sectors and years, respectively 
 
Controls draw on the literature on firm-level innovation: descriptives are provided in 
the third panel of Table 1.  Levels and types of workforce diversity and innovation are likely 
to vary by sector (Glaeser, 2005). Diversity-innovation ‘effects’ may therefore simply reflect 
sectoral specificities, particularly in the knowledge-intensive services which dominate high-
value activity in the London economy. These issues are dealt with via sectoral fixed 
effects, and an additional dummy which takes the value one if a firm is part of the 
knowledge-intensive business services subsector (KIBS).  
 
Apparent diversity-innovation relationships may also be generated through firm age 
and/or size. For example, large or established firms often generate large amounts of 
patent activity, but small, often new firms may introduce disruptive innovations (Griffith et 
al., 2006).  By default of having larger workforces, bigger firms may also have more 
diverse teams; but younger firms may be more likely to have diverse or migrant/minority 
managers. Following initial diagnostics, we fit the log of age, and the log and log squared 
of firm size. We also fit a dummy for company type: firms that are Public Limited 
Companies (PLCs) may be more innovative since they need to satisfy shareholder value.  
 
We complete the model with dummies for exports, collaborative activity and R&D 
spending, plus further controls for human capital and management ability. There is an 
established literature on ‘open innovation’ and collaboration (Von Hippel, 2005); the role of 
human capital and R&D in innovation is well established (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). 
Each of these factors may influence firm-level diversity as well. Companies that export or 
collaborate internationally may actively seek to hire diverse workforces. Equally, firms 
engaging in R&D may be more diverse if, as some evidence suggests, particularly ethnic 
groups dominate categories of skilled research activity (Stephan and Levin, 2001).  
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Unfortunately LABS has no information on workforce human capital (such as the 
share of a firm’s employees with higher educational qualifications).59 However, the survey 
provides detailed information on management experience and qualifications (shares of 
firms’ managers with previous experience, formal qualifications, on-the-job training or with 
completed in-work management courses). We fit all four as controls for management 
ability.60 All should be positively correlated with innovative activity.  
 
We estimate the model as a conditional logit. This estimator allows data to be 
grouped by sector, so better handles sector-specific, time-invariant effects. All 
specifications use HAC standard errors clustered on SIC3 sector.  
 
5.1 Identification challenges 
 
As noted earlier, using London-only data may limit external validity – an issue we 
return to at the end of the paper. There are also several internal validity challenges. First, 
an apparent diversity effect might turn out to be something else, such as human capital or 
sectoral characteristics. We deal with this through careful model specification (in these two 
instances, four distinct human capital controls and a complete set of three-digit sectoral 
dummies). Second, an external economic shock might cause levels of diversity and 
innovative activity to rise at the same time. The natural experiment conditions reduce the 
risk of simultaneity and positive selection at city level, a common problem in studying the 
local economic effects of migration and diversity (Borjas, 1994).61 
 
Two further issues are harder to deal with. Although city-level positive selection is 
minimised by the choice of years, individual migrant and minority owners/partners may still 
be positively or negatively selected (see section 3). There also is potentially both-ways 
causation at firm level: current innovative activity influence workforce characteristics (if 
more successful firms attract or recruit a more diverse workforce). For the first of these we 
conduct separate robustness tests, using a subset of company founders. In the second 
case we use shift-share instruments to check causality. See section 8 for further details. 
                                               
59
 We experiment with a crude proxy by interacting the number of employees in the firm with the relevant 
industry-level share of graduates, assuming that bigger firms of a given industry type will employ a larger 
number of skilled workers. F-tests suggest the control makes little difference to overall model performance, 
so we exclude it from the final specification.   
60
 Controls pass Wald and LR tests of joint significance. We also experiment with an index of management 
ability using principal components analysis. The Index has a strong positive relationship with innovative 
activity; however, for easier interpretation we prefer to use separate controls. 
61
 If migrants choose to live in cities with the best economic performance, measures of economic success 
(such as innovation) might be correlated with higher diversity, even though the latter may have no causal 
effect. By choosing a period where London’s diversity was largely set by exogenous policy factors, we 
minimise this risk. However, we cannot fully eliminate the risk that deeper structural factors may 
simultaneously influence both diversity and economic performance (such as London’s historic position as a 
large and cosmopolitan milieu).  
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6. Main results  
 
The main results of the analysis are set out in Tables 3 – 10. Tables 3-8 inclusive present 
the main diversity findings, focusing on migrant diverse, ethnic diverse and migrant firms. 
Column (1) presents the results for diversity measures alone, column (2) adds controls. 
Tables 9 and 10 investigate quality of innovation, looking at knowledge intensive and non-
knowledge intensive firms. For ease of interpretation coefficients are given in odds ratios, 
which are the exponentials of the raw coefficients. Odds ratios above one indicate a 
positive association with the dependent variable, odds ratios below one a negative link.  
 
The model generally performs well.62 Tests suggest the model is generally well-
specified, and collinearity is not an issue (mean VIF is about 1). Controls are of the 
expected sign, magnitude and significance. As expected, collaborative activity, R&D 
spending and management ability all appear to play important roles in explaining 
innovative activity. In line with the discussion above, firms in KIBS sectors are more likely 
to engage in innovation. While firm size is usually positive significant, the square of firm 
size has a slight negative association – suggesting size effects on innovation fall away in 
the largest organisations.   
 
6.1 Results for innovation and commercialisation  
 
Tables 3 and 4 look at the association between firm diversity and the adoption of 
new products / processes. We fit dummies for migrant diverse and migrant firms together, 
with UK firms as the reference category. In all cases, and as suggested by the literature, 
firms’ ownership diversity has a small, significant link to innovative activity. However, there 
are differences between product and process innovations.  
 
 Table 3 focuses on product innovation. For new goods and services, the odds ratio 
of migrant diversity is 1.528 (column 1), falling to 1.238 when controls are added (column 
2). Both are significant at 1%. We interpret the latter result as suggesting that relative to 
firms with no migrant owners/partners, the odds of introducing a new product or service 
are about 1.24 times higher for diverse firms. Note that this specification also controls for 
the effect of having an all-migrant ‘top team’ of owners/partners, so identifies the diversity 
effect precisely. For modifications to the product / service line, there is a slightly smaller 
and weaker effect of diversity: with controls, the odds ratio is 1.192, significant at 5%. This 
                                               
62
 The numbers of observations differs slightly according in each specification. This is because the clogit 
command normally drops observations that perfectly predict success or failure. These have coefficients of 
+/- infinity: dropping them has no effect on estimates of other coefficients, and increases the stability of the 
estimation process. Some observations are always dropped, so n is always less than 7,615. However, the 
number dropped never exceeds 4.8% of the total sample.  
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translates to relative odds 1.19 times higher for diverse firms, controlling for other firm 
characteristics. The effects of having all-migrant owners / partners are generally weaker: 
although for modified products or services, the odds ratio is 1.182, significant at 5%.  
 
 Table 4 looks at process innovation. Here, all-migrant top teams appear to play a 
more important role than in product innovation. For new equipment, migrant firms are 
around 1.19 times more likely to innovate holding other characteristics constant; for new 
ways of working the odds ratio for migrant firms is 1.164. By contrast, the odds ratio of 
migrant diverse firms is significant when fitted alone, but not with controls.  
 
Tables 5 and 6 shift the focus to commercialisation of product and process 
innovations. We find positive associations between firm diversity and commercialisation 
activity. Compared to the earlier results, very few of the diversity variables have a 
significant link to the commercialisation of new ideas once controls are included. For both 
product and process innovation, none of the coefficients of DIV are significant, and in the 
case of migrant firms are generally close to zero. While the diversity of London firms is 
strongly linked to new products and processes, then, it plays less of a role in successfully 
taking these ideas to market. 
 
6.2 Basic robustness checks    
 
 We run a number of basic checks at this stage. None challenge our overall findings 
so far. First, initial diagnostics suggest a small number of outlier firms: removing the 
outliers makes little difference to the results. We also experiment with interacting diversity 
measures on the most powerful controls, collaboration and R&D activity: none of the 
interactions is significant.  
 
Second, we change the diversity variable: Table 7 presents results for ethnic 
diverse firms. These confirm the broad pattern of the previous results, suggesting that 
cultural diversity has a salient effect irrespective of the identity base selected. The first 
panel looks at innovation: ethnic diverse firms have a positive relationship with levels of 
innovative activity. Odds ratios of DIV are significant at 5% in all models except modified 
products and services. The second panel looks at commercialisation. By contrast with the 
main results, ethnic diversity has some significant links to the successful exploitation of 
new processes: for commercialising new ways of working, firms with at least half minority 
ethnic owners/partners are 1.29 times more likely to have introduced new ways of working 
– and raised annual revenue by at least 10%.  
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Third, because our main commercialisation measures are less than perfect, we 
cross-check our headlines on a sub-sample of firms who gave information on the share of 
turnover derived from innovative activity. We fit the main model in OLS with year and 
industry dummies. Results are given in Table 8, columns 1 and 4: they back up our main 
findings, suggesting a positive link between firm diversity and commercialisation. However, 
coefficients are not precisely estimated and none is significant.  
 
6.3 Innovation and commercialisation in different company types  
 
We now turn to innovative activities by different types of firms. We focus on 
differences between ‘knowledge-intensive’ firms (such as architecture and financial 
services) and less knowledge-intensive firms (such as retail or personal services). The 
descriptive analysis suggests that knowledge-intensive businesses are more likely to 
innovate than both the average firm and less ‘knowledge-driven’ firms (Table 2). We also 
suggest that the knowledge-intensive firms are – broadly – more likely to engage in high 
value-added innovations, and less knowledge-driven firms in ‘ordinary’ innovations.   
 
 Tables 9 and 10 look at innovative activity across our two firm types.63  In each 
case, column one fits a dummy for knowledge-intensive firms; column 2 fits interactions 
with migrant diverse and migrant firms. 
 
Table 9 looks at product innovation. For introducing major new products and 
services, there is no significant effect of all-migrant top teams on the average firm. But 
knowledge-intensive migrant firms are 1.31 times more likely than other migrant firms to 
introduce new products / services (column 2), and this effect is significant at 1%.  
 
For the other innovation measures, we find significant diversity effects in less 
knowledge-intensive firms. For modifications to the product / service line, for example, we 
find positive significant effects of both diverse and migrant firms and no significant effect of 
knowledge-intensive firms. However, firms that are both knowledge intensive and have 
diverse owners / partners are significantly less likely to innovate (column 2). The positive 
diversity effect is driven by less knowledge-intensive businesses. 
 
We find similar results for process innovation measures, which are given in Table 
10. The results imply that diverse top teams in less knowledge-intensive firms are more 
                                               
63
 Our knowledge-intensity typology is operationalised at SIC2 and SIC3 level, so models presented here 
run with industry fixed effects at SIC1 level. This does not substantively affect our main results. 
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likely to invest in major new equipment, and more likely to introduce new ways of working. 
Both effects are significant at 5%.  
 
We repeat the analysis with commercialisation measures, but as in the main results 
find no significant effects of either diversity measure. We also cross check using ethnic 
diversity measures. The only significant results are for new products / services. Ethnic 
diversity is positively and significantly linked to innovation; while knowledge-intensive 
businesses as a whole show no significant link, knowledge-intensive and ethnically diverse 
firms are 1.425 times more likely to innovate (significant at 5%).  
 
Finally, we take a closer look within the set of knowledge-intensive firms. 
Specifically, we pool the sample and re-run model (1), adding in dummies each of the six 
OECD categories of knowledge-intensive business (high-tech services, management 
services, financial services, other knowledge-intensive services, high-tech manufacturing 
and medium-tech manufacturing). We also fit interaction terms for diverse firms and 
migrant firms with each category of knowledge-intensive business. Coefficients for 
knowledge firms are interpreted relative to less knowledge-intensive firms, who comprise 
the rest of the sample.   
 
Results are given in Tables 11 and 12. As suggested in the descriptive analysis, in 
most cases knowledge-intensive firms are more likely to innovate than less knowledge-
intensive businesses. Coefficients of diversity variables are also generally positive 
significant, relative to UK-run firms. The interaction terms indicate a complex set of 
diversity-innovation interactions in the different types of knowledge-intensive businesses.  
 
For example, migrant-run knowledge-intensive firms are generally more likely to 
introduce major new products / services than their UK-run counterparts; these effects are 
significant for high-tech services, management services and high-tech manufacturing 
(table 11). By contrast, in financial services there is a positive significant effect for diverse 
firms over UK-run firms, but migrant-run financial services firms are less likely to innovate. 
Almost all types of knowledge-intensive firm are more likely to introduce major new 
equipment than less knowledge-based businesses (Table 12). While diverse firms are also 
more likely to innovate, most diverse knowledge-intensive firms are less likely to invest in 
new equipment. There is no significant effect of migrant-run firms overall, but a much more 
mixed picture for migrant firms within the knowledge-intensive sector.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that contra the wider literature, diversity and migrant 
firm effects in London operate across all types of firms, not just knowledge-intensive firms. 
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It also suggests differences between ownership composition effects both between 
knowledge-intensive firms and their less knowledge-intensive counterparts, but also within 
the set of knowledge-intensive businesses. If our simple division of innovation quality is 
correct, moreover, our results suggest that the ‘diversity bonus’ in London firms contributes 
at least as much to ‘ordinary’ innovations than to high value-added activity. 
 
 
7. Market orientation 
 
The previous section examined some of the channels through which diversity-innovation 
effects might operate – configurations of management teams and the importance of 
knowledge intensive activity. This section extends the analysis to look at firms’ market 
orientation. It is useful to know whether there is any significant difference between the 
markets served by diverse firms and those served by other firms in the sample. If diverse 
firms are particularly geared towards very local markets, this implies that London’s large 
and diverse consumer economy is part of the diversity effect. Conversely, if diverse firms 
are more internationally orientated, the combination of diaspora networks and London’s 
connectivity may be more important.  
 
LABS provides information on market orientation at various levels.64 We use this to 
break down a firm’s market share into three parts: the share of sales within London, share 
of sales within the rest of the UK and share of sales to the rest of the world. The fourth 
panel of Table 2 provides some brief descriptives. We can see that overall, firms in the 
sample are very much orientated towards markets in London, which account for nearly 
three quarters of sales. By contrast, markets outside the UK account for just over six per 
cent of sales.  
 
To establish whether firms’ cultural diversity has any influence on markets served, 
we estimate a simple model:  
 
Yit = a + bDIVit + CONTROLSitc + SECTORi + YEARt + ei   (2) 
 
Where Y is one of our sales share measures, DIV is one of our diversity measures and 
CONTROLS is our previous vector of controls (firm age, firm size and its square, dummies 
for exporting, PPLC status, collaboration and R&D spending, plus the four management 
ability measures, year and SIC3 dummies).  
 
                                               
64
 Although not all firms answer these questions, so n is slightly smaller for these regressions.  
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We fit the model as seemingly unrelated regressions, which provide some 
efficiency gains from OLS.65 Results are given in Table 13. The first panel looks at migrant 
diverse and migrant firms relative to UK firms (the reference category). As expected given 
the descriptives, we find a positive link between both types of firm and local sales, 
although neither is significant.  
 
By contrast, we find strongly significant negative relationships with national market 
orientation, and strongly positive links to international sales. For the latter, the coefficient of 
diverse firms is 2.318, significant at 5%, and for migrant firms 2.410, significant at 1%. 
These translate respectively into 2.3 and 2.4 percentage point differences in sales shares. 
Firms with some or all migrant owners/partners are thus significantly more likely than UK-
run firms to sell into international markets, and less likely to operate in the rest of Britain.   
 
The second panel of the table gives results for ethnic diverse firms. These are 
strikingly different to results for the first panel. Ethnic diverse firms have local sales shares 
nearly 6.5 percentage points higher than more ethnically homogenous firms, a difference 
significant at 1%. There is no significant difference in international sales shares. But as 
with migrant diversity measures, ethnic diverse firms are also significantly less plugged 
into UK markets than more homogenous firms, with over 5.7 percentage points fewer 
sales (significant at 1%).   
 
The results suggest the market orientation of diverse and migrant firms in London 
is markedly different from UK-run or ethnically homogenous companies. For ethnically 
diverse firms, the capital’s large and cosmopolitan home markets are an important source 
of revenue. For firms with migrant owners and partners, international markets matter, 
suggesting that diasporic effects (and connectivity) are in play. For both types of firms, 
London’s home markets and international accessibility play bigger roles in sales than 
markets in the rest of the UK. 
 
 
8. Robustness checks  
 
Our analysis may be affected by endogeneity problems at individual, firm and city level. As 
discussed above, city-level positive selection is minimised by our choice of sample years, 
                                               
65
 Specifically, the Breusch-Pagan test of error independence always gives a test statistic of over 2800. 
The null hypothesis is that standard errors in the three equations are not correlated. We therefore reject 
the null. The size of the test statistic suggests that error correlation is substantial, and SUR provides 
corresponding efficiency gains. As a cross-check we also run the model in OLS, with broadly similar 
results but substantially higher standard errors.   
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which are bracketed by an exogenous diversity shock. Individual and firm-level challenges 
remain. We take each in turn.  
 
8.1 Individual selection bias  
 
We need to check how far individual-level factors explain estimates of apparent 
diversity effects. Migrant and minority ethnic owners / partners may be highly 
‘entrepreneurial’, and more likely than the average worker to develop new ideas and/or 
start new firms. Conversely, ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ may be forced into starting their own 
businesses through exclusion from other economic institutions (Gordon, 2001). Positive 
selection of entrepreneurial individuals may explain the links between diversity and 
innovation. If this entirely accounts for diversity-innovation effects, coefficients of DIV will 
be biased upwards. By contrast, negative selection may explain the lack of connection 
between diversity and measures of commercialisation. If migrant and minority 
owners/partners face discrimination in marketing new ideas, estimates of DIV are biased 
downwards.  
 
We partly deal with this by including controls for management ability. However, 
‘talent’ is not fully observed via courses and qualifications. We therefore develop further 
robustness checks, focusing on reasons for firm formation. LABS allows us to identify 
respondents directly involved in founding each firm, and their motivation for doing so. We 
can observe some migrant founders by identifying firms where both the respondent is a 
founder, and all owners/partners are non-UK born.66 We identify the share of founders who 
set up firms for reasons roughly corresponding to ‘entrepreneurial’ behaviour (e.g. ‘I 
wanted to start my own business’), and for reasons that may reflect exclusion (e.g. ‘I found 
it hard to get work’).67 We then construct dummies for ‘entrepreneurial founders’, ‘locked 
out founders’ and ‘other founders’, by country of birth.68  
 
The final panel of Table 2 gives descriptives. 54% of all respondents were involved 
in firm formation; migrant founders comprise 12.2% of the sample, and 22.6% of all 
founders. Compared to founders as a whole, a higher share of migrant founders appears 
                                               
66
 We are unable to observe all migrant founders in this way (e.g. migrant founders of firms with a mixed 
management team are excluded). We are also unable to identify minority ethnic company founders.  
67
 Specifically, we select the three most common ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘excluded’ reasons for firm 
formation. For the former, these are ‘I wanted to start my own business’ (q14_2), ‘I wanted a new 
challenge’ (q14_5), ‘I wanted to be my own boss’ (q15_12). For the latter, these are ‘I was made 
redundant’ (q14_3), ‘I found it hard to get work’ (q14_10) and ‘My old business collapsed’ (q14_23).  We 
exclude around 8% of respondents gave multiple answers covering more than one of these categories.  
68
 This approach is the best use of available data, although it is open to challenge. Our measures of 
‘attitude’ are imperfect and involve some subjective judgement. More seriously, survey answers are likely 
to exaggerate positive reasons for firm formation, while playing down negative reasons. So the results are 
likely to overstate positive selection and understate negative selection.  
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to have founded the firm for entrepreneurial reasons (30.4% vs. 27.6%), with a lower share 
locked out (8.1% vs. 9.9%).69  
 
We then run two checks. First, we regress reasons for firm formation on migrant 
status, management ability and migrant-ability interaction terms. We estimate the model as 
a conditional logit with year and SIC3 dummies. Results are given in Table 14. Being a 
migrant raises the possibility of entrepreneurially-motivated firm formation; migrant status 
has no significant link to ‘locked out’ motivations, and has a marginally significant link to 
other motivations. This suggests some role for positive selection via migrant 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Second, we test whether entrepreneurial or locked out migrant founders affects 
firm-level innovation. To do this, we simply substitute these variables for DIV in equation 
(1), with ‘other founders’ as the reference category. In contrast with the full panel, the only 
significant result is for commercialising major new products or services, where 
entrepreneurial migrant founders are 0.556 times less likely to successfully commercialise 
their innovation. However, this result is only marginally significant.  
 
Overall, these results suggest that positive selection of individual migrants plays 
some role in firm formation. This is a useful finding in itself, as it still suggests that the 
positive selection of the migrants who come to London is economically beneficial. 
However, this kind of ethnic entrepreneurship is not strong enough to explain our findings. 
Rather, a combination of individual, firm-level and urban-level diversity-innovation effects 
seem to be operating in London.  
 
8.2 Firm-level endogeneity issues  
 
Our model in equation (1) may be affected by reverse and/or both-ways causation. 
If firm-level diversity facilitates innovation, innovative firms may also seek out or attract a 
more diverse workforce. In this instance, coefficients of DIV are likely to be biased 
upwards.70 To assess the extent of this problem we use an instrumental variables 
approach. Suitable instruments are not easy to find: as our sample is a repeat cross-
section we are unable to use lagged data, and matching firms in LABS with other firm-level 
microdata would be extremely complex.  
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 Pearson tests, not reported here, suggest significant correlations between being an entrepreneurial 
founder and being a migrant; there is also a significant link between lockout and migrant status. 
70
 Downwards bias may arise if less innovative firms have fewer opportunities to recruit from the 
mainstream labour market and recruit individuals – such as those from ethnic minorities or migrant groups 
– who face discrimination in the wider labour market. Evidence from the literature suggests this is less 
likely than upwards bias, which we take as our main endogeneity problem at firm level. 
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We examine two main candidates for potential instruments. First, migrants tend to 
cluster in certain industries (Green, 2008) so that migrant-intensive sectoral characteristics 
might form the basis of an instrumentation strategy.  We test a number of shift-share 
instruments based on historic sectoral characteristics – however, these fail first stage tests 
(largely because sectoral properties may also influence innovative activity).71 
 
Second, migrants and minority ethnic groups tend to cluster in certain urban 
neighbourhoods, and this may influence the pool of workers from which a firm recruits: 
historic location patterns have been used elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Altonji and Card 
(1991), Card (2005), Ottaviano and Peri (2006)). We develop a very simple instrument, 
which we deploy for the 2007 cross-section. For migrant firms and ethnic diverse firms in a 
given borough, we substitute firm-level DIV with historic borough-level migrant and 
minority population shares.  
 
For firm i in borough j and year t, the instrument takes the form:  
 
 pDIVijt = DIVjtb                         (3) 
  
In this case, t is 2007 and tb is 2001, with historic diversity data drawn from the 
100% sample provided by the 2001 UK Census. To instrument migrant firms we use the 
proportion of the borough population who were not born in the UK. To instrument ethnic 
diverse firms we use the proportion of the population of the borough in which the firm is 
located, who are not of white ethnicity in 2001. 
 
For migrant diverse firms we need a slightly different approach, and use a 
fractionalisation index of 14 country of birth zones as our instrument. Specifically:   
 
pDIVijt = 1 – ∑a [SHAREajtb]2                      (4) 
 
Where a is one of our country of birth zones.72 As before, we are using information from a 
firm’s borough, j, to instrument the firm i. 
 
                                               
71
 These are: (1) a shift-share instrument based on Ottaviano and Peri (2006) which generates predicted 
ethnic / migrant shares in particular sectors based on 2003 data and changes in London's population over 
the period 2003-2007, (2) an interaction term between borough level diversity in 2001 and diversity at the 
firm or sectoral level, and (3) by collapsing the data to sector / borough averages for 2007 and using the 
lagged values for sector / borough diversity in 2003.  
72
 These are taken from 2001 Census categories and comprise Great Britain, Ireland, Isle of Man, rest of 
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Africa, Middle East, Far East, South Asia, North America, South 
America, Oceania, rest of the world. 
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Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009) we estimate in 2SLS with robust standard 
errors to obtain consistent estimates. Table 15 gives first stage results for the instruments. 
Fitted together, the instruments for migrant and migrant diverse firms perform badly. Model 
R2 is extremely low, as is the first-stage F-statistic in one case. More worryingly, both 
instruments fail weak instrument and under-identification tests. We therefore do not report 
second-stage results. The instrument for ethnic diverse firms does rather better. First 
stage R2 is again very low, but F-statistics and other instrument tests are satisfactory.  
 
Table 16 gives second-stage results for ethnic diverse firms.73 Coefficients of DIV 
are always positive but most of the significant results from the main regressions are not 
replicated here. There are three exceptions: introducing new ways of working and 
commercialising new ways of working (significant at 5%) and commercialising new 
equipment (significant at 10%). In these three cases coefficients of DIV are also 
substantially bigger than in the main regressions.    
 
 These results only give us a partial view on firm-level endogeneity. What we have 
suggests that simultaneity and/or reverse causation is indeed present at the firm level, but 
the findings subject to heavy caveats regarding the validity of the instrument. In particular, 
we lose a great deal of precision by instrumenting dummies with continuous variables, and 
are only able to use the instrument on a single cross-section.74 More seriously, while our 
instruments arguably meet the exclusion restrictions it is less clear they meet relevance 
conditions, as expressed by the low R2 scores in the first and second stages. The cautious 
conclusion is that simultaneity is likely to be present, and given that this will bias DIV 
upwards, the main results are interpreted as upper bounds not point estimates.  
 
 
9. Discussion  
 
This paper investigates whether culturally diverse firms in London are more innovative, 
and so whether this cultural diversity is an economic asset to the city, in terms of its impact 
on innovation. The analysis focuses on the role of migrant and minority business owners / 
partners, using a survey of over 7,600 firms in 2005-7. This period coincided with a 
significant increase in London’s diversity via A8 accession, providing an ideal opportunity 
                                               
73
 Results are shown with SIC3 dummies partialled out, in order to achieve a robust variance-covariance 
matrix with some singleton dummies. We also fit the model without partialling, giving very similar 
coefficient estimates and rather bigger model R2 and F-statistics.  
74
 We experiment with various workarounds. We also constructed a synthetic panel at sector/borough 
level, following the approach of Angrist (1991) and Deaton (1985). In practice finding a suitable grouping 
variable proved difficult, and the final panel was not stable enough to provide reliable results.  
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to examine potential diversity-innovation links. As far as we are aware, this is the first 
research to look at cultural diversity and innovation in firms in an urban context. 
 
We find some evidence to suggest that diverse firms are more innovative. There 
are small but robust effects of management team diversity on the development and 
implementation of new products and processes, and of migrant-run firms on process 
innovation, relative to UK-run firms. However, there is little connection between diversity 
and the successful commercialisation of new ideas.  
 
In contrast to other studies that suggest diversity effects are restricted to 
knowledge-intensive environments, we find diversity-innovation effects across London’s 
industrial structure. In three out of four innovation measures, diversity effects were driven 
by less knowledge-intensive firms. In turn, this suggests that the ‘diversity bonus’ in 
London firms often manifests itself as much in ‘ordinary’ innovations than in high value-
added activities.  
 
Compared to more homogenous firms, diverse businesses are more orientated 
towards London’s large and diverse home markets (for ethnic diverse firms) and markets 
in the rest of the world (migrant firms).  The talents and skills of migrant entrepreneurs 
explain part of our findings, but London’s diasporic communities, home markets and 
international connectivity also play important roles through different aspects of diversity. 
 
There are some important caveats to our findings. First, we use relatively noisy 
measures of ‘cultural diversity’ that arguably understate the true richness of the capital’s 
people mix. Future research using richer measures of diversity (particularly at individual 
level) would be welcome. Second, although we are able to control for several endogeneity 
issues, we are unable to fully deal with potential firm-level simultaneity in our results. 
Simultaneity is likely to bias DIV upwards, so caution suggests that results are interpreted 
as upper bounds rather than point estimates.  
 
We explain the gap between the innovation and commercialisation results as 
follows. One explanation is simply that diverse firms produce new ideas that tend to fail in 
the marketplace. A more plausible answer is that the measure of commercialisation is too 
restrictive to capture the benefits of innovation. Many new ideas take time to successfully 
commercialise, particularly for knowledge-based firms where idea-market-revenue lags 
may run to several years. Given London’s knowledge-focused industrial structure, this may 
explain some of the gap. Further research using alternative measures of 
commercialisation might deliver different results. Better data on London firms, ideally a 
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true panel, would also help to resolve this question. A third explanation is that diverse firms 
face difficulties bringing their products to market. That suggests potential co-ordination 
failures around business support, access to finance and workforce development. The GLA 
and the London Skills Board could usefully investigate these issues further, through 
sectoral and/or case study based research.  
 
Overall, the results can be seen as providing support for claims that London’s 
cultural diversity helps support innovative activity, and thus helps strengthen the capital’s 
long-term economic position. In other words, London’s diversity is an economic asset, not 
just a social one.  
 
For London firms, London’s diversity seems unambiguously positive. For 
Londoners as a whole, the impacts are less clear. For example, assume firms have a 
limited budget for staff. If firms alter hiring decisions to increase the diversity of teams, 
those workers who would previously have been hired are ‘losers’ – even though the firm 
(and the wider economy) may gain from the resulting externalities (Borjas, 2011). The 
objection to this argument is that it implies losers cannot get equally or better-paid jobs 
elsewhere. If losers have low skills or very specialised skills, they may move directly to 
lower-value employment or unemployment. However, in a large urban economy their 
chances of finding other work are maximised.75  
 
It is also less clear whether our results generalise to different cities. In theory, we 
might find similar results for firms in other large UK cities. But London’s size, economic 
structure and demography are unique, and we should be careful in applying these findings. 
Intuitively, our findings are likely to be replicated in other big British cities – such as 
Liverpool, Manchester, Glasgow or Birmingham – but diversity-innovation effects may be 
smaller, or driven by other channels. Further research is needed on a comparative urban 
scale to establish the wider potential benefits of urban diversity. 
                                               
75
 Borjas uses the example of US mathematicians displaced from academia by arrivals from the former 
Soviet Union. In practice, as Borjas suggests, many of these ‘losers’ have moved into far better-paid jobs 
in merchant banks and hedge funds.   
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Variable N Mean SD Min Max 
      
Firm introduces major new products or services 7615 0.314 0.464 0 1 
Major modifications to product / service range 7615 0.261 0.439 0 1 
Major new equipment 7615 0.228 0.42 0 1 
Major new working methods 7615 0.258 0.437 0 1 
‘Gazelle', annual revenue grows >=10% 7615 0.364 0.481 0 1 
Gazelle, major new products or services 7615 0.13 0.336 0 1 
Gazelle, sig. modifies products or services 7615 0.109 0.312 0 1 
Gazelle, major new equipment 7615 0.096 0.294 0 1 
Gazelle, major new ways of working 7615 0.107 0.308 0 1 
% turnover from 'innovations' in last 12 months 2552 20.515 21.705 0 100 
      
Firm has zero migrant owners / partners 7615 0.598 0.49 0 1 
Firm has all migrant owners/partners 7615 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Firm has some migrant owners / partners 7615 0.18 0.384 0 1 
Of which migrant-run firm  3058 0.53 0.499 0 1 
Firm has at least half minority ethnic owners/partners 7615 0.214 0.41 0 1 
      
Company age 7615 16.011 21.415 2 307 
Number of employees 7615 22.49 63.82 1 1700 
Firm collaborates with others 7615 0.299 0.458 0 1 
Firm does R&D 7615 0.337 0.473 0 1 
Firm exports 7615 0.213 0.409 0 1 
Firm is PLC 7615 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Knowledge-intensive firm (OECD definition)  7615 0.472 0.499 0 1 
Less knowledge-intensive firm (OECD definition) 7615 0.528 0.499 0 1 
Knowledge-intensive business services firm 7615 0.19 0.392 0 1 
% managers with management qualification 7603 0.307 0.699 0 1 
% who've completed management course 7577 0.394 0.812 0 1 
% with informal/on-job management training 7591 0.573 0.834 0 1 
% with prior management experience 7593 0.565 0.708 0 1 
      
% sales in London 7164 74.437 33.193 0 100 
% sales in rest of UK 7164 19.035 27.37 0 100 
% sales in rest of world 7164 6.533 19.021 0 100 
      
Respondent is a/the founder of the firm 6952 0.540 0.498 0 1 
Respondent is migrant and a/the founder of firm 6952 0.122 0.328 0 1 
Founder, 'entrepreneurial' reason for starting firm 3752 0.276 0.447 0 1 
Founder, 'locked out' reason for starting firm 3752 0.099 0.299 0 1 
Founder, other reasons for founding firm 3752 0.624 0.484 0 1 
Migrant, 'entrepreneurial' reasons for starting firm 851 0.304 0.460 0 1 
Migrant, 'locked out' reasons for starting firm 851 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Migrant, other reasons for starting firm 851 0.615 0.487 0 1 
      
 Source: LABS.  
Notes: Not all firms answered all questions. Missing observations on % turnover from innovations,  
management qualifications and experience, firm founders. 
Table 1. Summary statistics. 
  
199 
Table 2. Innovative activity by firm type, 2005-7.  
 
Firm type  major new product / service modified product / service major new equipment new way of working 
     
All firms 0.304 0.257 0.257 0.257 
Non-knowledge intensive  0.292 0.23 0.221 0.239 
Knowledge intensive 0.317 0.288 0.228 0.266 
KIBS 0.306 0.284 0.184 0.249 
     
          
  
commercialised new 
product / service 
commercialised modified 
product / service 
commercialised new 
equipment 
commercialised new way of 
working 
     
All firms 0.127 0.107 0.094 0.105 
Non-knowledge intensive  0.107 0.085 0.089 0.089 
Knowledge intensive 0.149 0.132 0.098 0.123 
KIBS 0.159 0.135 0.09 0.121 
     
Source: LABS.
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Table 3. Results for firms introducing major new / modified products or services: 
effects of business diversity, 2005-7. 
 
 
Dependent variable New product/service Modified product/service 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
  
  
Migrant diverse firm  1.528*** 1.238*** 1.434*** 1.192** 
 (0.113) (0.084) (0.131) (0.097) 
     
Migrant firm 1.050 1.134 1.123 1.182** 
 (0.077) (0.087) (0.109) (0.095) 
     
ln(firm age)  0.842***  0.898*** 
  (0.033)  (0.031) 
     
ln(number of employees)  1.441***  1.299*** 
  (0.128)  (0.110) 
     
ln(employees2)   0.961**  0.974* 
  (0.015)  (0.015) 
     
firm collaborates  1.835***  1.646*** 
  (0.133)  (0.104) 
     
firm does R&D  2.625***  2.094*** 
  (0.174)  (0.135) 
     
firm exports  1.074  1.018 
  (0.083)  (0.080) 
     
firm is plc  1.638**  1.216 
  (0.329)  (0.150) 
     
% qualified managers  0.998  1.219** 
  (0.141)  (0.119) 
     
% management course  1.133  1.425*** 
  (0.176)  (0.128) 
     
% management training  1.020  1.232** 
  (0.181)  (0.106) 
     
% management experience  0.935  1.071 
  (0.146)  (0.069) 
     
KIBS  2.466***  2.335** 
  (0.823)  (0.977) 
     
Observations 7529 7476 7510 7457 
Pseudo R2 0.005 0.088 0.004 0.071 
Log-Likelihood -4234.763 -3854.844 -3969.129 -3678.762 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Results are odds ratios. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications 
include year and SIC3 dummies: some obs dropped because of perfect prediction groups. * = 
significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 4. Results for firms introducing major new equipment / new ways of 
working: effects of business diversity, 2005-7. 
 
 
Dependent variable New equipment New way of working 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Migrant diverse firm  1.341** 1.128 1.385*** 1.158 
 (0.170) (0.117) (0.158) (0.110) 
     
Migrant firm 1.129 1.188** 1.101 1.164** 
 (0.113) (0.101) (0.096) (0.089) 
     
ln(firm age)  0.988  0.908*** 
  (0.031)  (0.031) 
     
ln(number of employees)  1.474***  1.480*** 
  (0.121)  (0.090) 
     
ln(employees2)  0.959***  0.958*** 
  (0.014)  (0.010) 
     
firm collaborates  1.343***  1.422*** 
  (0.108)  (0.098) 
     
firm does R&D  1.778***  1.927*** 
  (0.108)  (0.119) 
     
firm exports  0.831**  0.870** 
  (0.069)  (0.059) 
     
firm is plc  1.197  1.060 
  (0.230)  (0.167) 
     
% qualified managers  1.277***  1.080 
  (0.101)  (0.082) 
     
% management course  1.197*  1.367*** 
  (0.119)  (0.116) 
     
% management training  1.063  1.363*** 
  (0.086)  (0.078) 
     
% management experience  0.903  1.057 
  (0.063)  (0.093) 
     
KIBS  2.372  0.797 
  (2.200)  (0.325) 
     
Observations 7486 7435 7494 7441 
Pseudo R2 0.002 0.041 0.003 0.059 
Log-Likelihood -3729.408 -3565.636 -4029.675 -3777.228 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Results are odds ratios. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications 
include year and SIC3 dummies: some obs dropped because of perfect prediction groups. * = 
significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 5. Results for firms commercialising major new / modified products or 
services: effects of business diversity, 2005-7. 
 
Dependent variable New product / service Modified product/service 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
 
  
  
Migrant diverse firm  1.354*** 1.122 1.286** 1.111 
 (0.141) (0.121) (0.136) (0.132) 
     
Migrant firm 1.028 1.023 1.075 1.081 
 (0.119) (0.119) (0.140) (0.130) 
 
  
  
ln(firm age)  0.632***  0.645*** 
  (0.040)  (0.035) 
     
ln(number of employees)  1.385***  1.418*** 
  (0.118)  (0.126) 
     
ln(employees2)  0.964**  0.959** 
  (0.016)  (0.017) 
     
firm collaborates  1.796***  1.710*** 
  (0.169)  (0.164) 
     
firm does R&D  1.967***  1.918*** 
  (0.162)  (0.186) 
     
firm exports  1.113  1.043 
  (0.094)  (0.109) 
     
firm is plc  1.033  0.890 
  (0.161)  (0.181) 
     
% qualified managers  1.095  1.120 
  (0.114)  (0.132) 
     
% management course  1.190**  1.336*** 
  (0.103)  (0.147) 
     
% management training  1.108  1.147 
  (0.124)  (0.129) 
     
% management experience  1.053  1.005 
  (0.088)  (0.106) 
     
KIBS  0.835  0.713 
  (0.344)  (0.256) 
     
Observations 7434 7370 7354 7301 
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.097 0.032 0.099 
Log-Likelihood -2555.120 -2346.350 -2238.543 -2068.579 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Results are odds ratios. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications 
include year and SIC3 dummies: some obs dropped because of perfect prediction groups. * = 
significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
 
  
203 
Table 7. Results for firms commercialising new equipment/ways of working: 
effects of business diversity, 2005-7. 
 
Dependent variable New equipment New ways of working 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
     
Migrant diverse firm  1.358*** 1.163 1.217** 1.042 
 (0.156) (0.124) (0.116) (0.097) 
     
Migrant firm 1.149 1.185 1.087 1.080 
 (0.157) (0.148) (0.138) (0.121) 
     
ln(firm age)  0.718***  0.660*** 
  (0.041)  (0.035) 
     
ln(number of employees)  1.701***  1.602*** 
  (0.233)  (0.245) 
     
ln(employees2)  0.932***  0.946* 
  (0.024)  (0.028) 
     
firm collaborates  1.645***  1.502*** 
  (0.197)  (0.122) 
     
firm does R&D  1.675***  1.762*** 
  (0.137)  (0.158) 
     
firm exports  0.897  1.036 
  (0.099)  (0.117) 
     
firm is plc  0.849  0.722* 
  (0.188)  (0.130) 
     
% qualified managers  1.120  1.153 
  (0.119)  (0.126) 
     
% management course  1.137  1.151 
  (0.132)  (0.143) 
     
% management training  1.149  1.265*** 
  (0.109)  (0.103) 
     
% management experience  0.840  0.983 
  (0.093)  (0.108) 
     
KIBS  3.082  0.697* 
  (2.620)  (0.138) 
     
Observations 7302 7243 7355 7305 
Pseudo R2 0.027 0.075 0.030 0.087 
Log-Likelihood -2104.292 -1986.532 -2270.112 -2119.610 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Results are raw coefficients, not marginal effects. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  
All specifications include year and SIC3 dummies: some obs dropped because of perfect 
prediction groups. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 7. Results for business innovation and commercialisation: effects of ethnic diverse firms, 2005-7.  
 
Depvar = innovation New product / service Modified product / service New equipment New way of working 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
         
Ethnic diverse firm 1.089 1.211** 1.032 1.077 1.131 1.187** 1.144 1.218*** 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.093) (0.080) (0.118) (0.103) (0.107) (0.091) 
         
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 7529 7476 7510 7457 7486 7435 7494 7441 
Pseudo R2 0.001 0.088 0.001 0.070 0.001 0.041 0.001 0.060 
Log-Likelihood -4253.437 -3855.603 -3981.824 -3682.347 -3735.615 -3565.890 -4037.946 -3776.440 
 
 
Depvar =commercialisation New product / service Modified product/service New equipment New way of working 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
         
Ethnic diverse firm 1.098 1.124 1.039 1.023 1.111 1.141 1.264* 1.288** 
 (0.107) (0.100) (0.108) (0.102) (0.117) (0.119) (0.152) (0.141) 
         
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y 
Observations 7434 7370 7354 7301 7302 7243 7355 7305 
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.097 0.031 0.099 0.025 0.074 0.030 0.088 
Log-Likelihood -2560.089 -2346.266 -2241.551 -2069.171 -2108.029 -1987.466 -2268.986 -2116.702 
 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Results are odds ratios. HAC standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include year and SIC3 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm 
size, log size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified managers, % completed management course, % with 
informal management training, % with management experience, KIBS dummy. Some obs dropped because of perfect prediction groups. * = significant at 
10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 8. Alternative commercialisation results: % turnover from product and/or 
process innovation 2005-7, OLS regressions.  
 
Dependent variable % turnover from any kind of innovation 
(1) (2) 
   
Migrant diverse firm  0.576  
 (1.040)  
   
Migrant firm  1.305  
 (1.375)  
   
Ethnic diverse firm   1.495 
  (1.119) 
   
Controls Y Y 
Observations 2539 2539 
R2 0.039 0.040 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications include year and SIC3 dummies. 
Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, 
exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified managers, % completed management course, % with 
informal management training, % with management experience, KIBS dummy. Some obs 
dropped because of perfect prediction groups. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 9. Results for product innovation by firm knowledge-intensity, 2005-7. 
 
Dependent variable  New product / service Modified product / service (1) (2) (1) (2) 
       
Migrant diverse firm 1.240*** 1.316*** 1.250*** 1.473*** 
  (0.083) (0.073) (0.080) (0.103) 
       
Migrant firm  1.153* 1.025 1.232*** 1.221** 
  (0.098) (0.066) (0.068) (0.105) 
       
Knowledge-intensive 1.168 1.127 0.984 1.034 
(KI) firm (0.114) (0.127) (0.067) (0.070) 
       
KI * migrant diverse   0.888  0.728*** 
    (0.082)  (0.067) 
       
KI * migrant firm    1.313***  1.037 
    (0.129)  (0.101) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7524 7524 7524 7524 
Pseudo R2 0.088 0.088 0.074 0.075 
Log-Likelihood -4170.431 -4167.398 -3934.109 -3931.260 
 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Coefficients are odds ratios, not raw coefficients. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  
All specifications include year and SIC1 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log 
size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified 
managers, % completed management course, % with informal management training, % with 
management experience. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 10. Results for process innovation by knowledge-intensity, 2005-7.  
 
 Dependent variable Major new equipment New way of working (1) (2) (1) (2) 
       
Migrant diverse firm 1.083 1.348* 1.181** 1.363*** 
  (0.161) (0.218) (0.097) (0.091) 
       
Migrant firm  1.169** 1.152 1.190*** 1.145* 
  (0.075) (0.105) (0.062) (0.088) 
       
Knowledge-intensive 0.914 0.978 1.137 1.173* 
(KI) firm (0.076) (0.102) (0.096) (0.100) 
       
KI * migrant diverse   0.636**  0.751** 
    (0.138)  (0.084) 
       
KI * migrant firm    1.057  1.104 
    (0.146)  (0.129) 
       
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7524 7524 7524 7524 
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.039 0.059 0.059 
Log-likelihood -3838.197 -3832.756 -4012.463 -4009.598 
 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Coefficients are odds ratios, not raw coefficients. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  
All specifications include year and SIC1 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log 
size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified 
managers, % completed management course, % with informal management training, % with 
management experience. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
  
208 
Table 11. Results for product innovation within the knowledge-intensive sector. 
 
 Dependent variable 
  
New product/service Modified product/service 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
        
Migrant diverse firm  1.204** 1.279*** 1.256*** 1.473*** 
  (0.096) (0.089) (0.089) (0.102) 
Migrant firm  1.111 1.011 1.218*** 1.222** 
  (0.077) (0.059) (0.066) (0.104) 
        
High-tech services * Diverse  0.876   0.687** 
  (0.198)   (0.127) 
High-tech services * Migrant  1.863***   1.041 
  (0.334)   (0.166) 
        
Management services * Diverse  0.886**   0.781*** 
  (0.053)   (0.053) 
Management services * Migrant  1.261***   1.000 
  (0.074)   (0.094) 
        
Financial services * Diverse  1.212***   0.656*** 
   (0.066)   (0.058) 
Financial services * Migrant  0.772***   0.817** 
   (0.046)   (0.081) 
        
Other services * Diverse  0.799   0.621*** 
   (0.224)   (0.071) 
Other services * Migrant  1.176   0.938 
   (0.237)   (0.119) 
        
High-tech MF * Diverse  0.867**   2.217*** 
   (0.055)   (0.173) 
High-tech MF * Migrant  1.482***   4.986*** 
   (0.120)   (0.518) 
        
Medium-tech MF * Diverse   0.469   0.651*** 
   (0.451)   (0.087) 
Medium-tech * Migrant    1.253   1.580*** 
   (0.379)   (0.183) 
        
High-tech services firm 1.748*** 1.536*** 1.875*** 1.951*** 
  (0.054) (0.141) (0.027) (0.130) 
Management services firm 0.612*** 0.586*** 0.858** 0.874** 
  (0.033) (0.023) (0.056) (0.047) 
Financial services firm 0.952 0.946 0.727*** 0.819*** 
  (0.038) (0.033) (0.013) (0.032) 
Other services firm 0.917*** 0.924 1.139*** 1.270*** 
  (0.024) (0.085) (0.033) (0.072) 
High-tech MF firm 1.858*** 1.845*** 0.665*** 0.386*** 
  (0.140) (0.131) (0.040) (0.021) 
Medium-tech MF firm 1.430** 1.469 1.132 1.073 
  (0.230) (0.417) (0.139) (0.129) 
        
Constant 0.135*** 0.136*** 0.093*** 0.089*** 
  (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.017) 
          
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7524 7524 7524 7524 
Pseudo R2 0.112 0.114 0.088 0.090 
Log-Likelihood -4150.352 -4144.352 -3939.628 -3933.888 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Coefficients are odds ratios, not raw coefficients. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  
Controls fitted as per Table 10. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 12. Results for process innovation within the knowledge-intensive sector. 
 
 Dependent variable New equipment New way of working 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
        
Migrant diverse firm  1.098 1.358* 1.189** 1.370*** 
  (0.162) (0.213) (0.101) (0.092) 
Migrant firm  1.177** 1.162 1.191*** 1.154* 
  (0.077) (0.107) (0.062) (0.089) 
        
High-tech services * Diverse  0.687*   1.020 
  (0.140)   (0.223) 
High-tech services * Migrant  1.368   1.686*** 
  (0.547)   (0.141) 
        
Management services * Diverse  0.652**   0.742*** 
  (0.113)   (0.053) 
Management services * Migrant  1.089   0.969 
  (0.113)   (0.109) 
        
Financial services * Diverse  1.306   0.817*** 
   (0.244)   (0.061) 
Financial services * Migrant  1.296**   1.126 
   (0.134)   (0.095) 
        
Other services * Diverse  0.461***   0.576** 
   (0.122)   (0.129) 
Other services * Migrant  0.827*   0.922 
   (0.092)   (0.155) 
        
High-tech MF * Diverse  0.376***   0.953 
   (0.080)   (0.063) 
High-tech MF * Migrant  0.553***   1.043 
   (0.085)   (0.116) 
        
Medium-tech MF * Diverse   0.597***   2.073** 
   (0.104)   (0.594) 
Medium-tech * Migrant    1.091   2.273** 
   (0.177)   (0.932) 
        
High-tech services firm 1.459*** 1.430*** 1.486*** 1.324*** 
  (0.024) (0.094) (0.026) (0.081) 
Management services firm 1.754*** 1.823*** 1.158*** 1.253*** 
  (0.031) (0.058) (0.041) (0.066) 
Financial services firm 0.822*** 0.730*** 1.145*** 1.160*** 
  (0.021) (0.037) (0.028) (0.053) 
Other services firm 1.074*** 1.278*** 1.221*** 1.382*** 
  (0.028) (0.068) (0.030) (0.094) 
High-tech MF firm 0.546*** 0.756*** 0.462*** 0.444*** 
  (0.063) (0.079) (0.021) (0.015) 
Medium-tech MF firm 0.735 0.763 1.132* 0.886 
  (0.240) (0.269) (0.085) (0.081) 
        
Constant 0.089*** 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.091*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.011) (0.010) 
          
Controls  Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7524 7524 7524 7524 
Pseudo R2 0.044 0.047 0.061 0.062 
Log-Likelihood -3862.953 -3853.315 -4037.755 -4030.885 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Coefficients are odds ratios, not raw coefficients. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  
Controls fitted as per Table 10. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 13. Results for market orientation and owner/partner diversity, 2005-7. 
 
Dependent variable % sales  
local national international 
    
Migrant diverse firm 1.348 -3.666*** 2.318** 
 (1.532) (1.309) (0.934) 
    
Migrant firm 1.718 -4.128*** 2.410*** 
 (1.290) (1.102) (0.786) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 3089 3089 3089 
R2 0.281 0.205 0.185 
Joint sig test chi2 statistic 24604.894 2546.327 1118.698 
P-value of joint sig test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan error independence test 2830.291 
 
 
Dependent variable % sales  
local local local 
    
Ethnic diverse firm 6.493*** -5.743*** -0.750 
 (1.305) (1.117) (0.800) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 3089 3089 3089 
R2 0.286 0.207 0.182 
Joint sig test chi2 statistic 24799.371 2562.068 1102.669 
P-value of joint sig test 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Breusch-Pagan error independence test 2816.633 
 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications include year and SIC3 dummies. 
Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, 
exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified managers, % completed management course, % with 
informal management training, % with management experience, KIBS dummy. Some obs 
dropped because of perfect prediction groups. Breusch-Pagan test of error independence 
follows a chi-squared distribution. H0 = errors in equations are independent.  
* = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 14. Reasons for firm formation: testing the role of migrant founders on firm 
formation motives, 2005-7.  
 
 
Reason for firm formation Entrepreneurial Locked out Other reason 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Migrant, firm founder 1.363** 0.859 0.804* 
 (0.193) (0.188) (0.096) 
    
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 3632 3475 3665 
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.008 0.004 
Log-Likelihood -1986.189 -1017.156 -2224.185 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Coefficients are odds ratios. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications 
include year and SIC3 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log size 
squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified 
managers, % completed management course, % with informal management training, % 
with management experience, KIBS dummy. Some obs dropped because of perfect 
prediction groups. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 15. Instrumental variable results: first stage. 
 
 Dependent variable = instrument  (1) (2) (3) 
        
Migrant diverse firm 1.200 -0.757   
  (0.734) (0.752)   
        
Migrant firm -1.520 1.658   
  (1.044) (1.079)   
        
Ethnic diverse firm     0.353*** 
      (0.066) 
        
Controls Y Y Y 
Observations 1496 1496 1496 
R2 0.055 0.064 0.073 
F-statistic 6.426 6.274 7.092 
Partial R2 for instrument 0.0034 0.0221 0.0199 
Excluded instruments test F-statistic 2.8 16.26 28.51 
P-value for excluded instruments test 0.0613 0.0000 0.0000 
Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test 3.242 29.016 
P-value for under-identification test 0.072 0.000 
Kleibergen-Paap weak identification test 1.494 28.592 
Stock-Yogo 10% critical value, weak ID test 7.03 16.38 
 
Source: LABS / 2001 Census.  
Notes. Sample is for 2007 only. HAC standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications include 
year and SIC3 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log firm size, log size squared, 
collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified managers, % 
completed management course, % with informal management training, % with management 
experience, KIBS dummy. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Table 16. Instrumental variable results: second stage. 
 
Depvar = innovation New product, service Modified product, service New equipment New way of working 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Ethnic diverse firm  -0.098 0.010 0.257 0.465** 
 (0.224) (0.220) (0.214) (0.232) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496 
R2 0.068 0.070 0.012 -0.056 
F 8.941 7.813 4.151 6.420 
     
Commercialisation New product, service Modified product, service New equipment New way of working 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
     
Ethnic diverse firm  0.141 0.224 0.323* 0.426** 
 (0.199) (0.195) (0.187) (0.207) 
     
Controls Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1496 1496 1496 1496 
R2 0.052 0.027 -0.046 -0.087 
F 6.507 5.972 2.664 4.006 
 
Source: LABS.  
Notes: Sample is for 2007 only. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  All specifications include year and partialled SIC3 dummies. Controls fitted: log firm age, log 
firm size, log size squared, collaboration dummy, R&D dummy, exports dummy, PLC dummy, % qualified managers, % completed management course, % with 
informal management training, % with management experience, KIBS dummy. * = significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Appendix A. Classifications: country of birth, ethnicity, CEL 
 
 
Country of birth categories (Labour Force Survey) 
 
UK / GB Algeria 
Belgium Angola 
Denmark Botswana 
France Ethiopia 
Germany Egypt 
Greece Gambia 
Irish republic Ghana 
Italy (excl. Vatican City) Kenya 
Luxembourg Libya 
Netherlands Malawi 
Portugal Mauritius 
Spain Morocco 
Andorra Nigeria 
Austria South Africa 
Cyprus Sierra Leone 
Gibraltar Seychelles 
Finland Somalia 
Liechtenstein Tanzania 
Malta & Gozo Tunisia 
Norway Uganda 
Sweden Zaire 
Switzerland Zambia 
Turkey Zimbabwe 
Former Yugoslavia Other Africa 
Albania Bangladesh 
Bulgaria India 
Former Czechoslovakia Pakistan 
Hungary Iran 
Poland Iraq 
Romania Israel 
Former USSR etc. Lebanon 
Other Europe Other Middle East 
Barbados Burma Myanmar 
Belize China 
Canada Hong Kong 
Other Caribbean Indonesia 
Cuba Japan 
Guyana Korea 
Jamaica Macau / Macao 
Trinidad & Tobago Malaysia 
USA Philippines 
West Indies Singapore 
Other Central America Sri Lanka 
Mexico Vietnam 
Other South America Other Asia 
Argentina Australia 
Brazil New Zealand 
Chile Caribbean Commonwealth 
Columbia Other New Commonwealth 
Uruguay Rest of the world 
Venezuala  
Source: LFS. 
Note: Categories are taken from the FLS variable CRYOX. At sea / in the air and stateless dropped in this 
analysis.  
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Office of National Statistics ethnicity categories (Labour Force Survey, Census) 
 
ETHCEN15 categories 
British 
Other White 
White and Black Caribbean 
White and Black African 
White and Asian 
Other Mixed 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Other Asian 
Black Caribbean 
Black African 
Black Other 
Chinese 
Other  
 
ETHNIC categories 
White  
Black Caribbean 
Black African 
Black Other 
Indian 
Pakistani 
Bangladeshi 
Chinese 
Other  
 
Source: ONS.  
Note: Categories in the top panel are taken from the 2001 Census variable ETHCEN15. Categories in the 
bottom panel are taken from the 1991 Census variable ETHNIC.  
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ONOMAP Cultural-Ethnic-Linguistic (CEL) sub-groups  
 
AFRIKAANS LEBANESE 
ALBANIAN MALAYSIAN 
AMERICAN MUSLIM NORTH AFRICAN 
ARMENIAN MUSLIM STANS 
BALKAN NATIVE AMERICAN 
BANGLADESHI NIGERIAN 
BLACK OTHER AFRICAN 
BLACK SOUTHERN AFRICAN OTHER BALTIC 
CELTIC OTHER EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC 
CHINESE OTHER EUROPEAN 
CONGOLESE OTHER MUSLIM 
CZECH & SLOVAK OTHER NORDIC 
DANISH OTHER SOUTH ASIAN 
DUTCH NORWEGIAN 
ENGLISH PAKISTANI 
ERITREAN PAKISTANI KASHMIR 
ETHIOPIAN POLISH 
FINNISH PORTUGUESE 
FRENCH ROMANIAN 
GERMAN RUSSIAN 
GHANAIAN SCOTTISH 
GREEK SERBIAN 
HINDI NOT INDIAN SIERRA LEONIAN 
HISPANIC SIKH 
HUNGARIAN SOMALIAN 
INDIAN HINDI SPANISH 
INTERNATIONAL SRI LANKAN 
IRANIAN SWEDISH 
IRISH TURKISH 
ITALIAN UGANDAN 
JAPANESE UKRANIAN 
JEWISH VIETNAMESE 
JEWISH AND ARMENIAN WELSH 
KOREAN  
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes: Categories refer to ONOMAP subgroups, which aggregate more detailed ‘types’. ‘Other …’ 
subgroups are composed as follows. 1) ‘OTHER MUSLIM’ subgroup includes CEL name types ‘BALKAN 
MUSLIM’, ‘MALAYSIAN MUSLIM’, ‘MUSLIM INDIAN’, ‘SUDANESE’, ‘WEST AFRICAN MUSLIM’, ‘OTHER 
MUSLIM’ (SMALLER MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES, N/AFRICAN COUNTRIES, CENTRAL ASIAN 
REPS). 2) ‘OTHER SOUTH ASIAN’ includes CEL name types ‘ASIAN CARIBBEAN’, ‘BENGALI’, 
‘BHUTANESE’, ‘GUYANESE ASIAN’, ‘KENYAN ASIAN’, ‘NEPALESE’, ‘PARSI’, ‘SEYCHELLOIS’, 
‘SOUTH ASIAN’, ‘TAMIL’.  3) 'JEWISH' includes CEL name types ‘JEWISH / ASHKENAZI’, ‘SEPHARDIC 
JEWISH’ 4) ‘OTHER EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC’ includes CEL name types ‘BURMESE’, ‘CAMBODIAN’, 
‘FIJIAN’, ‘HAWAIIAN’, ‘LAOTIAN’,‘MAORI’, ‘MAURITIAN’, ‘POLYNESIAN’, ‘SAMOAN’, ‘SINGAPOREAN’, 
‘SOLOMON ISLANDER’, ‘OTHER SOUTH EAST ASIAN’ , ‘THAI’, ‘TIBETIAN’, ‘TONGAN’, ‘TUVALUAN’, 
‘OTHER EAST ASIAN & PACIFIC’. 5) ‘OTHER AFRICAN’ includes CEL name types ‘BENINESE’, 
‘BOTSWANAN’, ‘BURUNDIAN’, ‘CAMEROONESE’, ‘GAMBIAN’, ‘GUINEAN’, ‘IVORIAN’, ‘KENYAN’, 
‘LIBERIAN’, ‘MALAGASY’, ‘MALAWIAN’, ‘NAMIBIAN’, ‘RWANDAN’, ‘SENEGALESE’, ‘SWAZILANDER’, 
‘TANZANIAN’, ‘ZAIREAN’, ‘ZAMBIAN’, ‘ZIMBABWEAN’, Other African not otherwise specified. 6) ‘OTHER 
BALKAN’ includes CEL name types ‘BOSNIAN AND HERZEGOVIAN’, ‘BULGARIAN’, ‘CROATIAN’, 
‘MACEDONIAN’, ‘MONTENEGRIN’, ‘SLOVENIAN’, ‘BALKAN / OTHER’. 7) ‘OTHER BALTIC’ includes 
‘ESTONIAN’, ‘LATVIAN’, ‘LITHUANIAN’, ‘BALTIC / OTHER’. 8) INTERNATIONAL includes otherwise 
unclassified names.  
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ONOMAP Geographical Origin Zones 
 
Africa 
Americas 
British Isles 
Central Asia 
Central Europe 
East Asia 
Eastern Europe 
Middle East 
Northern Europe 
South Asia 
Southern Europe  
Rest of the World 
 
Source: ONOMAP.  
Notes: Geographical origin zones are one of several elements used to construct full CEL typologies. They 
are used here as rough proxies for geographical ‘roots’.
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Appendix B. ONOMAP Cultural-Ethnic-Linguistic classification 
 
 
 
ONOMAP is an example of a Cultural-Ethnic-Linguistic (CEL) classification system.  CEL 
classifications are designed to be objective and multidimensional typologies of ethnic / 
cultural identity (see Mateos (2007) for a review of recent CEL research). ONOMAP itself 
was originally designed for mining patient data for the UK National Health Service, and 
classifies individuals according to most likely cultural, ethnic and linguistic characteristics 
identified from forenames, surnames and forename-surname combinations.76  
 
ONOMAP is built from a very large names database drawn from UK Electoral 
Registers plus a number of other contemporary and historical sources, covering 500,000 
forenames and a million surnames across 28 countries (Mateos et al., 2007). These are 
then algorithmically grouped together, combining information on geographical area, 
religion, and language. Separate classifications of surnames, forenames and surname-
forename combinations are produced. This gives 185 basic CEL categories (or ‘types’) 
which can be aggregated, broken down into constituent parts (such as likely geographical 
origin) and crosswalked onto other classifications (such as ONS ethnic groups).77  For this 
thesis I use a typology of 67 CEL subgroups (for the 2001-6 urban areas analysis), and 
two constituent typologies for the analysis of ethnic inventors – 13 geographical origin 
zones and nine ONS ethnic groups.  
 
ONOMAP exploits similarities and differences between name families – so that 
‘John Smith’ is more likely to be ethnically British than French:  
 
Each name … [is] assigned an Onomap type together with a probability score that 
summarises the likelihood of a particular name belonging to such a type. Such a 
probability score is derived from the share of the population with that 
(fore/sur)name that also has a (sur/fore)name belonging to the same Onomap 
type. When classifying a list of names, the Onomap software assesses both 
components of a person’s name (forename and surname). In cases of conflict 
between … forename and surname it assigns the Onomap type with the highest 
probability score. (Lahka et al (forthcoming), p3) 
                                               
76
 For more details see http://www.onomap.org/FAQ.aspx.   
77
 Names information is drawn from 1998 and 2004 GB Electoral Registers, Northern Ireland Electoral 
Register 2003, Irish Electoral Register 2003, plus electoral data from Australia (2002), NZ (2002), United 
States (1997) and Canada (1996). Experian MOSAIC geo-demographic data and the Experian Consumer 
Dynamics datafile are used to boost the sample. This produces 25360 surnames and 299797 first names. 
These are classified using a combination of triage, spatio-temporal analysis, geo-demographic analysis, 
text mining, ‘name-to-ethnicity’ techniques from population registers and researching international name 
frequencies. ‘British names’ are taken as those originating in the British Isles (including Ireland) or arriving 
there before 1700.  
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 As with country of birth and ONS ethnic groups, ONOMAP has pros and cons as a 
proxy for ethnic / cultural identity. It offers its own version of Aspinall’s ‘granularity – utility’ 
trade-off (Aspinall, 2009). Like all CEL approaches, ONOMAP has the advantage of being 
multidimensional and available at different levels of detail. Because ONOMAP uses 
surname and forename information, it is able to deal with many names with multiple 
cultural origins, and the alteration and/or adoption of names traditional to the UK.78 All of 
these factors give it both high granularity and high utility.  
 
 However, ONOMAP has three important limitations. First, it has the drawback of 
only observing objective characteristics of identity – the most conservative interpretation is 
that it provides information on most likely cultural / ethnic identity. This is potentially an 
important limitation to utility, although robustness tests using Census birth-country and 
ethnicity information indicate that ONOMAP ascribes identity with a high degree of 
reliability (Mateos et al., 2007).  
 
Second, ONOMAP does not distinguish countries with a common language, so that 
North American and Australasian-origin individuals are largely identified as British-origin 
(or unclassified). This is potentially a significant limitation on both granularity and utility. In 
practice, resulting measurement error is likely to be small. Although the largest 
concentrations of these groups are in London, their spatial distribution is not very different 
from minority communities as a whole. These groups also represent a relatively small 
share of the UK’s minority population: for example, Labour Force Survey figures suggest 
that American, Canadian, Australian and New Zealand migrants comprised just 8.84% of 
migrants in 1994, falling to 7.98% in 2004.  
 
 Third, and most seriously, ONOMAP is unable to distinguish migrants from 
members of existing, established minority communities. In a few cases it could provide 
indirect identification – for example, when minority groups are very new and known to be 
composed of migrants. The rest of the time this is a major granularity limitation.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
78
 The author’s name is one of the more challenging to classify. According to Mateos (by email), ‘Nathan is 
unclassified at the moment in Onomap, perhaps because there are conflicting frequencies in India, New 
Zealand and the UK. "Max" is classified as "Jewish", probably because it is common in this community in 
the UK compared to the national average. Therefore you would be classified as ‘Jewish’.” This is a good 
proxy for my actual British/English/secular Jewish sense of self.   
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Appendix C. Urban and rural Travel to Work Areas typology. 
 
 
In order to identify urban areas in the UK, I use the ‘primary urban’ Travel to Work Areas 
(TTWAs) developed by Gibbons et al (2011). Travel to Work Areas are contiguous zones 
designed to approximate functional labour markets. Specifically, they require that 75% of 
the workers in a given zone also live in that zone, and that 75% of the residents in that 
zone also work in it (Bond and Coombes, 2007).  
 
 As a starting point Gibbons and colleagues take the most recent set of TTWAs, 
which were constructed by Newcastle University in 2007, based on 2001 Census data. 
Many TTWAs represent distinct cities and their hinterlands. From the 243 existing areas, 
Gibbons et al identify 79 ‘primary urban’ TTWAs. Primary urban TTWAs are those centred 
around, or intersecting urban footprints with populations of 100,000 or more (for example, 
London, Manchester or Plymouth).  
 
A map of the 79 primary urban TTWAs is show in Figure 2 below.  
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Figure 2. ‘Primary Urban’ Travel to Work Areas. 
 
 
 
Source: Gibbons et al (2011).  
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